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SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC

By John Foster Dulles

THE United States has now signed four major treaties with Pacific nations. One of these is the Treaty of Peace between 48 Allied Powers and Japan. The other three are security treaties, one with the Philippines, another with Australia and New Zealand and the third with Japan.

The Treaty of Peace with Japan has two great purposes. It is first of all designed to close an old war on terms which will not provoke another war. To that end, the victors have made a treaty of reconciliation, eliminating from it all trace of hatred and vengefulness. They sought, both in the manner of their negotiation and in the substance of their terms, to avoid the humiliations and the discriminations which victors usually impose upon the vanquished either because passion supplants their reason or because they think that is the way to discourage a defeated nation from going to war again. History shows that such a course in fact spurs the vanquished to seek revenge.

The Treaty of Peace with Japan is designed to break the vicious cycle of war, victory, peace and war. Whether it will do so no one can say surely, because no single act of itself is sufficient to guarantee future peace. One can prophesy with confidence, however, that nothing in the peacemaking will cause Japan to turn against the victors, as Germany did after the First World War.

It is something to have made a peace which avoids grievous blunders. There was, however, a second and even more difficult task. That was to translate Japan from a defeated enemy into a positive contributor to collective security in the Pacific as against the new menace of aggression which had arisen even before the old war was formally ended.

II. JAPAN'S COMMITTAL TO THE FREE WORLD

Japan's strategic position and her human and industrial potential are such that there can be no adequate security for anyone in the West Pacific unless the Japanese sincerely desire to be sus-

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taining members of the free world. That, happily, is now the case.

The Japanese people have known the magnanimity coupled with strength shown by the Occupation under General MacArthur. They have seen Western leadership, and Soviet obstruction, in the matter of peace. They received consideration and courtesy in the peace negotiations and at the San Francisco Conference. And the terms of the peace have revealed to them that the free world has an unexpected capacity to exercise control over the evil emotions; to forgive those who, when they gained victories, did not themselves exercise such control; and to extend a hand to lift the fallen to a place of dignity and equality in the family of nations.

The United States has considered it axiomatic that no position that Japan took and no promises that Japan gave would have durability except as they grew out of the free will of the Japanese people. When I was in Japan in February 1951, I pointed out to the Japanese people that the principal deterrent to armed aggression now lay in the power of the United States. I said that we did not propose to use that power merely to protect ourselves but were prepared to combine it with that of others in mutual committals in accord with the U. N. Charter, so that the power which protects us will also protect others. Japan, I said, if she wishes, can share collective protection, but, I went on to say, "That is not a choice which the United States is going to impose upon Japan. It is an invitation. The choice must be Japan's own choice."

The Occupation authorities have scrupulously abstained from exerting any pressure whatsoever upon the Japanese nation in relation to the Treaty of Peace or the Security Treaty. These treaties have been fully and critically examined and lengthily debated in Japan in the public press, at public meetings and in the Diet. The Diet has now ratified both treaties by a vote which was overwhelming. The votes in opposition came principally from a handful of Communist deputies and from members of the Socialist Party. As a matter of pacifist and neutralist Party principle, the Socialists voted against the Security Treaty; but most of them voted in favor of the Treaty of Peace, despite the fact that the Party line had been against a "separate" peace, *i.e.* a peace not participated in by the Soviet Union and Communist China.

It is possible to proceed on the assumption that the Japanese nation genuinely wants to be a sustaining member of the free world. The United States is proceeding on that assumption.

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III. JAPAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The Treaty of Peace contemplates that Japan will promptly apply for membership in the United Nations, and each of the 44 United Nations members who signed the Treaty can be counted on to support that application. However, delays may intervene and it seemed prudent to provide, by the Peace Treaty itself, that in security matters Japan would have privileges and responsibilities similar to those of members. So Japan undertakes, by Article 5(a) of the Treaty, "to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter and to refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations may take preventive or enforcement action."

In return, the Allied Powers, by Article 5(c), recognize that Japan, "as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense referred to in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and that Japan may voluntarily enter into collective security arrangements." Article 6 goes on to provide for the ending of the Occupation, but it further stipulates that: "Nothing in this provision shall, however, prevent the stationing or retention of foreign armed forces in Japanese territory under or in consequence of any bilateral or multilateral agreements which have been or may be made between one or more of the Allied Powers, on the one hand, and Japan on the other."

The provisions of Article 5(a), dealing with assistance to the United Nations, were given concrete content by an exchange of notes of September 8, 1951, between the United States and Japanese Governments, whereby the Japanese Government gave assurance that "if and when the forces of a Member or Members of the United Nations are engaged in any United Nations action in the Far East after the Treaty of Peace comes into force, Japan will permit and facilitate the support in and about Japan, by the Member or Members, of the forces engaged in such United Nations actions." This, of course, has particular relevancy to Korea.

A further foundation for international security in the Pacific area is the provision of Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace which authorizes the United States to propose to the United Nations a trusteeship of the Ryukyus, with the United States as administering authority. The Ryukyu Islands include Okinawa, where the United States presently maintains an important naval and air establishment, and, under trusteeship, the United States would be obligated "to ensure that the trust territory shall play

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its part in the maintenance of international peace and security." (U. N. Charter, Article 84.)

As a result of these Peace Treaty provisions, Japan, although not yet a member of the United Nations, will coöperate in any U. N. action of a preventive or enforcement character and will in important ways contribute "facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." (U. N. Charter, Art. 43.) Also, Japan gains the right to collective self-defense, so that, though now disarmed, she need not be a vacuum of power which would attract aggression.

IV. THE UNITED STATES–JAPAN SECURITY TREATY

By making its bilateral Treaty with the United States, Japan at once exercises her right of collective self-defense. Under this Treaty, United States sea, air and land forces and Japanese facilities will be combined for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and for the security of Japan.

This Security Treaty is described in its Preamble as a "provisional arrangement." That is because, as I explained in Tokyo on February 11, 1951, the United States does not make "definitive" security arrangements with other countries unless they undertake to provide "continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid" in accordance with the basic policy laid down by the "Vandenberg" Senate Resolution of June 11, 1948.

The Japanese Government felt that, while it could provide "facilities" for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security, it could not at the present time commit itself to "continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid" in the form of military force. That was partly because of economic considerations, partly because Japan's first security task is to create internal security through an adequate police force and coastal patrol and partly because of the provisions of the Japanese Constitution which, in renouncing war, states that "land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potentials, will never be maintained."

There is divided opinion in Japan as to the correct interpretation and application of this provision. Many Japanese believe that their Constitution does not prevent Japan from exercising what the U. N. Charter calls the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense" and that Japan could contribute to collective security forces called for by the United Nations or created pursuant to authorization of the U. N. Charter, particularly if

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this Japanese contributon, by reason of its composition and the nature of its responsibilities, could never be an instrument for national aggrandizement or aggression. However, this is a matter which the Japanese must decide for themselves.

In view of the Japanese position, the United States was not disposed to assume obligations which Japan could not now reciprocate. Therefore the United States assumes no treaty obligation to maintain land, air and sea forces in and about Japan or to guarantee the security and independence of Japan, although this will be a practical result of the exercise by the United States of its right to station its forces in Japan.

The Security Treaty between the United States and Japan contains a clause which assimilates "large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside Power or Powers" to "armed attack from without." The United States forces in Japan are authorized—but not required—"at the express request of the Japanese Government" to assist to meet such indirect aggression.

This is a novel provision which has met with some criticism on the ground that there might be a conspiracy on the part of the United States and Japanese Governments to keep political power against the will of the Japanese people. However, in her present disarmed condition Japan is not in a position herself to deal with large-scale internal riots which might be caused through the instigation or intervention of an outside power. That is a known and proclaimed Communist threat, and not an empty one, as we can see in several Pacific and Asian countries. It is particularly a threat to Japan, for the Soviet Government has withheld many Japanese prisoners of war for indoctrination and possible secret introduction into Japan for revolutionary activity. Where such a danger exists it should be faced frankly and dealt with adequately. That may involve dispositions which are capable of abuse; but all power is subject to abuse. In this case the risk of abuse is demonstrably negligible. If the United States had wanted to be in a position to rule Japan, it need only have refrained from exerting itself to end the powers which it possessed under the Surrender Terms.

The dangerous conditions of our time require that those in common peril place trust in each other's integrity of purpose. There can be confidence that the United States will live up to the provisions of the Treaty of Peace which recognize that, hereafter,

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Japanese sovereignty resides in "the Japanese people" and not in foreign bayonets.

The United States–Japan Security Treaty is, indeed, necessary to give reality to that sovereignty. Forty-eight Allied nations recognized that by signing a Peace Treaty which authorized the Security Treaty. Sovereignty which is not defensible is an empty husk. Japan, disarmed physically, legally and psychologically, is not now in a position to defend herself. Left alone, she would be surrounded and menaced by a Great Power of demonstrated aggressiveness and she would not, in that position, be able to lead an independent existence.

Of course, collective security and interdependence always and everywhere involve sovereign adjustments. But these are a small price for Japan to pay for security worked out with a nation of her own choosing, which has amply demonstrated respect for Japan's sovereignty and which, to a unique degree, possesses power to deter aggression.

V. THE AUSTRALIA–NEW ZEALAND–PHILIPPINE TREATIES

At the same time that it was negotiating peace with Japan, the United States also negotiated security treaties with Australia and New Zealand and with the Philippines. These two security treaties are much alike. The parties to each treaty declare that "an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety." This language goes back to the classic language of the Monroe Doctrine. It differs from the language of the North Atlantic Treaty which provides that "an armed attack against one . . . shall be considered an attack against them all." This language of the North Atlantic Treaty gave rise to an extended constitutional debate in the United States Senate, a debate in which I participated. Many Senators felt that if the United States by treaty determined that an attack upon Western Europe would be the same as an attack upon the United States, the President would then be under an affirmative duty to use our armed forces for an area defense of Western Europe just as for the defense of the United States itself. Some Senators felt that this unduly enlarged the responsibility and authority of the President as against that of the Congress.[1]

It seemed unnecessary and unwise to revive this domestic constitutional issue in connection with the Pacific security treaties.

[1] See *Missouri v. Holland*, 252 U. S. 416 (1920), where the Supreme Court indicated that treaties can alter the Constitutional division of power.

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Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines, with good reason, were quite satisfied with the security which would result from a treaty declaration, in Monroe Doctrine language, that an armed attack upon them would be considered by the United States as dangerous to itself and that it would act to meet that danger "in accordance with its constitutional processes."

Both the Security Treaty with Australia and New Zealand and the Mutual Assistance Treaty with the Philippines bind the parties, in accordance with the Vandenberg Resolution, "separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid" to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."

The United States–Philippine Treaty is primarily significant in converting a unilateral relationship into one of mutuality. The historic relationship between the peoples of the Philippines and of the United States is such that, as President Truman said in his statement of April 18, 1951, "the whole world knows that the United States recognizes that an armed attack on the Philippines would be looked upon by the United States as dangerous to its own peace and safety and that it would act accordingly." However, the time had come to put that relationship into a treaty of mutuality, which would be responsive to the dignity of the Philippines' newly attained sovereignty.

Both the Australia–New Zealand and Philippine Treaties define an armed attack to include an attack upon any land under the jurisdiction of the parties in the Pacific and also an attack on its "armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific." For the purposes of the treaties, then, there would be an armed attack on the United States if there were an armed attack upon Okinawa, which the United States is administering, or an attack on the American armed forces stationed in or about Japan under the Security Treaty with that country. In this practical sense the three security treaties and the Japanese Peace Treaty interlock.

VI. THE OFFSHORE ISLAND CHAIN

From our standpoint, the arrangements which we have been considering add up to a determination—with the concurrence and help of the peoples concerned—to make safe the offshore island chain which swings south through Japan, the Ryukyus, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. In addition, the President has declared that the United States will not permit the sta-

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tus of Formosa, now the seat of the National Government of China, to be changed by force, and the Pacific Fleet has been instructed accordingly. That sum total is an impressive development of United States policy and a formidable deterrent to the domination of the Pacific by Communist imperialism. It may be asked why the result has been brought about by a series of separate treaties, rather than by a single treaty which would define the offshore island chain as a security zone in much the same way that the North Atlantic Treaty and the Rio Pact define a specific geographical area for common security purposes.

There were several reasons against doing that. A present reason—though we hope only a temporary one— is that the Australian, New Zealand and Philippine peoples have memories of Japanese aggression which are so vivid that they are reluctant to create a Mutual Security Pact which will include Japan. They fear Japanese aggression, which they know as an actuality, more than Russian or Chinese aggression, which they have never experienced. They want to see the United States share responsibility for the security of Japan and keep a sea and air base at Okinawa. But they want this not primarily because of Russia but because they believe that this provides a shield between them and Japan. Also, they hope that the United States will permanently assume the principal responsibility for sea and air defense of the Japan area, so that any future Japanese force would be land-bound and unable, by itself, to be aggressive overseas. Thus while they welcome our participation in the defense of Japan, and recognize that if our forces there were attacked that would be a danger to themselves, they hesitate at the present time to engage themselves directly in what their people might misinterpret as a sort of "alliance" with Japan.

Another reason against defining the offshore island chain as a distinct geographical area for security purposes is that the dimensions of the area are not adequate. There are significant areas in East Asia not included and we do not want to increase the danger to which they are exposed by drawing a line which leaves them out. That might seem to imply that while it would be dangerous to an aggressor to cross the line, he need not fear so long as he does not cross it.

On the other hand, it is not at this time practicable to draw a line which would bring all the free peoples of the Pacific and East Asia into a formal mutual security area. As we have seen, even

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such countries as Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines do not as yet desire contractual security arrangements which include the Japanese Government. The future of Korea, as an independent, united and free nation, is obscure, and there is need for further United Nations action before Korea could be brought into a regional security pact. Those Asian nations such as Indonesia and Burma which have just won liberation from Japanese aggression and political freedom from Western colonialism have hesitated to assume security relationships either with Japan or with the Western Powers. As a practical matter, in Indo-China and Malaya assistance must be given largely through France and the United Kingdom, a procedure which many in Asia find repellent, as promoting "colonial imperialism." Some countries are as yet unable or unwilling to qualify for definite security arrangements under the "Vandenberg formula" of "continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid." Lastly, but perhaps not least, is the fact that the United States should not assume formal commitments which overstrain its present capabilities and give rise to military expectations we could not fulfill, particularly in terms of land forces. The security treaties now made involve only islands, where security is strongly influenced by sea and air power.

All of the parties to the present Pacific security treaties have, however, made it clear that they do not regard the present situation as adequate or final. The Australia–New Zealand Treaty and the Philippine Treaty both refer to "the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area." The United States–Japan Security Treaty is not only described as "provisional" but it will expire when "there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japanese area."

VII. THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF PACIFIC SECURITY

But treaty words in themselves have little power to compel action. Treaties of alliance and of mutual aid mean little except as they spell out what the people concerned would do anyway.

The Rio Pact reflected a sense of common destiny as between the Americas which had existed for 125 years before it was formalized. The North Atlantic Treaty reflected a sense of common

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destiny as between the peoples of the West, which grew out of a community of race, religion and political institutions, and it had been tested in two world wars before it was formalized. The security treaties which we have now made with Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Japan reflect the fact that the historical events of the recent past have developed a sense of common destiny between our nation and each of those others. But that element does not clearly exist as yet elsewhere in the Pacific area.

The further steps require, first of all, not more treaties, but more will to act together. This calls for a dissipating of unreasoned fears which now divide the free nations, negate their sense of common destiny and jeopardize continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid.

One disrupting fear is that felt by the peoples whom Japan assaulted that Japan will again be an aggressor. These peoples are not yet aware of the change of mood in Japan nor do they appreciate that the best insurance against a possible renewal of aggression is coöperation between Japan and others along the lines of the United States–Japan Security Treaty.

To do away with the present fear, the Japanese must exert themselves to win the good will of those they have injured.

They will have the opportunity under the Treaty of Peace to make certain amends to the nations they occupied and damaged —for example, the Philippines and Indonesia. In commercial and fishing arrangements contemplated by the Treaty of Peace, and in the observance of "internationally accepted fair trade practices," the Japanese Government and people will have ample opportunity to show that they can and will be good neighbors.

Another corroding fear is felt by the Japanese themselves. They fear that the loss of all their colonies makes the economy of their homeland so precarious that they will not be able to do anything substantial by way of just reparation or develop their own capacity for defense. This fear the free world, which made the Japanese peace, can dissipate. I do not mean that the United States should go on subsidizing Japan as during the Occupation, when in five years we put up $2,000,000,000. But Japan should be given the opportunity to earn her living in the free world by means of what the Potsdam Surrender Terms promised, namely, "access to raw materials" and "participation in world trade relations."

Japan has trained manpower and a large though now some-

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what obsolete industrial capacity. The country can be a useful workshop, not only in relation to the war in Korea, where Japan has been earning about $25,000,000 a month, but when the time comes eventually to rehabilitate Korea. Also, trade between Japan and Southeast Asia and Pacific countries can be mutually advantageous. The Philippines, Malaya and Indonesia can provide food and raw materials needed in Japan, and she in turn can manufacture capital goods needed by these countries for their development. There also are many overseas markets where the type of consumer goods which Japan is equipped and accustomed to produce will be welcome. But if she is to continue politically independent of the Communist world she must have the opportunity within the free world to get essential food and raw materials and the markets—perhaps on a quota basis—which will produce the kind of money needed to pay for these imports. She should be encouraged to rebuild a merchant marine sufficient to carry more fully her exports and imports. The fact that only about 20 percent of these have been carried in recent years in Japanese bottoms accounts largely for the unbalance in Japan's economy which the United States has had to meet during the Occupation. This is a time of economic hazard for everyone, but there are no insuperable obstacles to Japan's development of a robust economy.

Many Orientals fear that Westerners are incapable of coöperating with them on a basis of political, economic and social equality, and this fear divides the East and West. It has a long background of growth, and Communist propaganda in Asia concentrates on keeping it alive and whipping it up. The Communists scream that there cannot be a genuine "Asia for the Asiatics" until every vestige of Western influence has been driven out of Asia—leaving, of course, "Asia for the Russians."

The future relationship between Americans and Japanese will provide a crucial test, with all of Asia watching. In Japan, our soldiers will have to shift from the rôle of conquerors to one of coöperation in friendly association with the Japanese as sovereign equals. It would be hard to devise a more difficult test. To pass it will require an extraordinary effort, unique in history.

Much of Asia is skeptical that the effort will be made or if made can be successful. India does not believe in the possibility of Americans having friendly coöperation on this spot with Japanese as equals. That was a principal reason why the Indian Govern-

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ment wanted the Japanese Peace Treaty to require that United States forces be wholly withdrawn from Japan and from the Ryukyus; and it refused to sign the treaty when its views in this respect were not met.

We must not let this Indian foreboding come true. We can hope that on further reflection India will coöperate to promote friendly association of East and West rather than seem to align herself with those who use fear and hatred to create a disunity which only benefits the new Communist imperialism. Most of the Allied nations in Asia did not endorse the Indian position. Instead they put faith in the ability of East and West to coöperate in Japan. We must do our part to justify that faith. I am confident we shall succeed. We must if we are to avoid being expelled from Japan and seeing all Asia consolidated against us. We usually meet the challenges which are great and apparent.

VIII. THE PATH AHEAD

This analysis of the problem of developing an adequate security system in the area of the Pacific and East Asia may seem to some to prove that where the difficulties are so great no early progress can be made. I believe this conclusion would be false. The difficulties ahead are great, but not nearly as great as those which seemed to be in the way of drawing up a peace with Japan in which 49 nations representing every continent, race and civilization would concur. Nevertheless, in a year after the United States decided to go ahead, that result was achieved. We were successful because we were resolute on reaching a goal which not only was vital to the welfare of the free world but was demanded by considerations of justice and morality. Precisely the same considerations call for the creation in the Pacific area of a more adequate security system. It is true that there is no point in building a superstructure until it has a solid foundation on which to rest. But the elements of a foundation already exist in terms of a common peril; a genuine integrity of purpose on the part of the West; and an opportunity for the economic and social advancement of underdeveloped areas which will continue only if there is a sense of security.

The initial task is to bring about in Asia a clearer understanding by both governments and peoples as to where the true peril lies and how security can be won. As far as the peacetime relations between Japan and the United States are concerned, the

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crucial test will occur within a matter of months rather than of years. The obstacles are all of a kind which can be overcome by resolution and intelligent effort. Certainly the circumstances amply warrant and require such an effort.

Stalin proclaimed, in 1925, that the "amalgamation" of the Asian peoples into the political orbit of the Soviet Union was a primary goal of Soviet policy; that Asia is "the road to victory in the West;" and that, with Japan, the Soviet Union would be "invincible."

No one can predict with confidence, of course, just what the present plans of the Politburo may turn out to be. However, nothing has happened over the past 25 years to suggest that there has been any basic deviation from the strategy of seeking to consolidate and exploit the vast human and natural resources of Asia and the industrial power of Japan before there is any open assault on the West. That strategy is still taught in the Soviet Communist "bible" of Stalin's selected writings. It is reflected in Soviet Communist conduct.

In Europe, Soviet imperialism seized on the unexpected chance, provided by World War II, to absorb Eastern Europe, and from there it threatens Western Europe. But the threat has not been carried into violent action, despite the great preponderance in military power possessed by the Soviet Union in Europe. In Asia there is violent action. Mao Tse-tung, on returning from Moscow in February 1950, broadcast an appeal to the peoples of non-Communist Asia to rise up in armed struggle in coöperation with the Soviet Union. We have seen that armed struggle in progress in China, Korea, Indo-China, Malaya, Burma, the Philippines and Indonesia. We heard the Soviet Delegation at San Francisco brazenly demand that Japan should be kept virtually disarmed, that all Western power should be permanently withdrawn, and that Japan's surrounding waters and the straits which divide her own home islands should be open, for all times, only to warships based on the Sea of Japan, which means the Red Pacific fleet at Vladivostok.

It is in Asia that Russian imperialism finds its most powerful expression. The countermeasures taken in 1951 have been good, but they are not good enough to justify a mood of relaxation. We must go forward to achieve greater unity and greater strength.

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THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT SEEN FROM AUSTRALIA

By Robert Gordon Menzies

EVERY country's international thinking is profoundly affected and perhaps finally shaped by its own history, particularly its experience in time of war. The United States itself provides an admirable example. The First World War ultimately engaged American forces on the grand scale; and those forces played a great part in the getting of victory. It was, paradoxically, American leadership which did so much to create what turned out to be a non-American League of Nations. But, the war over, isolationism once more grew and prospered in the United States. The war was felt by many to have been a European war. It brought, after a decade of prosperity, a world economic depression in which even the powerful United States was, for a time, an almost helpless victim. These things inevitably had their effect on public thinking.

In 1941, when the Second World War had just surmounted its first great crisis, I visited the United States and found a great nation, one of the most powerful of all human history, almost equally divided on the question whether Hitler's war was America's war. Pearl Harbor settled all that. Pearl Harbor was nearer home than Europe had ever been in 1917 and 1918. The Japanese bombs not only blasted American battleships; they blasted isolationism to pieces, and ushered in a period, still enduring, of American world action, and therefore world responsibility, and therefore world thinking. If any historian of the future compares the American policy and the American inner consciousness of the five years after the First World War with those of the five years after the Second World War, he will find what I believe will be the key to the world history of the rest of the twentieth century.

This revolutionary event in international affairs seems to me to demonstrate my initial thesis. The United States has irrevocably gone out into the world because, in economic crisis or in battle, the world has gone into the United States.

Apply this reasoning to Australia, and you will understand some of what may seem to you to be the extravagances of the Australian view about Japan.

The First World War, costly as it was to Australia in human

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life, was fought thousands of miles away. In the second, Japanese forces successfully invaded Australian territory in Papua and New Guinea, and but for the crucial naval victory in the Coral Sea might have secured a footing on the north of Australia herself. A great division of the Australian Imperial Force, one-fourth of our entire expeditionary strength, was captured at Singapore. The Japanese soldier proved himself an uncivilized enemy and a brutal and inhuman jailer. Nobody in this generation of Australians will ever forget the instances, all too well attested, of brave soldiers murdered after capture, of nurses tortured and destroyed, of prisoners-of-war starved, enslaved, beaten, driven mad, driven into the grave. We are, numerically, a small country. It is, perhaps, for that reason that each of us has at least some friends who suffered under the Japanese and bear the marks of their misery.

Once these things are understood, it is simple to understand that the instinctive reaction of Australia to any proposal for a Japanese peace settlement is, "Keep them down! Don't let them rearm! Don't trust them!" It is true that history proves that such reactions are ephemeral and sometimes dangerous. But we are not living in a world of historians; we are living in a world of men and women, of widowed wives and bereaved mothers; a world tenaciously attached to a justice which precedes mercy, though it may be tempered by it.

II. THE JAPANESE PEACE TREATY

It was against the background of thought and feeling just described that the Australian Government had to work out its own attitude to the Pacific peace settlement. It very soon discovered that its own advocacy of a prohibition of Japanese rearmament, an advocacy vigorously and repeatedly pursued, had no hope of success. The United States and the United Kingdom, the two principal free nations, made it clear that they were not prepared to prohibit a substantial measure of Japanese rearmament. And if these Great Powers were not willing to prohibit, and to enforce that prohibition by supervision and occupation if necessary, how could Australia by herself make a prohibition effective? To that question there was, and is, no real answer.

In any event, full reflection suggests that there is a realism in the Anglo-American approach which will impress, even if it will not always convince, the Australian mind. Let me try to express it in my own words.

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1. Japan is destined once more, and very rapidly, to be a great industrial power. To prohibit this successfully would be to condemn the most virile people in East Asia to poverty, misery and revolution. No greater threat to Asiatic peace could be imagined. To prohibit it unsuccessfully would be to make the worst of both worlds, for power and hatred would be renewed together.

2. Japan will again become a great industrial power more rapidly than she can become a military power; in her case the one depends so much upon the other. But during the intervening period an undefended Japan would be a constant temptation and an easy prey for the territorial imperialism of the Communists. We must not forget that one of the checks upon aggression today is the fact that, with Western Germany and Japan outside the Soviet orbit, the balance of heavy industrial production weighs down heavily in favor of the free world.

3. Japan must therefore be defended. By whom? Putting aside the question of how far and how long any democracy will be prepared to maintain an army of occupation in a defeated country—a question full of not only economic but psychological and moral considerations—let me look once more at the pure sentiment of it. Armies of occupation in Japan must, having regard to the Communist threat, have two functions. One is to keep the peace in Japan, against the Japanese. So far, our feelings are satisfied. But the other function must be to defend Japan against an external attacker! It would come as a shock to most Australians to be told that, as a punishment for the Japanese, Australian troops were in future to defend Japan while the Japanese themselves went smiling and bowing about their affairs of production and commerce.

The answer therefore is that Japan must be defended, and in particular by the Japanese themselves.

4. The case for a measure of Japanese rearmament is thus complete, unless the Great Powers, *i.e.* the United States and the United Kingdom, are able and willing to do on the grand scale what I am sure Australia would not want to do, for any length of time, on the small scale.

5. This process of reasoning leaves one question unanswered and, sooner or later, it must be answered. Are both defensive armament and offensive armament to be included in Japanese rearmament? Japan, to be defended against invasion, does not, for example, need long-range submarines. Nor does she need long-

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range surface ships of war. She may need them against us, or against you. But does she need them against the common prospective enemy?

This is not just an expression of fear. It is a note of warning. At San Francisco and before, we stated our case on this matter. It is a case which should not be overlooked. It is based upon a recollection of the reason for Japan's rapid southward advance in 1941–42. That reason was sea power. No enemy not possessed of superiority at sea could have mounted the series of amphibious operations which led to the rapid collapse of Malaya, the Philippines and the East Indies, and the invasion of the Australian mandated territories. True, the Japanese for a long time had superiority in the air and on the land; but the truly fluid instrument of advance was a powerful navy and a great mercantile marine.

It is this recollection which gave rise to the repeated Australian request, made to both Washington and London, that in any permitted Japanese rearmament there should be a prohibition upon the creation of naval units of a long-range, *i.e.* an offensive, character.

There is another aspect of this matter which requires thought. The United States proposes a military pact with Japan, under which there will be mutually defensive arrangements against aggressive Communism. Is such an arrangement based upon World Power realism, or upon some specific regional application of the United Nations Charter? Or, more accurately, is it not based upon both?

Australia subscribes to the Charter, and, in and around Korea, some of her best young men have already given their lives in proof of that subscription. Politically, our people may vary in their views about the practical efficacy of the United Nations. There are many who feel that the world's peace is more effectively defended by a democratic group of Powers with superior prepared strength at the points of potential conflict than by resolutions and charters. But that does not mean that they envisage a world perpetually divided between hostile groups of Powers. The balance of power is never quite even. An eternal struggle to preserve it means an eternal danger of war and a never-ending subtraction from those standards of peaceful life to which all decent men and women aspire. Even the realistic critics therefore join in the pursuit of an international law based upon international action.

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This, to people like myself, does not involve a conflict between practical groupings of power and the great and noble principles of the Charter. What it means is that, while we gather together with our friends and gird our loins for a possible battle, we see ourselves and our friends as the champions of a new international order in which aggression ends and international differences are settled by reason and not arms. But before the rule of law becomes a world rule, those who believe in it must first defeat, at the bar of world human opinion or by strength if necessary, those who set that rule at nought. In brief, power politics for the sake of power must die. But power politics, to create a state of affairs in which power becomes irrelevant, must still remain one of the great preoccupations of the democratic peoples of the world.

III. THE IMPLICATIONS AND RISKS OF THE TREATY

I do not propose to make any attempt to analyze the economic provisions of the Treaty. It is true that, so far as Australia is concerned, for example, the Treaty creates no obligations upon us and confers no reciprocal rights upon Japan except by virtue of some subsequent act on our part. But, broadly, the economic settlement is a "soft" one. It contemplates, as does the military settlement, the reconstitution of a powerful and self-supporting Japan. It is, one may reasonably assume, not unaffected by the belief that the First War settlement and the events which followed it were "neither the one thing nor the other," were not sufficiently severe and enforced to make Germany powerless to take revenge, and not sufficiently friendly to destroy the desire for revenge.

Clearly, judgment upon such matters must involve the acceptance of risks. We have no assurance that a rearmed Japan will not some day turn against us. We have, for that matter, no assurance that a strengthened and assisted Western Germany will not some day again prove our enemy. But the calculation of risks must be based not upon theory but upon facts.

It is a natural and admirable disposition of mankind to seek permanent solutions. But unfortunately, while there will always be problems, the problems themselves change. We must deal with them as we encounter them; and will deal with them the more successfully if we have not (in our pursuit of the permanent) become too rigid-minded about them in advance. This does not mean that we are to have no principles of international law or

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practice, no devotion to an international charter, no settled machinery of peace. What it does mean is that in the making of regional settlements we are to be at greater pains to guard against the existing or immediately prospective enemy than to secure ourselves against a possible or remote one. To put this argument quite bluntly, we should be foolish to force a hard and bitter peace upon Japan because we feared that in 15 or 20 years' time Japan might once more become an aggressor, when the real and deadly and present question is whether, inside the next two years, we shall between us be strong enough to resist (and therefore deter) a vast Communist aggression against one manifestation of which we are actually now fighting in Korea.

If the United States, with its tremendous world responsibility and its magnificent and unprecedented preparation to discharge it, chooses to see Japan not as a possible future danger but as a present and important factor in world defensive strategy against Communism, who can with confidence gamble upon the future course of history and say that it is wrong? And in any case, the United States is taking its risk prudently. Pursuant to Article 6 of the Treaty the United States is entering into a defensive pact with Japan. Thus, by a double stroke, Japan is made a coöperator in the short-range defense problem and a potential friend in the long run.

There are, of course, many people who feel that the Japanese people have, by the joint effects of defeat and occupation, "suffered a sea change" into democracy. I do not believe this for a moment. Democracy is a growth from the soil; it is never imposed from without. Witness the easy and swift collapse of parliamentary self-government in Germany and Italy. It needs a tree with deep roots in a deep soil to withstand the winter gales of tyranny. The real question is not whether Japan has already become democratic (a notion which I frankly do not believe), but whether, to quote the recent words of my colleague, Mr. R. G. Casey, "to permit the Japanese people to recover their self-respect and some measure of economic independence offers the best means of promoting the growth of a workable democracy in Japan." It is my own deep belief that, though slavery is the breeding ground of revolution, only freedom and free men can bring forth democracy.

Before I leave the Peace Treaty, I would like to add a few words about the historic question of reparations.

Even the unsophisticated political economists of the Versailles

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settlement must have realized before long how impossible it is to make the defeated pay for a war except on terms which guarantee unemployment and financial crisis in the victor country. But some financial punishment or recompense may well be required from Japan without financial or economic disaster. This thought at once brings up the claims of former prisoners-of-war for some compensation for the wrongs suffered by them, in breach of all the laws of war, at the hands of their Japanese captors. The United States has already dealt with American prisoners-of-war by paying them a daily allowance out of Japanese assets forfeited to the Republic. Every consideration of justice and decency cries aloud for the imposition of a just penalty to be paid to the innocent by the guilty. It would be intolerable to say that the maltreated American prisoner-of-war should, by the accident of the location of forfeited Japanese assets, be entitled to substantial compensation, while his Australian brother in arms should, by the like accident, secure little or none.

It is true that, under Article 16 of the Treaty, Japan transfers certain of her overseas assets to the International Committee of the Red Cross for distribution to appropriate national agencies for the benefit of former prisoners-of-war and their families. But, on such figures as are available, the amount so provided will be grossly inadequate. I hope and believe that American opinion will be strong to see that all former prisoners-of-war, whether American or otherwise, will be treated equally and generously, and that the means of doing so will be required from Japan, whose lawlessness and inhumanity in the conduct of war have wrought so deep an injury to so many thousands of gallant men.

IV. THE PACIFIC SECURITY TREATY

Efforts have been made in certain quarters to convert the Japanese Treaty into an Australian party political issue. The significance of these efforts should not be exaggerated. No Australian party or leader has been prepared to say that Japan should be kept unarmed *and* that Australia should be the policeman for that purpose. It is perhaps thought, by some individuals, that the Australian Government could and should have forced its view upon Great Britain and the United States. Such an argument needs no answer once it has been stated. The Australian Government thought it much more sensible not to go on obstinately "kicking against the pricks," but to seek such a Pacific regional

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arrangement—of the same derivation as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—as would strengthen Australia's Pacific position against a possible future resurgence of Japanese or Communist militarism. The discussions were, so far as the United States of America and Australia were concerned, largely conducted by Mr. John Foster Dulles and the then Australian Minister for External Affairs (now our Ambassador at Washington), Mr. P. C. Spender. The negotiations were conducted with great spirit, friendliness and international intelligence. Our sister nation, New Zealand, was a warm and willing coöperator.

The result is now well known. The Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America is constructed around the central Article IV, which says that, "Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." This mutual declaration is both historic and momentous. As it is worked out through the Council of Foreign Ministers (which a later Article sets up), it will give a particular force and application to the United Nations Charter in the Pacific, corresponding to the North Atlantic arrangements and to those arrangements for an integrated Middle East Command which have more recently been put in hand.

Two comments upon the Pact should be made, if its full significance to Australia is to be understood.

The first is that the obligations are not all one way. Article II says that, "in order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."

After the treaty has come into effect, our Australian defense preparations are not merely our own business; we owe them also to our friends, without whose help we cannot hope to maintain our freedom against a major challenge. In other words, our defense effort ceases to be of merely local significance, but becomes part of the concerted efforts of the free world. Americans who fought alongside Australians in the southwest Pacific will know that we mean this, and we shall do our part.

The second comment is evoked by a phrase in the preamble to the Pact, "Recognizing that Australia and New Zealand as

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members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outside as well as within the Pacific Area."

Sometimes, discussing such matters with my friends in the United States, I have encountered the suggestion that British countries like Australia must choose whether to be in or out of the British Commonwealth. In the same way I have heard it suggested that Great Britain has to make some choice between Western European commitments and those which are inherent in the British Commonwealth. No such choice arises. Great Britain's participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has Australia's full approval; ours in the Three Power Pact had the blessing of Great Britain. No responsible person in Australia thinks that Australia could or would stand neutral in a British war of survival, or that Great Britain would be inactive in a struggle for Australian liberty. We are members of a family of nations under the British Crown, and we stand together. But we know that, the divisions in the world being what they are, the peace of the world depends upon the unshakable unity of thought and action of the United States and the British Commonwealth, and of those other great and free nations who hold their liberty in common.

Thus understood, North Atlantic and Pacific Pacts are not a means of creating separate obligations or inconsistent action on the part of British Commonwealth countries. They are, on the contrary, the instruments by which we build our joint and several strengths into the over-all strength of the United Nations, and so make our own unity a vital element in an even greater partnership without which no free nation, or group of free nations, can long survive.

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GENERALISSIMO STALIN AND THE ART OF GOVERNMENT

By O. Utis

WE are living in an age when the social sciences claim to be able to predict more and more accurately the behavior of groups and individuals, rulers and ruled. It is strange, then, to find that one of the political processes which still causes the greatest perplexity is to be found not in some unexplored realm of nature, nor in the obscure depths of the individual soul intractable to psychological analysis, but in a sphere apparently dominated by iron laws of reason, from which, supposedly, the influence of random factors, human whims, unpredictable waves of emotion, spontaneity, irresponsibility, anything tending to loosen the rigorously logical nexus, has been remorselessly eliminated. The process to which I refer is the "general line" of the Communist Party of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Its abrupt and violent changes of direction puzzle not merely the outside world, but Soviet citizens; and not merely Soviet citizens, but members of the Communist Party itself at home and abroad—to whom, as often as not, it occasions disconcerting, violent and even fatal surprise.

Inability to predict the curious movements of the line is a crucial failure in a Communist. At best it upsets all his personal calculations; at worst, it brings total ruin upon him. Thus the history of Communist Parties outside Russia—and notably of the German Party—provides many instances where sudden switches of the Moscow "line" have involved these Parties in major disasters. The spate of books by such well informed ex-Communists as Barmine, Ciliga, Rossi and Ruth Fischer, as well as the *romans à clef* by gifted authors who have turned against the Soviet régime like Arthur Koestler, Humphrey Slater and Victor Serge, deal vividly with this phenomenon. Both in the ideological realm, and in the concrete economic and political aspects of Communist foreign policy, much of this uncertainty can doubtless be put down to the predominance of Russia's national interest over the interests of world Communism in general or of the local Parties in particular. Moreover, since even the Soviet leaders are not all of them men from Mars, they must be credited with the normal coefficient of miscalculation, stupidity, inefficiency and bad luck.

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But even allowing for disparate factors such as nationalism, human fallibility and the confusion of human affairs in general, the irregular path traversed by the ideological policy of the Soviet Union still remains abnormally puzzling.

Here perhaps some recourse to Marxist doctrine is inevitable, for it is reasonable to assume that Soviet leaders do not merely profess to judge events in the light of some form of Marxism, but in fact sometimes do so. No doubt the intelligence of the members of the Politburo is of a practical rather than a theoretical bent; nevertheless, the fundamental categories in terms of which the outside world is apprehended, and policies framed, continue to derive from the cluster of theories put forward by Marx and Hegel, and adapted by Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Tito and others, as well as, in a distorted and inverted fashion, by Fascist dictators. According to this developed Marxist theory one must distinguish between "crests" and "troughs"—periods when "history" appears to be in a state of rising ferment and moving toward a revolutionary climax, and, on the other hand, those more frequent times when things tend, or at least seem to tend, to be quiescent and stable. And while, of course, the theory teaches that underneath the placid surface there is always a clash of factors which will ultimately lead to the inevitable collision (which constitutes progress), the process may at times still be latent, invisible—the revolution still "burrowing away," in Marx's (and Hegel's) image from Hamlet, like the old mole underground. These are the periods when revolutionary parties should husband and consolidate their resources rather than spend their strength in battle. This theory of alternating phases, which is at least as old as St. Simon, appears to be the only hypothesis which offers a plausible explanation of Stalin's policies in the late twenties and the thirties.

One of the best examples of the halting on an "activist" policy is found in the liquidation of Trotsky's aggressive line in China. The reasoning on the part of M. Stalin and his allies seems to have led to the conclusion that one of the "quiescent" periods had begun and that as a result the making or support of violent revolution would "necessarily" lead to frustration. Conversely, the most spectacular example of a call to arms is the notorious directive to German Communists in 1932 to concentrate their fire upon the Social Democrats as being more dangerous enemies than Hitler. M. Stalin's speeches of that period are very instructive in this re-

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spect: he seems clearly to have assumed that after a long trough of despond in the twenties the crest of the revolution was beginning to rise once more. He looked upon the economic crisis of 1929–31 as the most violent indication which had yet occurred that the contradictions of the capitalist system were at last about to perform their historic task of finally blowing up the entire rickety capitalist structure. (Nor, incidentally, was it to him alone that the situation appeared in this lurid light; many observers, in lands far apart and belonging to many shades of political opinion, spoke at this time in terms no less dramatic.) In a so-called "revolutionary" situation the Communist Party advances. The period of quiet incubation during which it is obliged to lull potential rivals and enemies into false security is over; it drops all pretense of solidarity with other left-wing and "progressive" forces. Once cracks have visibly begun to appear in the capitalist order, the decisive moment cannot be very far off, and Lenin's preparation for his *coup* in September–October 1917 becomes the proper model to follow. The Communist Party, bold, strong, alone knowing what it wants, and how to get it, breaks off its false (but at an earlier stage tactically necessary) relationship with the "soft" and confused mass of fellow-travellers, fellow wanderers, temporary allies and vague sympathizers. It takes the great leap across the precipice to the conquest of power for which it alone is—and knows that it is—adequately organized.

The order to advance which M. Stalin issued to his German allies in 1932 had consequences fatal to them and nearly as fatal for himself—consequences, indeed, familiar enough to the entire world, which has been paying ever since with incredible suffering. Yet even this did not shake Communist faith in the simple formula. It remains unaltered and says again and again: In revolutionary situations, liquidate your now worthless allies and then advance and strike; in non-revolutionary situations, accumulate strength by *ad hoc* alliances, by building popular fronts, by adopting liberal and humanitarian disguises, by quoting ancient texts which imply the possibility, almost the desirability, of peaceful, mutually tolerant coexistence. This last will have the double advantage of compromising potential rivals by taking them further than they wish to go or are aware of going, while at the same time embarrassing the right-wing oppositions—the forces of reaction—by ranging against them all the best and sincerest defenders of liberty and humanity, progress and justice.

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And indeed it may be that this simple maxim will to some extent account for the oscillations of Soviet propagandist policy after 1946, when Soviet planners began by expecting a vast world economic crisis and became correspondingly aggressive and uncompromising. There followed a gradual and reluctant realization (prematurely foretold by the Soviet economist Varga, who was duly rebuked for ill-timed prescience) that the crisis was not materializing fast enough, and might not come either at the moment or with the violence expected. This may account for attempts in the last two years to replace (at least for foreign export) straightforward propaganda, framed in old-fashioned, uncompromising Marxist terms, with non-Communist values, such as appeals to the universal desire for peace, or to local or national pride against American dictation, or to alleged traditions of friendship between, let us say, Russia and France as contrasted with no less traditional hostility between, for example, France and England. Soviet reliance on this historical schema of alternating periods of quiescence and crisis (which has a respectable pre-Marxist pedigree) may not be a complete key to all the convolutions of its ideological policies abroad, but without some such hypothesis these policies become totally unintelligible, and can be accounted for only by assuming a degree of blindness or stupidity or gratuitous perversity in Moscow which, on other grounds, can scarcely be imputed to the present rulers of the U.S.S.R. And this is a powerful argument for believing the hypothesis to be correct.

II

But whatever may be the theory of history which guides the Soviet Government's policy toward its agents abroad, it will not explain the zigzag movement of the Party line within the Soviet Union itself. This is the arm of Soviet policy of which its own citizens stand most in awe, in particular those whose professions cause them to be articulate in public—writers, artists, scientists, academic persons and intellectuals of every kind—since their careers and indeed their lives depend upon their ability to adjust themselves swiftly and accurately to all the alternating shapes of this capriciously-moving Protean entity. The principles of its movement are not always, of course, wholly inscrutable. Thus the adoption of the doctrine of "Socialism in one country" in the twenties could not but alter the entire direction of the Party's activities. Nor could an intelligent observer have felt great sur-

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prise when the ideological followers of the earlier, so-called "Trotskyite," line, or even the individuals personally connected with the banished leader, were, in due course, purged or ostracized. Similarly there was no cause for wonder at the ban on anti-German or anti-Fascist manifestations after the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939. Nor yet at the rise of a nationalistic and patriotic mood, with strong official encouragement, during the war of national resistance against the Germans.

On the other hand, no one expected or could have foretold such curious incidents as the denunciation of the official Party philosopher, G. Alexandrov, for maintaining that Karl Marx was merely the best of all Western thinkers, and not, as he should have pointed out, a being altogether different from, and superior in kind to, any thinker who had ever lived. The Party authorities maintained that Marx had been described inadequately—almost insultingly—by being called a philosopher; the impression was conveyed that to say of Marx that he was the best of philosophers was much as though one had called Galileo the most distinguished of all astrologers, or man himself the highest and most gifted among the apes. Again, no one had, or perhaps could have, predicted the explosion of feeling (so soon after the mass murders and tortures of Jews by the Nazis) against the older generation of intellectuals, mostly writers and artists of Jewish origin, as a gang of rootless cosmopolitans and petty Zionist nationalists; nor the summary disbandment, not long after, of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee. Nor, again, could any of the philologists who for so many years had faithfully subscribed to the highly fanciful (but officially approved) doctrines of the late Academician Marr be blamed for not foreseeing his sudden eclipse. How could anyone in the world have imagined that so much devoted sacrifice of knowledge and intellect upon the altar of duty to country and Party would be visited by so eccentric a fate as intervention by the Generalissimo himself, with an *ex cathedra* pronouncement on the real truth about the inter-relationships of language, dialects and the social structure?

Everyone who has ever been in contact with Soviet writers or journalists, or for that matter with Soviet representatives abroad, is aware of the extraordinary acuity of ear which such persons develop toward the faintest changes of tone in the Party line. Yet this is of little ultimate avail to them since it is accompanied by a helpless ignorance of the direction in which the "line"

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is likely to veer. There are, of course, endless hypotheses about each individual lunge and lurch, some frivolous, some serious; in Soviet Russia itself they are at times characterized by the sardonic and desperate quality which belongs to the humor of the scaffold, that typically Soviet *Galgenhumor* which is responsible for some bitter and memorable shafts of wit. But no general explanation seems to have been advanced to cover all the facts. And since it is, after all, unlikely that human beings so coldly calculating as the masters of the Soviet Union would leave the central line from which everything derives, and on which everything depends, to chance or the snap decision of the moment, we may find it a not altogether idle pastime to consider a hypothesis which may account for much of this peculiar situation.

III

Our theory starts from the assumption that there are two main dangers which invariably threaten any régime established by a revolution.

The first is that the process may go too far—that the revolutionaries in their excessive zeal may destroy too much, and in particular exterminate those individuals upon whose talents the success of the revolution itself and the retention of its gains ultimately depend. Few, if any, revolutions bring about the ends for which their most fervent supporters hope; for the very qualities which make the best and most successful revolutionaries tend to oversimplify history. After the first intoxication of triumph is over, a mood of disillusionment, frustration and presently indignation sets in among the victors: some among the most sacred objectives have not been accomplished; evil still stalks the earth; someone must be to blame; someone is guilty of lack of zeal, of indifference, perhaps of sabotage, even of treachery. And so individuals are accused and condemned and punished for failing to accomplish something which, in all probability, could not in the actual circumstances have been brought about by anyone; men are tried and executed for causing a situation for which no one is in fact responsible, which could not have been averted, which the more clear-sighted and sober observers (as it later turns out) had always expected to some degree. Trials and penalties fail to remedy the situation. Indignation gives way to fury, terror is resorted to, executions are multiplied. There is no reason why this process should come to a stop without external

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intervention or physical causes, for there can never be enough victims to expiate a crime which no one has committed, to atone for a crisis which must be attributed to a general and very likely inevitable failure to understand the situation correctly. But once the nightmare of mutual suspicion, recrimination, terror and counterterror has set in, it is too late to draw back: the whole structure begins to crumble in the welter of frantic heresy hunts from which scarcely anyone will escape. Every schoolboy knows of the violent climax of the Great French Revolution in 1794.

The second danger is precisely the contrary: and is often the natural sequel of the first. Once the original afflatus of revolution is exhausted, enthusiasm (and physical energy) will ebb, motives grow less passionate and less pure, there is a revulsion from heroism, martyrdom, destruction of life and property, normal habits reassert themselves, and what began as an audacious and splendid experiment will peter out and finally collapse in corruption and petty squalor. This, too, happened in France during the *Directoire,* and it has marked the end of the revolutionary phase in many other cases. It seems to be the unavoidable aftermath of many a romantic rising in Latin and Latin American countries.

The avoidance of these opposite dangers—the need to steer between the Scylla of self-destructive Jacobin fanaticism, and the Charybdis of post-revolutionary weariness and cynicism—is therefore the major task of any revolutionary leader who desires to see his régime neither destroyed by the fires which it has kindled nor returned to the ways from which it has momentarily been lifted by the revolution. But at this point Marxist revolutionaries find themselves in a peculiar predicament. For according to that element in Marxism which proceeds from the doctrine of Hegel, the world—everything animate and inanimate—is in a condition of perpetual inner conflict, mounting ceaselessly toward critical collisions which lift the battle on to a new plane—tensions and conflicts at a "new level." Consequently the "dialectic" itself—for this is what the process is called—should in theory be a sufficient guarantee of the vitality of any genuine revolutionary movement. For since the dialectic is inexorably "grounded in the nature of things" and can be neither stopped nor circumvented, the course of the post-revolutionary régimes must—cannot help but—obey its laws. And just as the French revolution broke out in obedience to those laws, so it declined and ran into the shallows of the *Directoire,* and, worse still, was followed by the Em-

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pire and the Restoration, presumably in obedience to the same dialectical process. Whatever degree of determinism Marx's historical materialism is held to entail (and the doctrine is far from clear, either in Hegel or in Marx, and grows particularly dark in the later works of Engels), M. Stalin seems to have resolved that the gloomy fate apparently in store for previous revolutions should not overtake his régime. Although the majestic self-fulfillment of the world pattern cannot be tampered with or deflected to suit capricious human wills, yet History (to judge by its past performances) did not seem too sure a guarantee of the survival of what M. Stalin and his Party considered the most desirable features of the Russian revolution. Nature herself (although in general dependable enough) sometimes nodded; and some slight adjustments could perhaps be made to render her processes even more regular and predictable. Human skill would be employed in aiding the Cosmos to fulfill even more faithfully its own "inner laws."

Consequently, M. Stalin made use of an original expedient, thoroughly in keeping with the inventive spirit of our time, and in particular with the new fashion of producing synthetic equivalents of natural products. As others produced artificial rubber or mechanical brains, so he created an artificial dialectic, whose results the experimenter himself could to a large degree control and predict. Instead of allowing history to originate the oscillation of the dialectical spiral, he placed this task in human hands. The problem was to find a mean between the "dialectical opposites" of apathy and fanaticism.[1] Once this was determined, the essence of his policy consisted in accurate timing and in the calculation of the right degree of force required to swing the political and social pendulum to obtain any result that might, in the given circumstances, be desired.

Let us apply this hypothesis to the conditions of the Second World War. In 1941, when the fate of the Soviet system seemed to be in the balance, full vent was given to patriotic sentiment. This acted as a safety valve to the pent-up feeling which the pop-

[1] The problem was not, of course, one of pure theory, and did not arise in the void—in the course of abstract contemplation of history and its laws on the part of M. Stalin or anyone else. When the excesses of the first Bolshevist terror and "war Communism" were followed by the compromises of the New Economic Policy, the danger of repeating the pattern of the great French Revolution, or, for that matter, of the revolutions of 1848–49, must have appeared very real to Bolshevik leaders. They were certainly reminded of it often enough, especially by foreign critics. The technique of political navigation here described was therefore born, as most notable inventions are apt to be, of urgent practical need.

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ulation had had to repress during the two previous decades. The Party leaders clearly realized that this rush of national feeling acted as the most powerful single psychological factor in stimulating resistance to the enemy. The process clearly was not compatible with keeping Communist indoctrination at its full prewar pressure; the war was won on a wave of patriotic rather than ideological fervor. A certain loosening of bonds began to be felt. Writers wrote more freely; there was, temporarily at least, the appearance of a slightly less suspicious attitude towards foreigners, at any rate those connected with the Allied countries. Old-fashioned, long disused expressions of Great-Russian sentiment, and the worship of purely national heroes, once more became fashionable. Later, however, the victorious Soviet troops who came back from foreign countries, filled (as so often after European campaigns) with a favorable impression of foreign customs and liberties, began to give cause for anxiety; after all, the great Decembrist revolt of 1825 sprang from a similar experience. It became clear to the authorities that a powerful re-inoculation with Communist doctrine—ultimately the sole cement which binds together the ethnically heterogeneous peoples of the Soviet Union—was urgently required. The returned soldiers—both victors and prisoners of war liberated in Germany and elsewhere, as well as those likely to come into contact with them at home—would need careful supervision if centers of resistance to the central authority were not to spring up. Unless such reindoctrination were done swiftly, the entire pattern of Soviet life, depending as in all totalitarian states on ceaseless discipline and unrelaxing tautness, might soon be in danger of sagging—notoriously the beginning of the end of all such régimes. Toward the end of 1945, a call was issued for stricter orthodoxy. The policy of encouraging nationalism was halted sharply. All were reminded of their Marxist duties. Prominent representatives of various nationalities were found to have gone too far in glorifying their local past, and were called to order with unmistakable severity. Regional histories were suppressed. The all-embracing cloak of ideological orthodoxy once more fell upon the land. The Party was commanded to expose and expel the opportunists and riffraff who had, during the confusion of war, been permitted to creep into the fold. Heresy hunts were instituted once more (though not on the appalling scale of 1937–38).

The danger of this kind of move is that it places power in the

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hands of a class of zealots dedicated to the unending task of purifying the church by severing all offending limbs—and presently of anything remotely capable of promoting growth. Such men will be effective only if those, at least, who compose their central nucleus are fanatically sincere; yet when this happens their activity will inevitably go too far. After purging major and minor dissentients, the inquisitors are perforce carried on by their own sacred zeal until they are found probing into the lives and works of the great leaders of the Party themselves. At this point they must be swiftly checked if the whole machine is not to be disrupted from within. An added reason for stopping the purge and denouncing its agents as deranged extremists who have run amok is that this will be popular with the sacred and desperate rank and file, both of the Party and the bureaucracy (not to speak of the population at large). A mighty hand descends from the clouds to halt the inquisition. The Kremlin has heard the cry of the people, has observed its children's plight, and will not permit them to be torn limb from limb by its over-ardent servants. A sigh of relief goes up from the potential victims; there is an outpouring of gratitude which is sincere enough. Faith in the goodness, wisdom and all-seeing eye of the leader, shaken during the slaughter, is once more restored.

Something of this kind occurred after the great purge of 1937–39. It occurred again, in a much milder fashion, in 1947, when purely doctrinal persecution was somewhat relaxed and gave way to a period of national self-adulation and a violent assault on the very possibility of foreign influence, past and present. However grotesque this ultra-chauvinism may have looked when viewed from abroad, and however ruinous to the few representatives of a wider culture still surviving in the Soviet Union, it was probably not ill received by the mass of the population (when has nationalist propaganda been unpopular among any people?); and it did stay the hand of the Marxist inquisitor in favor of the more familiar national tradition. On this occasion the pendulum was swung in the direction of Russian pride and *amour propre*. But just as the earlier ideological purges went too far in one direction, so this reaction in its turn duly overreached itself.

The Soviet Government wishes to preserve a minimum degree of sanity at least among the élite upon which it relies; hence any violent swing of the pendulum always, sooner or later, demands a corrective. In normal societies a movement of opinion, whether

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spontaneous or artificially stimulated, does not occur in a vacuum. It meets with the resistance of established habits and traditions and is to some degree swallowed, or diluted, in the eddying of the innumerable currents created by the interplay of institutional influences with the relatively uncontrolled trends of thoughts and feelings characteristic of a free society. But in the Soviet Union this random factor is largely absent, precisely because the Party and the state are engaged in sweeping away the smallest beginnings of independent thought. Hence there is a kind of empty region in which any artificially stimulated view (and in the U.S.S.R. there can scarcely be any other) tends to go too far, reaches absurd lengths, and ends by stultifying itself—not merely in the eyes of the outside world but even within the Soviet Union itself. It is at this point that it must be swung back by means which are themselves no less artificial. This is what occurred when the nationalist-xenophobic campaign reached a point almost identical with that of the most violent phases of the brutal policy of "Russification" of Tsarist days. (The recent denunciations of cosmopolitan intellectuals were framed in language almost identical with that of the reactionary, anti-Semitic, fanatically anti-liberal press and police after the repressions following the Revolution of 1905.) Something had evidently to be done to restore the fabric of Soviet unity. The Party can, *ex hypothesi,* never be mistaken; errors can occur only because its directives have been misinterpreted or misapplied. Again, no serious alteration of the bases of the Marxist theory itself is feasible within a system of which it is the central dogma. An open attempt to modify—let alone cancel—any Marxist principles in such central and critical fields as political theory, or even philosophy, is therefore out of the question: for there is too serious a danger that, after so many years of life in a strait-jacket, confusion and alarm might be created in the minds of the faithful. A system which employs some hundreds of thousands of professional agitators and must put their lessons in language intelligible to children and illiterates, cannot afford doubts and ambiguities about central truths. Even M. Stalin cannot disturb the foundations of ideology without jeopardizing the entire system.

Hence safer areas must be found for the ideological manœuvres required in situations which seem to be moving slightly out of control. Music, poetry, biography, even law, are peripheral territories in which doctrinal pronouncements, modifying the "line,"

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can be made without disturbing the vital central region. The moral of such public statements is very swiftly grasped by the (by now) highly sensitized eyes and ears of intellectuals working in other and often quite distant fields. Philology is still remoter from the center and, consequently, even safer. Perhaps that is why M. Stalin chose the theory of language, in what seemed to the uninitiated so whimsical a fashion, to indicate that the "clarion call" for Marxist purity had had its full effect and must be muted. The mild rectification of the line ordered in the field of linguistics was no sooner made than other relatively "non-political" specialists must have begun hopefully to ask themselves whether their windowless worlds too might not expect some small relief—perhaps a chink into the outer universe, or at least a little more breathing space within. Bounty to grammarians and linguists means that musicians and acrobats and clowns and mathematicians and writers of children's stories and even physicists and chemists cower a little less. Even historians have raised their heads; a writer in a Soviet historical journal in the summer of 1951 argued timidly that since Stalin had said nothing about historical studies, might not they also, like linguistics, be excluded from the Marxist "superstructure," and possess an "objectivity" and permanent principles which Stalin had so sternly refused to artistic or juridical institutions? Physicists, chemists, even the harassed geneticists whose studies lie so unhappily close to the heart of the historical dialectic, may presently be afforded some relief; certainly the vagaries of the "line" in their subjects seem to spring from internal political needs more often than from metaphysical considerations or an incurable *penchant* for this or that philosophical or scientific "materialism," to which some of their more hopeful or naïve Western colleagues, in their anxiety to understand Soviet scientific theory, so often and so unplausibly try to attribute them.

The themes of "peace" and "coexistence" indicate unmistakably which way the dialectical machine is veering after the Korean misadventure: hence faint and pathetic attempts to hint at "Western" values again on the part of professors whose love of their subject has not been completely killed. And if such first timorous feelers are not too brusquely discouraged, those who make them know that they may at last begin to look to a period of relative toleration. But the more experienced know that this is unlikely to last for long. Presently symptoms begin inevitably to

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indicate that the ties have been loosened too far—too far for a machine which, unless it is screwed tight, cannot function at all. Presently new calls for conformity, purity, orthodoxy are issued; elimination of suspects[2] begins, and the cycle repeats itself.

Yet something depends on the force with which the pendulum is swung: one of the consequences of driving the terror too far (as happened, for example, during the Yezhov régime in the late thirties) is that the population is cowed into almost total silence. No one will speak to anyone on subjects remotely connected with "dangerous" topics save in the most stereotyped and loyal formulae, and even then most sparingly, since nobody can feel certain of the password from day to day. This scared silence holds its own dangers for the régime. In the first place, while a large-scale terror ensures widespread obedience and the execution of orders, it is possible to frighten people too much: if kept up, violent repression ends by leaving people totally unnerved and numb. Paralysis of the will sets in, and a kind of exhausted despair which lowers vital processes and certainly diminishes economic productivity. Moreover, if people do not talk, the vast army of intelligence agents employed by the government will not be able to report clearly enough what goes on inside their heads or how they would respond to this or that government policy. When the waters are very still, and their surface very opaque, they may be running much too deep. In the words of a Russian proverb, "devils breed in quiet pools." The government cannot do without a minimum knowledge of what is being thought. Although public opinion in the normal sense cannot be said to exist in the Soviet Union, the rulers must nevertheless acquaint themselves with the mood of the ruled, if only in the most primitive, most behavioristic, sense of the word, much as an animal breeder depends on his ability to predict, within limits, the behavior of his stock. Hence something must be done to stimulate the population into some degree of articulate expression: bans are lifted, "Communist self-criticism," "comradely discussion," something that almost looks like public debate is insistently invited. Once individuals and groups show their hand—and some of them inevitably betray themselves—the leaders know better where they stand, in particular whom they would be

[2] These are as often as not the orthodox of yesterday. One wonders what is to be the fate of Professor Kon who sought, in the summer "breathing spell" of 1951, to protect history from the fanaticism of the ultra-Marxists of 1946–47.

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wise to eliminate if they are to preserve the "general line" from uncontrolled pushes and pulls. The guillotine begins to work again, the talkers are silenced. The inmates of this grim establishment, after their brief mirage of an easier life, are set once more to their backbreaking tasks and forbidden to indulge in any interests, however innocent, which take their minds off their labors—the great industrial goals which can be accomplished only with the most undivided attention and by the most violent exertions. Communication with the outside world is virtually suspended. The press is recalled to a sense of its primary purpose —the improvement of the morale of the public, the clear, endlessly reiterated sermons on the right way of living and thinking. When this state of things grows too dreary even for Soviet citizens, the "line" oscillates again, and for a very brief period (the penultimate state of which is always the most dangerous moment) life once more becomes a little more various.

IV

This—the "artificial dialectic"—is Generalissimo Stalin's most original invention, his major contribution to the art of government, even more important, perhaps, than "Socialism in one country." It is an instrument guaranteed to "correct" the uncertainties of nature and of history and to preserve the inner impetus—the perpetual tension—the condition of permanent wartime mobilization—which alone enables so unnatural a form of life to be carried on. This it does by never allowing the system to become either too limp and inefficient or too highly charged and self-destructive. A queer, ironical version of Trotsky's "permanent revolution," or, again, of his "neither peace nor war" formula for Brest-Litovsk, it forces the Soviet system to pursue a zigzag path, creating for its peoples a condition of unremitting tautness lest they be caught by one of the sharp turns made whenever a given operation begins to yield insufficient or undesirable returns.

Naturally, the need to keep the population on the run in this way is not the sole factor which shapes the ultimate direction of the line. This is determined in addition by the pressures of foreign policy, national security, internal economic and social needs, and so on—by all the forces which play a part in any organized political society, and which exert their influence on Soviet policy too, albeit in a somewhat peculiar fashion. The Soviet

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Union is not a Marxist system working in a total vacuum, nor is it free from the effects of psychological or economic laws. On the contrary, it claims to recognize these more clearly and shape its policies more consciously in accordance with the findings of the natural sciences than is done by "reactionary" policies doomed to be victims to their own irreconcilable "internal contradictions." What, then, makes the political behavior of the Soviet Union seem so enigmatical and unpredictable to Western observers, whether they be practical politicians or theoretical students of modern politics? Perhaps this perplexity is due in some measure to the failure in the West to realize the crucial importance attached by the makers of Soviet policy to the zigzag path upon the pursuit of which they assume that internal security and the preservation of power directly depend. This technique of determining the "general line" in accordance with which all the means available to the Soviet state and to Communist Parties at home and abroad are to be used is a genuinely novel invention of great originality and importance. Its successful operation depends on a capacity for organizing all available natural and human resources, for completely controlling public opinion, for imposing an ultra-rigid discipline on the entire population; and, above all, on a sense of timing which demands great skill and even genius on the part of individual manipulators—above all, of the supreme dictator himself. Because it requires this—because the exactly correct "line," undulating as it does between the equally unavoidable and mutually opposed right wing and left wing "deviations" (extremes out of which it is, like the Hegelian synthesis, compounded, and which, in the shape of its individual human representatives and their views, it destroys)—it cannot be determined mechanically. It is an artificial construction and depends on a series of human decisions; and for this reason its future cannot be regarded as altogether secure. So long as someone with M. Stalin's exceptional gift for administration is at the helm, the movement of the "line," invisible though it may continue to be to many both within and without the Soviet Union, is not altogether unpredictable. Its destiny when he is no longer in control (whether or not the Soviet Union is involved in a general war) is a subject for hope and fear rather than rational prophecy. For it is certainly not a self-propelling, or self-correcting, or in any respect automatically operating piece of machinery. In hands less skilful or experienced or self-confident it could easily lead to a débâcle

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to which human societies are not exposed under more traditional forms of government.

Will M. Stalin's successors display sufficient capacity for the new technique, which calls for so remarkable a combination of imagination and practical insight? Or will they abandon it altogether, and, if so, gradually or suddenly? Or will they prove unable to control it and fall victims to a mechanism too complicated for men of limited ability—a mechanism whose very effectiveness in the hands of an earlier and more capable generation has so conditioned both government and governed that catastrophe is made inevitable? We cannot tell; all that seems certain is that Generalissimo Stalin's passing will sooner or later cause a crisis in Soviet affairs—a crisis which may be graver than that caused by the death of Lenin, since in addition to all the other problems of readjustment peculiarly acute in a tight dictatorship, there will arise the agonizing dilemma created by the future of M. Stalin's elaborate machinery of government, too complex to be used save by a great master of manipulation,[3] and too dangerous to interrupt or neglect or abandon.

One other thing seems moderately clear: those who believe that such a system is simply too heartless and oppressive to last cruelly deceive themselves. The Soviet system, even though it is not constructed to be self-perpetuating, certainly bears no marks of self-destructiveness. The government may be brutal, cynical and utterly corrupted by absolute power: but only a moral optimism, fed by passionate indignation or a religious faith rather than empirical observation or historical experience, can cause some students of the Soviet Union to prophesy that such wickedness must soon itself erode the men who practise it, render them incapable of retaining power, and so defeat itself. The governed, a passive, frightened herd, may be deeply cynical in their own fashion, and progressively brutalized, but so long as the "line" pursues a zigzag path, allowing for breathing spells as well as the terrible daily treadmill, they will, for all the suffering it brings, be able to find their lives just—if only just—

[3] We do not wish to imply that M. Stalin is solely responsible for all of even the major decisions of Soviet policy. No system so vast, however "monolithic," can literally be directed by any single individual, whatever his powers. But, on the other hand, we have no reason for supposing that M. Stalin's henchmen, however competent under his leadership, will prove any more capable of carrying on his methods after him than were the companions of Ivan the Terrible or Peter the Great, in whose hands the system of their master disintegrated very fast. On the other side we must place the opposite experience of Kemal's Turkey. Time alone will show.

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sufficiently bearable to continue to exist and toil and even enjoy pleasures. It is difficult for the inhabitants of Western countries to conceive conditions in which human beings in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union (or for that matter India or China) not merely can survive but, being surrounded by others in no better plight, and with no alternative forms of life visible through the Curtain to attract and discontent the imagination, adapt themselves to conditions, look on them as normal, contrive to make arrangements, like soldiers in an unending campaign, or prisoners or shipwrecked mariners. Such arrangements may seem intolerable to the average citizen of a civilized community, yet because, if not liberty, then fraternity and equality, are born of common suffering, a human life can be lived—with moments of gaiety and enthusiasm, and of actual happiness—under the most appalling and degrading conditions.

And it should be remembered that the art of manipulating the "general line" consists precisely in this—that human misery must not, taking the population as a whole, be allowed to reach a pitch of desperation where death—suicide or murder—seems preferable. If the citizens of the Soviet Union cannot be permitted a degree of freedom or happiness which might make them too unruly or insufficiently productive, neither must they be permitted to fall into a state of panic or despair or indifference which would in turn paralyze their activity. The oscillations of the "general line" are designed to be a means which avoids precisely these extremes. Hence, so long as the rulers of the Soviet Union retain their skill with the machinery of government and continue to be adequately informed by their secret police, an internal collapse, or even an atrophy of will and intellect of the rulers owing to the demoralizing effects of despotism and the unscrupulous manipulation of other human beings, seems unlikely. Few governments have been destroyed by a process of inward rotting without the intervention of some external cause. As the Soviet Government is still conspicuously in the full possession of its political senses, the experiment of a nation permanently militarized has, in the long terms of historical periods, hardly reached its apogee. Beset by difficulties and perils as this monstrous machine may be, its success and capacity for survival must not be underestimated. Its future may be uncertain, even precarious; it may blunder and suffer shipwreck or change gradually or catastrophically; but it is not, until men's better natures assert themselves,

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necessarily doomed. The physical and nervous wear and tear exacted (to no purpose, at least no discernible human purpose, beyond the bare self-perpetuation of the régime) by the system is appalling: no Western society could survive it. But then, those finer organisms in which, before 1917, Russia was no poorer than the West have perished long ago. Many decades may be required to recreate them—as recreated one day they surely will be, when this long, dark tunnel is nothing but a bitter memory.

In the meanwhile, the astonishing invention itself surely deserves the most careful study, if only because it is as mechanically powerful and comprehensive an instrument for the management of human beings—for simultaneously breaking their wills and developing their maximum capacities for organized material production—as any dreamt of by the most ruthless and megalomaniac capitalist exploiter. For it springs out of an even greater contempt for the freedom and the ideals of mankind than that with which Dostoevsky endowed his Grand Inquisitor; and being dominant over the lives of some eight hundred million human beings, is the most important, most inhuman and still the most imperfectly understood phenomenon of our times.

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GUERRILLA WARFARE

By Field-Marshal Alexander Papagos

WHEN we soldiers speak of war, or warfare, the term implies combat conducted by a regular army, with all its rules and ramifications, its orthodox precepts for the handling of larger and lesser units of strength, its intricate overall pattern of communications and supply. It is this kind of warfare which has been the object of analysis and study by generations of military experts and writers and which is taught in our military schools and academies; it is to the requirements and objectives of this kind of warfare that our entire unit organization and training are geared. And the outstanding characteristic of this kind of warfare may well be said to be that its theater of operations is clearly and discernibly divided into two distinct and separate zones—enemy and friendly—by the line of the front.

In the course of past centuries, however, there have been cases —one is tempted to qualify them as heretical—wherein irregular armed forces have conducted military operations on their own or have participated in the campaigns of regular armies. Although such activity has almost always had unfavorable effects on the opponent—and sometimes done him critical injury—it has never, so far as I am aware, been treated by high commands and general staffs as a serious subject of study. Though it is mentioned in some classical military textbooks, military investigators have given it scanty attention. It seldom has been considered worthy of advance planning or of premeditated use.

During the past decade, Greece has been a theater of war in which irregular forces formed one of the opposing sides. I will endeavor to sketch here briefly the circumstances in which their activity arose and how they conducted it, and to reach certain conclusions as to the practical extent to which one may generalize the Greek experience and apply its lessons to other countries. It seems necessary to describe the setting of the operations in question because without this the reader cannot evaluate them. Since it is somewhat audacious, of course, to draw broad conclusions from local experience alone, I shall proceed warily in this respect. It will remain for the qualified military student, on the basis of his coördinated knowledge of many such case histories, to reach final generalizations.

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II. THE OCCUPATION OF GREECE—THE LIBERATION

In May 1941, after a sustained and victorious war against the Italians, and while the major part of the Greek forces were still engaged against them, Greece was attacked by the Germans in strength, and succumbed. The Greek people quickly rallied, however, and despite the severity of their struggle for mere subsistence did not lose their morale. Their inherent—and inherited—love of freedom did not for a moment allow them to doubt their continued responsibility to fight for that freedom. Hardly had enemy rule been established in the country when they set themselves to devise practical ways of continuing the struggle, not only by passive resistance, but aggressively. At first these efforts were sporadic and individual, but gradually became better focused and more and more coördinated.

At that time, the Greek Communist Party was extremely restricted and had few adherents and little influence among the people. But it was quick to take advantage of the psychological climate prevailing. Under the banner of resistance against the invader the Communists endeavored to assemble the people into what appeared originally to be a democratic movement of no specific political hue, inspiringly if misleadingly designated the National Liberation Front (known generally by the Greek abbreviation, EAM). The armed forces of EAM were known as ELAS—the People's Army of Liberation. Thousands of patriotic citizens, young men in particular, eager to fight the Germans, flocked unsuspectingly into the EAM ranks. With their lifelong experience as conspirators and their rigid adherence to Party precepts and directives, the Communists were able gradually to consolidate their hold over the two organizations. All the key posts passed into the hands of trusted Communists.

As soon began to be apparent (and as confirmed by subsequent events), the object of the leaders of the Greek Communist Party was not the restoration of national independence. They were not concerned with fighting the Germans, who, they foresaw, were doomed in any case. Their chief concern was to retain ELAS intact and to increase its strength sufficiently to give its Communist leadership complete control of the country. Consequently, under a limited show of armed resistance against the Germans—the bare minimum necessary to camouflage their true purposes—the ELAS confined their military operations in occupied Greece almost exclusively to annihilating non-Communist movements.

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From the organizational point of view, the ELAS was primarily an irregular force. Initially it consisted of small individual bands of armed guerrillas, and though it attempted, as it grew, to assume the form of a regular army, with units designated as divisions and so on, this was superficial, done for its effect on the Allies in the Middle East, and in pursuit of political rather than military purposes.

Moreover, since the arms and equipment available did not allow the maintenance of a large force on continuous active service, the system of the ELAS reserve was invented. All the able-bodied inhabitants of regions under ELAS control were compulsorily registered in this so-called reserve. As a result, the ELAS always could speak in large terms, even though its actual fighting strength was considerably smaller.

Through the use of this irregular armed force, the Communists aimed at gaining control over extensive mountain areas; and in this they gradually succeeded. The foreign occupation forces, concerned primarily with maintaining their lines of communication, left the mountain strongholds of the ELAS unmolested. There was no necessity for them to deal with the Communists, who caused them no trouble; and they lacked sufficient forces with which to ensure an efficient occupation of the areas in question even if once they conquered them.

Until the beginning of December 1944, that is, until about two months after the liberation of Greece, the Communist organization remained concealed—for appearances' sake—under the designation EAM. Then, however, it shed its mask and undertook to win control of the entire country by armed action. Its main target was the British liberation force which had meanwhile landed in Greece. As a result, all-out military operations developed in the Athens area between British and Greek national forces on the one hand and the Greek Communists on the other. There were considerable losses on both sides, and, in addition, there were barbarous Communist atrocities against the general population. After a bitter struggle lasting two months, the Communist leaders abandoned their efforts and came to terms; but under the Varkiza Agreement, signed in February 1945, these turned out to be notably favorable to them.

From the history here very briefly told of the development of an armed Communist force, and from an understanding of its purposes, we Greeks have gleaned the following lessons:

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(a) The first essential element in the organization and operation of a movement of this sort is the existence of a suitable general undercurrent. In the case described, there existed a highly malleable mass resentment against the German and Italian conquerors. The Communists exploited it with subtlety and craft. The secret machinery of the Communist Party ensured that in the end the popular movement would come under its control.

(b) The masses, far from being Communist, did not even have Communist sympathies. In order to decoy the people, the movement had to make its appearance under the banner of armed resistance against the invaders and conquerors.

(c) To swell their ranks, the Communists used both persuasion and force. Persuasion took the form of lectures to the peasants, playing on their patriotic instincts and their desire for liberation. Force was used both directly, by the compulsory enlistment of the population, and also indirectly. Under the latter method, individuals refusing to join the Communist ranks were dubbed collaborators of the enemy, a charge which involved the death penalty or at least the burning down of the delinquent's home. Peasants who saw this happen and feared similar treatment joined the Communist ranks.

(d) In order to convert their recruits into an armed force the Communists needed arms and a cadre of leaders. The arms were procured from three main sources: first, the arms hidden in the villages by Greek soldiers after the German occupation and the disintegration of the Greek Army; second, considerable quantities parachuted into the mountains by the Allies; and third, after the armistice with Italy, the arms of the former Italian occupation forces. A cadre was formed of reservist noncommissioned officers and junior officers of the former Greek Army, lured in the manner described above. Since these ex-Army men were not always trusted by the Communists, the dual system of command was instituted, whereby each military commander was accompanied by a Communist political commissar who really controlled the unit.

Under such a system these armed units could not have really effective combat qualities. Most of the regular army officers joined nationalist resistance movements. The few that joined the ELAS were eyed askance. Rather than risk losing control, the Communists were willing to have their fighting potential against the Germans reduced.

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(e) These armed bands were called regular army units. However, when they took part in battles against regular army forces (British and Greek) after the liberation in Greece—battles with definite locations, not involving guerrilla tactics—they were unable to gain the ascendancy. The fact that the fighting continued for two months was due not to any particular fighting capacity of the Communist bands, but to the anomalous conditions under which it was conducted. For example, a chief concern of the British and Greek forces was to confine to a minimum the damage inflicted on the city of Athens.

(f) The skill with which the Communists conducted their propaganda was noteworthy. It not only won over numbers of individuals who had originally been bitterly opposed to Communism, but also succeeded in creating the impression abroad that the movement was a pure resistance movement in accord with the sovereign right of the people to choose their own form of government.

That, in brief, is the outline of how in a specific case a force of armed irregulars was formed and developed. From it certain general conclusions might be deduced:

1. In numbers, Communism is a restricted force. In order to become an active operational force it requires allies, "fellow-travellers." To acquire them is the first concern of the Communist leaders. They have a variety of methods at their disposal. A classic one is that of the "united front" or "popular front." They do not hesitate to appear under the banners of causes entirely contrary to that of true Communism. And we may be certain that they have not exhausted their repertoire, and that they still will spring new surprises.

2. The only weapon against such tactics is an intensive, unremitting and aggressive campaign of public instruction and enlightenment—not so much vague anti-Communist propaganda as concrete arguments to meet specific cases. And here I would put a question that often recurs in my mind: Why, in these days when so many efforts are being made to rally the free democratic countries to common defensive action against an eventual attack from behind the Iron Curtain, is there no coördinated effort in the field of public enlightenment? Why has there not been set up a joint Western headquarters for such an educational movement?

3. Communism operates on a long-term basis. It does not concern itself exclusively with immediate results, but looks also to

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far objectives. We saw this in Greece, where the ELAS army was developed not to help the Allies win the war but to help Moscow win the peace.

4. The military objective of the Communists is subordinate to their political requirements. Thus there were no noteworthy operations against the conqueror, since that was not the political purpose for which the guerrilla army was created. But as soon as the Communist political chiefs decided that to use the guerrilla army against the British and Greek liberation troops would advance their political aims they did not hesitate to do so.

III. GUERRILLA WARFARE: 1946–1947

By signing the Varzika Agreement in February 1945 the Communist leaders did not relinquish their ultimate purposes but merely deferred them temporarily. It was an example of the Communist tactic of a provisional withdrawal in order to renew the attack later under more propitious circumstances. Proof that they had not renounced their plans is apparent in the fact that after the signing of the Agreement the ELAS did indeed hand over their old and useless arms, but hid and retained all the serviceable arms and ammunition possible.

The year 1945 went by peacefully. During the last quarter of that year and the early months of 1946, the Communist Party tried to reëstablish its organization and to expand it in the form of nuclear groups. It maintained contact with foreign Communist leadership throughout the Balkans, and under the directives of the latter the first Communist bandit groups were formed and reappeared on the scene in northern Greece. In the beginning these bands were small and few in number; but in the spring of 1946 they were sufficient to resume guerrilla warfare. Their activity was confined for the most part to the regions immediately adjacent to the frontier, where they attacked small isolated army outposts. Occasionally they succeeded in wiping out all of these, after which they would attack and loot the nearby village and then vanish into neighboring foreign territory. Gradually, as the strength and number of these bands increased, they extended their operations southward, as far as Thessaly. Their weapons were chiefly those hidden after the December 1944–February 1945 revolution, along with some supplied by neighboring states to the north.

In this period the military activity of these bands consisted,

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briefly, of attacks against main lines of communication, not as yet by means of mines, but by strikes at vehicles, civilian or military, travelling alone or in small convoys; attacks against small isolated army detachments or gendarmerie posts; harassing actions against larger army units, by long-range firing; and attacks against defenseless villages.

Their tactics were based on the following principles:

1. When deciding to attack a post or village, the Communist bands first made sure that its armed strength was considerably less than theirs, so that they might achieve their objective quickly, certainly and with few casualties.

2. In cases when the target was larger they mustered enough additional bandits to cut all the routes by which reinforcements might arrive. But wherever possible they chose isolated posts. If the operation was not successfully completed within a predetermined time it was abandoned.

3. The objective was not to capture, occupy and consolidate certain areas but only to make swift strikes, achieve local results and then withdraw rapidly to distant strongholds—preferably, if proximity to a frontier permitted, to foreign soil.

Parallel to this activity, and helped by it, the Communist leaders engaged in intensive underground activity. The purpose here was to organize a network of spies, informers, suppliers and recruiting agents to support the guerrilla activity. This organization, called by the misleading name "self-defense," succeeded in establishing invisible control over large regions, mostly mountainous, which the bandit groups could not occupy openly. Through terrorism and propaganda the invisible administrative hierarchy exacted subservience, concurrence or, at least, nonresistance from the inhabitants of a considerable number of villages in those areas. Villagers who opposed it were either killed or forced to abandon their homes and seek refuge in the cities.

The national military forces and the gendarmerie were unprepared for this kind of warfare. After each operation the armed bands disappeared, so that when the military arrived they found no sign of the enemy except perhaps a few parting shots from afar. The attacks against the lines of communication made it necessary for all vehicles to move under armed escort. The raids against the defenseless villages, which brought desperate appeals for protection, necessitated a piecemeal allotment of a large part of the existing armed forces to guard key points. Not merely were

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these detachments static, but being isolated were extremely vulnerable to bandit attack. In addition, Communists had managed to insinuate themselves not only into the state machinery but even into the ranks of the Army. Towards the end of 1946, then, the situation was critical. The national struggle against Communism had begun to disintegrate.

Although known and unknown Communists in the various Army units were forming Communist cells, disseminating propaganda and obtaining and passing on information, no mass mutinies occurred, and desertions to the Communist bands were few and far between. The Communists who had infiltrated were instructed to stay in the Army units and gradually erode them. The Greek Army commanders were well aware of the situation, but the government hesitated to adopt special measures against the Communists without indisputable proof of guilt, and only rarely were the Communists careless or artless enough to provide it. However, there were two or three cases where, during attacks by bandits against small Army units, Communist soldiers turned against their comrades, killed their officers and helped the bandits to win.

It is perhaps difficult for outsiders to realize the psychological stress of this period. The situation in itself was extremely unpleasant, and in addition it contained the distinct threat of dangerous developments in the near future. Helped by their conscious or naïvely unconscious allies, the Communists had succeeded in erasing the memory of the atrocities they had committed little over a year ago. They succeeded in creating a general belief that appeasement measures could end the bandit activity, which, they alleged, resulted exclusively from excesses by the "Right." Nor was this belief confined to Greek public opinion alone; it received widespread credence abroad.

During the winter of 1946–47, in those regions where the guerrilla bands were most active, the Army, for the reasons outlined above, was concentrated around the main cities and towns and their lines of communications. The small detachments hitherto scattered over the countryside were withdrawn and grouped together. Simultaneously, under the pressure of events and in view of the seriousness of the situation, the first measures were taken to rid the units of Communist soldiers and confine them in a separate camp. Virtually no active cleaning-up operations against the guerrilla bands were undertaken during this period. Taking

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advantage of the situation, and favored by the fact that heavy snowfall had rendered many routes impassable, the Communists were able to gain complete control over large mountain areas, whence they would frequently emerge to the nearby plains to raid villages or harass troops. A study of the positions thus occupied reveals that they extended progressively southward, reaching out towards the ultimate objective—Athens, the capital. Moreover, an unbroken network of mountain corridors linked the strongholds to one another and to the northern frontier; not all the corridors were under Communist control, but the guerrilla bands had comparative ease of movement and supply from the north.

On the whole, the operations of the bandits during the year 1946 were designed first of all to achieve psychological results which, in turn, would yield material results. We cannot actually be certain whether this was the original Communist plan, or whether it developed with the trend of events. Even the professional soldier, whose teaching and experience has been connected with regular army warfare, finds it hard to appraise with certainty the material gains of the Communist bandits. It is a fact that the national forces were numerically superior to the guerrilla bands. Also, they were better armed, their leaders were tried veterans of the 1940–41 war (some even were veterans of previous wars as well) and their casualties negligible. No large-scale battles were fought, no mass enemy movements occurred. And in these negative factors lay the strength and effectiveness of the guerrillas' interconnected cold and hot war. The hot element remained smaller than the cold, so that the national forces were in danger of losing the war without fighting it.

IV. THE YEARS 1947 AND 1948

During the late winter of 1946–1947 the command of the country's armed forces examined the situation and reached certain general decisions.

Extensive cleaning-up operations would be initiated in the spring. As the available forces were not deemed sufficient for simultaneous operations of this kind in all the districts infested by Communist bandits, plans were laid to progress gradually from the south to the north. It was estimated that by the end of the year the Communist bands would have been liquidated. While the principal operations were in progress in a certain district, such forces as were available in other infested areas would also

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attack the bands there in order at least to hinder their further development.

These cleaning-up operations would consist at first of a pincer movement around a chosen area, with the points of the pincer gradually converging toward the center. It was hoped thus to capture a large number of bandits or, at least, force them into battle and exterminate them. The second period, estimated to be very short, would be given to mopping up the remnants. Following this, the bulk of the armed forces would be available to assume similar operations in the next area. However, a few forces would be left to deal with the last remnants of bandits and the local Communist "self-defense" organization. By now all understood that this was quite as dangerous as the bands themselves, who could not thrive without it.

It was also decided that the units of the Army would be systematically purged of Communist soldiers. These would be sent to a special camp to undergo a moral rehabilitation. Those who sincerely abjured Communism, into which they had been inveigled, would be returned to their units.

However, these operations did not go according to plan for several reasons. The Communist bandits were informed of impending attacks in given districts in time to withdraw, for the most part, to some neighboring district which had not yet been cleaned up. Even when they did not withdraw ahead of time most of them usually succeeded in leaking through gaps in the pincers. When the cleansing of a district from the "self-defense" organization and the liquidation of its remnants proceeded satisfactorily, much more time and much larger forces than had been estimated were required. In order to encourage the inhabitants to support the Army in its job, they had to be convinced that the Army would not withdraw and leave them unprotected. And when the cleansing had been successfully effected in some of the early operations, the Communist rebels elsewhere withdrew not only their bands but also the greater part of the local "self-defense" machine.

Moreover, to clear a district of rebel bands and keep it clear demanded the stationing on the spot of larger forces than had at first been estimated. In an effort to overcome this disadvantage armed peasants under military leadership were at first employed on a small scale; but they tended to be ineffective. The result was that as the main operations were carried northward the number of available government troops was continually reduced and fi-

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nally was insufficient to cope with the situation. By avoiding battle, the Communists endeavored, at times successfully, to reënter the districts from which they had been expelled, either by infiltrating through gaps in the cordon or by circuitous movements.

Finally, despite their losses and numerous defections, the Communist bands succeeded in refilling their ranks through compulsory recruiting of peasants. They also retained their fighting spirit. In June they actually attacked a significant urban center with large forces. That attack failed, but it was another proof that the numerous military operations undertaken against them had neither destroyed their fighting ability nor curbed the warlike disposition of their leaders. During the summer of that year the Communist bands for the first time received designations as regular army units (battalions), and their leaders endeavored to organize them in accordance with regular army standards—adjusted, of course, to the means at their disposal and to the lessons they had learned in guerrilla warfare. They were reinforced, moreover, by cadres freshly trained in military schools functioning in the neighboring satellite countries. And simultaneously, the supply of arms and ammunition reaching them from the neighboring countries was intensified.

The result of the 1947 operations was disheartening. Though the progress of the bandits had been checked the Communist threat was by no means ended. In the winter of 1947–1948 the bandits reorganized their forces and set to work to increase them. They returned to the districts from which they had been driven and prepared to meet the Army's new attacks in the coming spring. Moreover, the efforts to intercept the supplies dispatched from neighboring countries were not successful and the rebels now came into possession of artillery.

Along with these developments, the Communist leadership endeavored to assume a more official appearance. The leaders announced the formation of a government and endeavored to occupy some urban center adjacent to the border with the intention of using it as a "capital." They failed in this, however. According to the Greek Government's information, had they succeeded in this they would have received official recognition from the Communist countries, followed probably by open military aid.

The leaders of the Communist bandits also strove to create a "free area" which would be securely in their hands. This was a political necessity for them after forming a "government," and it

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was a military move as well, since if they were to extend their operations they needed a stable base on Greek territory. They selected as a base the mountainous region of Grammos-Vitsi, near the Greek-Albanian-Jugoslav border, and fortified it during the winter with military works, barbed wire and some minefields. The bulk of the Communist bands were assembled there. Several attacks were also made upon points guarded by the Greek Army, but they were of little avail.

The Greek command changed its tactics in 1948. It was decided that after a rapid cleaning-up operation from the south to the north, the Army's main effort would be concentrated against the Communist fortified area, in the hope that the enemy would give battle, and, forced to withdraw to the neighboring countries, would sustain serious losses. The seizure of this territory would seriously hamper, if not cut entirely, the supply lines by which the Communists maintained their troops in the interior.

The past year's experience had shown that the government forces were insufficient for their task, and thanks to American aid the size of the Army was notably enlarged. More of the quasi-military units called M.E.A., composed of armed peasants under military command, were organized. Operations began in the spring, when the Army's forces were concentrated opposite Mt. Grammos. The fighting continued for more than two months, with considerable losses on both sides, and in the end the area was taken. The remaining Communist forces escaped through Albanian territory, however, and reëntered Greece in the Vitsi area, farther to the north.

In the beginning of autumn the Army attacked this mountain mass, but failed in the operation and incurred serious losses. The losses of the Communist rebels were heavy also, but they were not dislodged. Clashes occurred continuously through the country, and the Communist bands extended their activity to the southernmost tip of continental Greece and to some of the islands. Supplies reached them at these distant points by sea from Albania. They mined the roads and railways, and the destruction of communications forced the Army to disperse its efforts. Thus by the end of 1948 and the beginning of 1949 the whole situation was deteriorating. Communist bandits reëstablished themselves on Grammos during the winter. Two years of hard and bloody effort seemed to have ended in failure. The end of the ghastly affair was not in sight.

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By spring the Communists had made good their losses, mainly by the compulsory recruiting of peasants, and supplies from the neighboring Communist countries were reaching them in ever-increasing quantities, including heavy armament, especially artillery. As a result they were enabled to attack even important towns successfully. The Communist excesses, as well as the executions by the reactionaries, had caused numbers of peasants to abandon their homes and seek safety in guarded towns. This created an enormous refugee problem. The year's fighting had shown that the concentration of Army efforts on uprooting the Communist base (Grammos-Vitsi) close to the border had simply enabled the bandits to extend their activity in the interior. Moreover, the Communist forces had now taken the shape of a regular army, thanks to the abundant supplies pouring in from abroad and the training of officers in the military schools of the satellite countries. The situation was critical. Communism seemed an unconquerable hydra.

V. THE YEAR 1949

Three years of indecisive guerrilla warfare were indeed a terrible price for a weary and impoverished nation to pay for learning the correct method of finally defeating the Communists who had taken up arms against the legal government. The fellow-travellers were still advising appeasement. Nobody else doubted that this would mean in fact handing the country over to Communism and that this would be followed by its subjugation by the Slav satellites of Moscow. Even so, some people doubted whether a victory by the national forces was possible. The writer was not one of these. He believed that, on the contrary, Communism could be defeated, that the measures applied for this purpose in the past had failed because they were either inadequate or uncoördinated, that a radical change would lead to victory, but that there was no time to waste.

The change in the command of the Greek armed forces took place in January 1949. The wide powers with which the new command was invested were, one may say, the fundamental reason for the subsequent improvement in the situation. The immediate and most important result was the recovery in morale of both the people and the Army. The new general plan of action, drawn up in agreement with the American and British military missions, was plain and simple. It was based on an analysis of exist-

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ing Communist activities. In the first place, the Communists had firmly occupied a certain number of areas close to the border, with their rear resting on friendly foreign territory; these areas, mainly Grammos and Vitsi, were well fortified with barbed wire and minefields and were defended by important forces well supplied with artillery and ammunition. Second, they had operated throughout the rest of the country by normal guerrilla activity —that is, by bands which evaded pitched battles but tried to control a whole area by visiting the different districts in it from time to time and dealing out severe punishment to unfriendly peasants.

The one possible way to deal with the firmly-held areas close to the border was to undertake an offensive action based on the usual rules employed by regular forces to annihilate an opponent. To deal with the Communist bands scattered through the country different tactics were necessary. In the first place, they must be pursued ruthlessly and relentlessly by day and night, by sufficient forces, proceeding from different directions, so that they would be obliged either to give battle or to disperse. Secondly, stern measures must be taken to liquidate the "self-defense" setup which provided them with essential intelligence, recruits and supplies.

As the available Army forces were not sufficient for the simultaneous execution of both tasks, plans were laid for a gradual advance from south to north. The cleaning-up of the Peloponnese had begun at the end of 1948, but fresh measures were needed to make sure that areas once cleared of guerrillas would not be reinfected. Militarized units of armed peasants under the command of Army officers were assigned this task. Meanwhile, sufficient forces for the occupation of Grammos and Vitsi had to be concentrated. To guard against Communist inroads among them, all personnel under suspicion were removed and sent to a special camp for national rehabilitation.[1]

The general plan, matured with American aid, was applied with strict attention to the minutest details. The new combined force, aided by the local military units, successively cleared one district after another from south to north. They accomplished their tasks virtually within the designated time limits. Fresh units replaced worn ones as the main force moved to new areas, and light bat-

[1] The rehabilitated men later were formed into separate units, some of which distinguished themselves in the field.

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talions were left behind to hold the ground gained. Their job was not too difficult, for the campaign had been so thorough that all but a small number of the roving bandits had been exterminated and the local "self-defense" organizations which maintained them had been wiped out. Finally, most of the Army's divisions were drawn up in imposing array before the Vitsi-Grammos fortified area. It fell after a swift drive. Victory had been achieved in nine months.

The Communists had reacted to these operations both tactically and strategically. By attacking with one echelon in the Vitsi-Grammos area in coördination with an offensive by roving bands in the interior they attempted to distract the Army's main forces from the cleaning-up operations further south. At another time they tried to occupy an important town near the Vitsi area; and later they resorted to a strong raiding action in depth. But they failed both tactically and strategically. They could not compel a change in the general plan or force the Army to withdraw from the main effort in order to protect the threatened areas.

VI. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Let me now summarize my conclusions from our experience in Greece.

Communist guerrilla warfare has two methods of operation: attack by arms and propaganda. Propaganda precedes the armed action and continues during and after it. The cold and hot war are closely coördinated, and one helps the other; but the emphasis is on the cold war. Communism cannot sustain its efforts alone; it requires allies, that is, the help of fellow-travellers. Without an auxiliary organization for obtaining information and giving general support guerrillas are condemned to early extinction. Parallel with their military operations, the Communist guerrillas seek to disintegrate their opponent—the army, the people, the state—by subversive propaganda and by reducing as many of the population as possible to destitution. To create a huge wave of hungry and ragged refugees they resort to any sort of ferocious and criminal action.

The first and principal antidote to these activities is timely diagnosis and ruthless suppression. Any leniency shown will inevitably be paid for later with blood and treasure. In saying this I wish not to be misunderstood: I do not imply that social problems are to be solved by the use of violence. On the contrary, it is

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the primary duty of a truly democratic government to seek and find just and generous solutions to such problems. But by now it has become quite clear that Communism is concerned only to exploit social problems; it seeks to aggravate rather than solve them because it thrives on unrest. The forcible measures which I advocate are to be used only against the professional dealers in subversion, the Communists and Communist agents who speculate in human lives. For them, no quarter. Our experience in Greece showed, however, that a considerable number of those who have accepted Communist leadership can with proper treatment and guidance be reclaimed and made into good members of the community. This should be one of the nation's chief aims. But the fanatic and hardened incorrigibles must be prevented from spreading their poison.

Public education and psychological warfare must be used intensively in order to counteract the Communist propaganda. Every democratic citizen should understand the Communist challenge.

When a nation reaches a point where it is forced to engage in military operations against guerrillas, the Communists have already won the first round. Thereafter the process will be painful. To suppress them will take much larger armed forces than those in the guerrilla bands. Moreover, activity must be directed simultaneously against the guerrillas and against the unseen organization which supports them. The members of this must be sought out everywhere, even in districts where guerrilla activity has not yet come into the open. The particular form of the military operations used against the elusive guerrillas themselves will be determined by local conditions, but in general the best procedure is continuous, relentless, unremitting pursuit, especially by night, so as to exhaust them and to force them either to fight or disintegrate.

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THE NEAR EAST: THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH

By Charles Malik

BY THE Near East I mean the cradle of Western civilization. Take the fundamental generic components of that civilization and trace them back across the ages to their lands of origin, and there you have the Near East. Thus if no fundamental component can be shown to originate in a given country X, then X is not part of the Near East. The concept therefore is neither political, nor geopolitical, nor geographic, nor strategic: it is essentially cultural-genetic.

If a circle is drawn on the map with Beirut or Damascus or Jerusalem as its center and with a radius of about nine hundred miles, this circle will pretty nearly comprise the whole of the Near East. It will include the following ten cities: Athens, Istanbul, Antioch, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Jerusalem, Alexandria, Cairo and Mecca. Western civilization is an offshoot, in diverse modes of relevance, of what was revealed, apprehended, loved, suffered and enacted in these ten cities or in their hinterlands.[1]

This cultural-genetic relatedness between the Near East and the West has been the theme of wonder and reflection literally for thousands of years. Nobody forgets his origins, and so the Western world has never tired of brooding upon the great mystery of the eastern shores of the Mediterranean where it was born. Is it a pure myth entirely devoid of any significance that Europa was a lovely Phoenician princess who was carried off by no less a god than mighty Zeus himself?

The fact that malevolence abounds in the world and may misinterpret or misquote or distort what we say will not deter us from facing our situation in the Near East squarely and honestly. There is abroad in the Near East today a new critical spirit. It is dissatisfied with the given and is not afraid to voice its dissatisfaction. There is health and hope and freedom only in the daring knowledge and confession of the truth, whatever risks that may involve.

Our subject is not easy, not because of present complications,

[1] The apparent exception of Rome is greatly mitigated by the fact that the deepest things did not arise there; that what did arise there was actually rooted in the Near East; and that the codification of Roman law was the achievement of the eastern Mediterranean. Rome was faithful but not original.

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but because in itself it raises the deepest issues. This study for the most part only opens up horizons for thought, only sets up signposts for further inquiry. Two lights alone guide us: truth and love. In their company alone we propose to walk, and if we stray from the right path it cannot be the fault of our lights, but our own. It can only be because we have not loved enough to deserve a fairer measure of the truth. But surely he who sets his heart in all purity and love upon the vision of the truth may hope that he will be granted a glimpse of it. It is this faith that sustains us.

II

There are in the Near East today some twenty states and principalities. Greece, Turkey and Israel are the only non-Arab states. Iran (Persia), another non-Arab state, does not fall properly within the Near East according to our conception, although, being distinctly a borderline case, it presents a gradual transition from the Near East to the Asiatic realms beyond. All the remaining Near Eastern states or principalities are Arab.[2] In the geographical area commonly known as the Fertile Crescent there are the Republics of Syria and Lebanon, and the Kingdoms of Jordan and Iraq. In the Arabian Peninsula there are the Kingdoms of Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and the principalities of Muscat and Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrein, as well as Trucial Oman and the Aden Colony and Protectorates. In North Africa there are Egypt and the Sudan. The other North African countries—namely, Libya (which is scheduled to attain independence on January 1, 1952), Tunisia and Morocco (which are under French rule), Algeria (which is incorporated into France proper), and Spanish Morocco—although they are parts of the "Arab world," do not fall within the Near East. It is apparent, then, that the Near East is that unique region which connects the three continents of Europe, Asia and Africa.

Nine of the Near Eastern states (or ten if you include Iran) are members of the United Nations. Seven of the Near Eastern states form the League of Arab States, but only six of them are

[2] The word "Arab" denotes neither a race nor a religion. For the most part its connotation today is "Arabic-speaking." The overwhelming majority of the Arabic-speaking peoples (or Arabs) are Moslem, just as the overwhelming majority of Moslems are non-Arab: so the two terms do not coincide. Although there are vast diversities of culture among them, the Arabs have certain general cultural traits in common. They also have common aspirations. Whether all Arabic-speaking peoples constitute a single nation depends first on the meaning of the term "constitute" and second on the "Arab" adaptation of the European concept of "nation." All this of course is independent of the question whether they *should* constitute a nation.

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members of the United Nations. Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan are loosely linked together by the practically obsolete Sa'adabad Pact of 1937. Turkey and Greece have been recommended for full membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Besides, several bilateral treaties link one or the other of the Near Eastern states either with another state in the same region or with some other members of the international community.

We shall exclude from the purview of our study the thematic treatment of Greece, Turkey and Iran. It is not difficult for the thoughtful reader to determine for himself how, where or to what extent the diverse parts of our inquiry apply to them.

Of all the countries of the Near East, Arab and non-Arab, the first to attain her modern form and structure was Egypt. The westernizing reforms of that great soldier-leader, Mohammed Ali, resulting in some modest industrialization and in an emergent middle class, antedate the reforms of Ataturk and Reza Shah by well over a century. If only Egypt's strategic importance were not what it is, and if as a result Mohammed Ali's ferment had worked itself out normally without inordinate interference from outside, it might be possible that Egypt today would present a different aspect so far as social and economic advance was concerned, and be in a better position to play a more effective part in the maintenance of peace and security in the Near East.

Nevertheless, fate (which is here another name for the unalterable facts of geography, or better of geopolitics) would not have it this way, and the development of Egypt's sovereignty has been both slow and checkered: the product of a long process of insurrection and negotiation which even now is not entirely at an end. From the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798 until the British declaration of the Protectorate during World War I, the country had no respite from foreign invasion and occupation, or from rivalry and conflict of the Great Powers, particularly France, Britain and Ottoman Turkey. Nor were matters happier after the acknowledgment, by her rivals, of Britain's position of supremacy in Egypt, or even after the subsequent abolition of the Protectorate and the declaration of independence in 1922. Britain's unswerving insistence upon maintaining a foothold in Egypt caused subsequent negotiations for a treaty to fail on three successive occasions; and when, at last, the Treaty of 1936 was concluded, it continued to place obligations upon Egypt which Egypt is still struggling to remove. A readjustment of Brit-

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ain's position in Egypt and in the Near East in general is clearly indicated (and has in fact already begun with respect to Palestine): the only question is as to its modality, as to the legacy of friendship or bitterness it might leave in its wake.

Politically Egypt leads in the Arab world. There is a significant Arabic literary movement in Egypt, and the Egyptian press dominates the Arab reading public everywhere. Egyptian universities draw students from all over the Moslem world, and there is an attempt to stamp out the curse of illiteracy.

The modern Sudan originally became known to the outside world through the invasion of it by Mohammed Ali's forces in 1820; and from then until the end of the century Egyptian forces supported by British troops were engaged in the pacification of the country. It was in 1899 that the Sudan was finally occupied in full. The Anglo-Egyptian Agreements of that year (January 19 and July 10) established the Condominium. These Agreements reflected on the whole the military aspect of Britain's participation in the administration of the Sudan, carefully circumventing the thorny issue of sovereignty by providing for the simultaneous use of the British and Egyptian flags and the dual process of appointment or removal of the Governor-General, in whom the supreme military and civil command of the Sudan was to be vested. Nor were the provisions concerning the Sudan in the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 more final in nature than the Agreements of 1899 which they mainly reaffirmed.

Egypt's claims for the incorporation of the Sudan in some form under the Egyptian Crown are based on four facts: (a), the general community of culture between the Sudanese and Egyptian peoples (language, religion, race, general cultural patterns); (b), the general historical interactions between the two peoples, especially the rôle played by Egypt since the time of Mohammed Ali in the conquest and pacification of the region; (c), the desires of certain sections of the population (*e.g.* the Ashigga Party) to enjoy their autonomy under the Egyptian Crown; and (d), fundamental considerations of national welfare and security—for the Nile, which is the very existence of Egypt, passes *first* through the Sudan. This fourfold argument is precisely what is meant by the pregnant phrase, the unity of the Nile Valley, which is absolutely fundamental to Egyptian thought.

From the viewpoint of what is abiding and natural, there is no doubt that this unity of the Nile Valley must reassert itself

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sooner or later in closer living ties between Egypt and the Sudan. Again the only question is as to the modality of this relationship. If there is a modicum of fundamental confidence and trust (which raises profound questions concerning men and cultures), and if other fundamental issues are honestly faced, not only as between Britain and Egypt, but as between the whole Western world and the East, then a working formula embodying the essential interests and rights of all concerned can be found. Not to believe in this is to worship utter darkness: to despair of the power of man, coming back to himself with a purified heart, to rise above and reconcile conflicting interests. And the more one broods upon Britain, Egypt and the Sudan, in their positive relationship to one another, the more one grows in the conviction that their interests, for all their present clash, are nevertheless essentially reconcilable.

One question must be raised in passing. Any student of geopolitics knows that population problems are among the history-determining issues, and will be so particularly during the coming decades. At the present rate of increase the population of Egypt will be doubled by the end of the century. How will this population pressure, in an already overpopulated country, be relieved? Where is Egypt's "living space" if it is not in North Africa and especially along the Nile? Long-term policy planners must ponder this question very deeply.

The two Kingdoms of the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, are slowly emerging from their original state of isolation, while the other principalities of the Peninsula remain more or less remote from the actual life of the region. The two sovereign Kingdoms are far yet from being full participants in the life of the Arab family of nations. They are indeed members of both the United Nations and the League of Arab States, but their contributions to the efforts of the former organization have been on the whole negligible. Nor is there much social interaction between them and the rest of the Arab world.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia does exercise some influence upon the political developments of the Arab States. It has been a moderating factor in many a tense situation. However, the absence of an enlightened and articulate public opinion, and of civil and political institutions commensurate with what obtains elsewhere in the Arab world, has restricted the impact of Saudi Arabia upon Arab affairs almost entirely to the governmental level; and even there its scope has been limited.

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The Saudi Arabian monarch has played an important rôle in the first half of the twentieth century. There are so many inscrutable factors, both internal and external, in the situation that it is quite impossible to foretell what the fortunes of his Kingdom will be in the coming decades. One thing is certain: the wealth accruing to the country from oil is bound sooner or later to induce significant changes in the otherwise changeless Peninsula.

The nationalist sentiment in Iraq, frustrated immediately after World War I, gave rise to the rebellion of 1920; and since then Britain has sought to meet piecemeal the Iraqi demands for full sovereignty, first through a period of probation under the Mandate, and subsequently through the declaration of independence and the conclusion of a series of treaties providing for certain military concessions. Here was another instance of the selfsame pattern of Anglo-Arab relations which prevailed since World War I: Britain devising formula after formula to reconcile her imperial interests with the shifting scene, a scene which would have been far more docile were it not for the tenacious attachment of the Arabs to their ideal of independence and for the internal relative weakening of Britain herself.

So strong has the nationalist sentiment in Iraq been for the last 30 years, and so preoccupied have the Iraqis been with the problem of independence, that there has been relatively little concern with the equally crucial problems of internal organization and social-economic reform. More so in Iraq perhaps than in the other Arab countries, nationalism pure and simple has been erected as a creed, a sole doctrine which dominates social thought and a single force which sways the public.

During the last three decades there has been on the average more than one cabinet change per year in Iraq. Three basic reasons explain this apparent political instability: the existence of powerful contending forces—racial, religious and social; the existence of what I might call a crisis of leadership in Iraq since the death of King Feisal; and the absence of an adequate socio-economic-ideological content in the nationalist movement, so that the support of the masses, in so far as it existed, was more based on sentimental than on objectively satisfying and enduring grounds.

I spoke of "apparent instability," for it will be apparent that the reigning Hashemite house has been the mainspring of stability in these decades. Nothing seems to be more firmly established in Iraq than this house and the love of the people for their boy-

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monarch. Feisal II has every opportunity to prove one of the leading world figures during the second half of this century.

The story of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is the story of the late King Abdullah. From the earliest stages of its history, when Transjordan, originally a part of the vilayet of Syria, was established as an Amirate and placed under the Mandate in 1922 and then recognized as an independent government under British tutelage in the following year; through the next 25 years of growth in self-government, during which period the succeeding stages of development were registered in successive treaties and agreements with Britain; up until the attainment of fuller independence, the transformation of the Amirate into a Monarchy, and the annexation of parts of Arab Palestine west of the river Jordan—during all this development the fortunes of the state revolved around the central figure of the Hashemite ruler.

The Amirate and the Kingdom owed their relative stability and limited progress to Abdullah's personal authority. His rule also spared the country (however good or bad this may have been) costly and periodic clashes with the dominating foreign power. He practised perfectly the maxim that politics is the art of the possible. So intertwined were the fortunes of Jordan with the person of the slain King that it is unlikely that his place will be filled by a successor of the same caliber. But it is important to note that the vacuum created by Abdullah's assassination will probably be much more felt in the conduct of Jordan's foreign relations than in the internal administration of the country.

Syria and Lebanon alone of all the Arab Near East had to contend with French domination. The nationalist situation in Syria was from the beginning intense, owing to the important position of Damascus in Arab life and to the many frustrations suffered by Syria at the hands of the Allies. Greater Syria was dismembered, the southern and northern parts being put under different administrations. Quarrels with the French never ended, and the policy of a national home for the Jews executed by the British administration in Palestine served at once to inflame Syrian nationalist feeling and to imbue it with a necessary anti-Western tinge. The nationalist movement came to look upon the West not as a friend, not as a liberator, but as a schemer and intriguer bent upon division, domination and the settlement, against the will of the native population, of countless Jews on Syrian soil.

The preoccupation of Syria during three decades with her na-

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tional struggle for freedom and independence reflects itself today in the young republic, not so much in specifically anti-foreign sentiment as in the absence of dominant planning and strong leadership. It is difficult for the foreigner to appreciate the effect of these decades of resistance and struggle in which national emancipation seemed the only purpose for common endeavor. A whole generation has been schooled in the negative—if necessary—discipline of resistance, and it must take some time before the more positive virtues of responsibility, planning, statesmanship and strong government can perfect themselves.

Youthful leadership is today gradually finding itself. The three *coups* of 1949 did not cancel one another: they were more like three successive ripples emanating from one and the same impulse, an impulse partly arising from the Arab disaster in Palestine, partly from the inadequacy of the old leadership in face of the strenuous demands of the moment, partly from the urge of youth to replace this outworn leadership. No strong government has so far emerged from these events: nevertheless a new constitution has been enacted, and several moderate reforms have been introduced. Real endeavors have been made to improve the agricultural and other economic conditions of the country. Education and the army have shared the greater attention.

But the most promising fact in Syria today is the increasing activity of a few political parties which have more than the "creed of full independence" to commend them to public support. Perhaps more than anywhere else in the Arab world genuine political parties and social movements, with clear-cut platforms, social and ideological convictions, and effective organization, are gradually feeling their way towards the light. When positive, constructive plans are elaborated (and they are bound, I believe, to ensue sooner or later), and a strong leadership arises with an orientation towards the future and a grounding upon a creative conception of freedom, then Syria, by reason of her economic, human and spiritual possibilities, may play a fundamental rôle in Near Eastern and Arab affairs.

For about a century now the Lebanon has enjoyed some kind of autonomy. In the sixties of the last century six European Powers—France, Great Britain, Prussia, Austria, Russia and Italy—established in agreement with Ottoman Turkey an organic statute according to which Lebanon was to enjoy autonomy within the Ottoman Empire under a Christian governor to be nominated

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by the Porte and approved by the six Powers. Even during World War I this autonomy was at least nominally respected by the Ottoman Turks who did not draft the inhabitants of Lebanon into their army.

After World War I Lebanon was enlarged and placed under a League of Nations mandate, with France as the mandatory. The Republic of Lebanon was declared in 1926, but France remained the dominating power. The struggle for complete independence went on until in 1943 Parliament erased from the constitution every text in any way diminishing the independence of the country. Subsequent events confirmed this independent act.

The Lebanon has a positive vocation in the international field. It is not political. It is spiritual and intellectual. It consists in being true to the best and truest in East and West alike. This burden of mediation and understanding she is uniquely called to bear.

Some writers, whatever their motive, have depicted Israel as destined to reconcile East and West. But how can one reconcile two things by being outside of them? The West is unthinkable apart from Christianity and the East apart from Islam. Israel is grounded neither in the one nor in the other. Lebanon—little and fragile as she is—is the only country, not only in existence today but perhaps throughout history, where East and West meet and mingle with each other on a footing of equality. The vigorous Moslem citizens of Lebanon bring in the integral contribution of the East, while the Christian citizens are in deepest spiritual and historical communion with the West. If this situation can endure, there is a wonderful possibility of creative confrontation.

The Lebanon could not be true to East and West alike unless she stood for existential freedom. In the end this is alone her justification. This means freedom of thought, freedom of choice, freedom of being, freedom of becoming. Whoever is about to suffocate must be able to breathe freely in the Lebanon. Here the possibility of access to the truth, the whole truth, must be absolutely real. Existential freedom interprets man as being subject only to the compulsion of truth. He is determined, but unlike the mob which is determined by every darkness and wind of doctrine, by the misguidance of every passing principality, his is the determination of truth.

Now the "middle term," the principle of mediation, is, according to Aristotle, the mark of reason. In this sense mediation *is* moderation. To be able to perform her moderating and mediating

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function between East and West, the Lebanon must be and feel secure in her existence. The narrow nationalist may grudge her her being; to the superficial aesthete she may be an embarrassment. But the Arab world, of which she is an integral part, and the West, in which she profoundly participates, must both see in a strong, self-respecting, peaceful, independent, free and secure Lebanon a blessing to everybody. Only the love of truth can really see this. Thus the secure existence of the Lebanon measures the degree of love abroad.

Everything that strengthens the Lebanon as thus conceived must be good. To swerve from her basic idea is to court disaster. Her basic idea is not political; on the contrary, her political existence is derivative. If she succumbs to the political temptation, to the manifestation of power, she will move from one defeat to another. The principle of international politics is power; but Lebanon's power is reason, truth, love, suffering, being.

Two things dominate the Arab mind in general: independence and unity. There is a deep-seated mystical element in both of these feelings. The only analogous situation I can think of is the radical sense of unity and independence which determined the history of the German peoples in recent decades. Independence springs from the Arab sense of difference from others, a sense that has been sharpened in recent centuries by the relative isolation of the Arabs from the rest of the world. Unity takes on many modalities: from the mild form of general community and consultation enshrined in the Arab League to the extreme form of complete political unification desired by certain nationalist movements, particularly in Iraq and Syria. But regardless of its modality, every Arab feels an immediate mystical unity with every other Arab. The elaboration of the ultimate causes and the real structure, limitation and promise of these two creative Arab persuasions is one of the most fascinating philosophical-cultural tasks to be undertaken by the loving and understanding mind.

The Arab League is an expression of the degree and modality of unity that prevails among the Arab States. However, the common aspiration for unity among most Arab intelligentsia (and to some extent among most Arab peoples) is greater than the actual unity among the Arab ruling circles. Thus there has been some popular dissatisfaction with the League on account of its failure to represent adequately, or even to promote, the existing unity among Arab peoples.

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The League has been severely tried during the first years of its existence (it was founded in 1945). To take the single example of Palestine: the average Arab is not convinced that—notwithstanding "foreign interference" and Zionist preparedness—the Holy Land would have been lost to Israel had the Arab League been more adequate to meet its tasks. To ascribe every failure to the League itself is very sentimental; for the League cannot rise above the combined stature of its members.

The basic disunity from which the Arab League suffers is the result of several factors: the social and existential discontinuities in the Arab world itself, the dynastic rivalries, and the subterranean inter-Arab tensions, heightened by the focussing of world interest upon the Arab world. To these there has recently been added a more tangible and perhaps more serious factor of disunity: the physical existence of Israel on the only land-bridge which connects the northeastern and the western parts of the Arab world. The social, economic and strategic significance of this factor cannot be overestimated. The Arab League also suffers from the absence of daring, enlightened leadership. The crisis of leadership in the Arab world is as sharp in inter-Arab relations as in the purely national sphere.

But regardless of its political limitations, the Arab League can play a more active rôle in the economic, cultural and social life of the Arab world. There is ample room for the coördination of the energies of the various Arab countries in the socio-economic realm; nor is such inter-Arab coöperation as likely to be handicapped by the various internal and external factors of disunity as is the strictly political coöperation.

There will always be an Arab League, regardless of what guise it may take, or by what designation it may be known. For there will always be a measure of community among the Arabs which, particularly under the exacting conditions of present life, will call for appropriate expression and embodiment on the socio-political international level.

III

The rise of Israel is certainly a great historic event whose total consequences it is impossible now to foretell. But it is safe to affirm that as a result the Near East has now entered upon a new critical stage of development. The fate of the Near East is now intertwined with that of Israel.

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The existence of Israel presents a real and serious challenge to Arab existence. It is a test of Arab patriotism, dynamism, wisdom and statesmanship. It constitutes a virtual touchstone of Arab capacities for self-preservation and self-determination. Both those Arabs who have been complacently contented with what has been termed "Arab renaissance" for the last 30 years, and those who have remained placidly indifferent to the fate of their countries, have been deeply shaken as a result of the recent events. There is abroad a grim sense of destiny.

There is today an internationally recognized state in the Near East called Israel. This new state quickly succeeded in becoming a member of the United Nations, while such older states as Italy or Ireland have not yet been able to join the world organization. Hundreds of thousands of Jews have been flocking into Israel, and the process of their absorption into the economy and community life of the new nation is in full swing. All this undoubtedly constitutes an historical achievement of the first magnitude.

Yet this achievement, great and real as it is, cannot by itself guarantee the future. To establish a state, or, for that matter, any institution, is one thing; to ensure its continued existence is entirely another. For no matter how difficult the act of establishment may be, I think it is clear that the effort at self-perpetuation will prove incomparably more exacting. Entirely different moral qualities are requisite for the accomplishment of that task. In the struggle for establishment you treat the others as alien forces, to be crushed or pushed back or at least prevented from encroaching upon you; your relation to them is external, summary, destructive, negative; under no circumstances can you allow internal, positive intercourse with them on a basis of equality. But in the struggle for enduring existence you must come to terms with them; you must take their existence positively into account; your idea must be softened and modulated and trimmed to accommodate their idea; you must enter into interacting relationship with them, based on mutual respect and trust. Whether the leadership and the ethos of Israel are adequate to the requirements of existence, of course only the future can disclose.

For it must not be forgotten that Israel is not yet at peace with her immediate world. Her Arab and Moslem environment has not yet recognized her. She has no dealings whatsoever with her surroundings. Besides this radical political and economic estrangement, there is a profound intellectual and spiritual chasm be-

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tween Israel and the rest of the Near East. Two entirely different economies, two entirely different religions, two entirely different languages (at least two languages whose kinship is the outcome of distant origination from a third source and not of immediate interaction, as *e.g.* between Arabic and Turkish or French and English), two entirely different mentalities, two entirely different cultures, two entirely different civilizations, face each other across this chasm. I do not know of a single other instance in the world where there is such radical existential discontinuity across national frontiers. The "ingathering" of the Oriental Jews may soften this discontinuity a bit, but not to the extent of making it at all comparable to the graded transition that obtains almost everywhere else in the world. Thus Israel is only geographically part of the Near East, and therefore her fundamental problem is not how to establish herself—a relatively easy matter, considering the world forces, both positive and negative, which aided her—but how to integrate herself, economically, politically, spiritually, in the life of the Near East; how to promote friendly, creative, sustained and sustaining, trustful, peaceful, internal relations with the Arab and Moslem worlds. Self-establishment by force is fairly easy—at least it is possible; but self-perpetuation by force is, in the nature of the case, absolutely impossible. At least history has not known an instance of a nation at permanent enmity with its immediate world.

I think the Zionist idea, reinforced by an organizational genius of the first order, and sharpened by the sufferings of the Jews in recent years, has proved itself exceedingly potent in summoning forth world-wide sympathy and support. Whether this same idea, in the next crucial phase of its development, is resourceful and resilient and humble enough to create genuine, internal relations of confidence and coöperation between itself and the Moslem-Arab world in the midst of which it has chosen to plant itself is altogether beyond my ken to prophesy or even to conjecture. But one thing can be said with certainty. If the present arrogance, defiance and ambition are to persist; and if Israel is to be again and again confirmed in her feeling that she is to be favored—just because the United States, owing to the position of the Jews in this country, to certain well-known peculiarities in the American political and social system, to widespread ignorance in the United States of real conditions in the Near East, and also to a certain genuine, well-meaning goodness of heart on the part of the Amer-

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ican people will at the crucial moment always decisively side with Israel against her immediate world—then, I am afraid, there will never be peace in the Near East, and the United States cannot be altogether innocent of responsibility for that situation.

The fair acount of the historical genesis of Israel, including the diverse factors that played a decisive rôle in this genesis, is yet to be written: and may not see the light of day before decades. Although I was a firsthand witness of and participant in the crucial events of 1947 and 1948 in the United Nations, it is not my intention to go into this matter here.[3] But on the profoundest possible plane a thoroughly grounded investigation (which I will touch upon in barest outline here) into the deep significance of Israel will have to inquire into four issues of prime importance. In this way, and from the nature of the case, as we shall see, Israel opens up vistas of thought that no other state can evoke.

The first fundamental issue is political. We have touched upon it already. It may be formulated thus: how a completely alien state that is suddenly thrust upon, and that is not wanted by, its immediate environment can survive, especially if this state has created for others the very problem (Arab refugees) it meant to solve for its own people. Here questions of diplomacy, strategy, external pressure, European and American interests, the psychological situation, the possibilities of explosion, and the balancing of the economic against the political, will all have to be responsibly discussed. I entitle this issue the political challenge of Israel.

The second fundamental inquiry may be formulated as follows: whether the concentration in one state of the factors at once of language, race and religion is not a challenge to the modern conception of the state, which is free of the necessary determination of any of these factors, and certainly of the three of them taken together. There is no other state in the world today—nor has there been for centuries—which is nationally characterized by a race, a language and a religion none of which nationally characterizes any other state. (I am aware of the recent disquisitions on the subject of race, but it can be shown that the conclusions therein reached, whatever their real scientific value, do not affect my present employment of the term which has—it can be fully demonstrated—a perfectly objective residual significance

[3] I might mention in this connection, however, two recent books, "My Mission in Israel," by James G. McDonald (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951), and "The Forrestal Diaries," edited by Walter Millis (New York: Viking, 1951), which are of special interest to the student of this subject.

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in the present discussion.) Israel as a state alone is Hebrew, Israel alone is Jewish, Israel alone is Judaic. No state is alone Moslem or Christian or Protestant or Catholic. No state is alone Aryan or Mongolian or Negro. And no state, except Israel and perhaps Ethiopia, has a national language of its own unconnected (in the sense of interaction) with any living language. This unique concentration of the three factors of race, language and religion is thus a challenge to the modern conception of the state, and in any case is bound to generate a tremendous exclusiveness and intensity of feeling (issuing in the most radical form of nationalism) that must find an outlet in some dynamism with incalculable consequences. I may term this the philosophical challenge of Israel, because it relates to the very conception of the state.

Far deeper than anything economic or political or philosophical are the two theological challenges of Israel. The one stems from the Old Testament, the other from the New.

The Old Testament theological challenge has to deal with the great mystery of Ishmael and Isaac. Whoever broods with a pure and loving heart upon this mystery and contemplates in its light the present spiritual situation between Jews and Arabs in the Near East must experience a profound emotion of wonder. What we behold is something not purely immanent, not something just human or historical or economic or political: there is a significance splashing irresistibly and mysteriously upon us from the beyond. The Arabs call themselves the sons of Ishmael; but Abraham loved Ishmael, and Sarah's counsel that he cast out Ishmael and his mother was "very grievous" in Abraham's sight (Gen. 21: 11). There is a most necessary philosophico-theological inquiry to be undertaken, perhaps in several volumes, into this question: to show how, just as there is a great so-called "Jewish problem," so there is and there has been in an entirely different sense a profound "Arab problem." (Is it without significance that the United Nations ever since its foundation has been preoccupied with the Arabs as much as with any other people: problems of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt, Libya, Morocco?) To dismiss the present conflict between the children of Isaac and the children of Ishmael, who are all children of Abraham, as just another ordinary politico-economic struggle, is to have no sense whatever for the awful and holy and ultimate in history. When history shall finally reveal its secret (of which we here and now already catch a real glimpse), the present confrontation between Isaac

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and Ishmael may turn out to be (the beautiful smile of the cynic is obvious at this point) one of the major keys unlocking that secret. The rise of Israel therefore presents a great challenge: that of the mystery of the two children of Abraham after the flesh.

The New Testament theological challenge may be formulated as follows: how is present-day Israel related on the one hand to the "old Israel" which, according to Christian theology, was once and for all dissolved by Christ, and on the other hand to the "new Israel," namely, the Church, which was founded by Christ? I believe no deeper question can be asked about Israel than this one, and here again we dimly perceive the distant vista of an important investigation yet to be attempted. The word "Israel" is mentioned 74 times in the New Testament. Is this fact (see especially Acts 13: 23 and I Cor. 10: 18) entirely unrelated to what exists in Palestine today? Christian theology has pondered most responsibly the mystery of "Israel" in relation to Christ. Are we to believe that its conclusions can have no bearing on present-day facts? Jerusalem is made a political center. But can the world ever forget the salvation wrought in Jerusalem? Zealots and politicians, whether Western, Jewish or Arab, would of course mock at these questions; but according to the truth, which is quite independent of all zeal and all politics, the challenge of love we are trying here to glimpse holds every determination in its hands, including above all that of Israel.

IV

In our study of the Near East we cannot stop with the political: we must press on to the deeper modes of human existence. Man does not exist only as ruler and ruled; man exists also as dealing with material nature and its forces, and as living with his fellow men. There is also man's own view of himself and of whoever is above this passing show. The last word about the Near East is not political: it must take full account of the material, social and spiritual problems besetting our existence. Therefore we turn now first to the examination of our economic and social situation: as to its realities, its possibilities and the prerequisites necessary to transform these possibilities into actual fact. In all this we cannot be humble enough, for only humility is proper to the truth.

All the countries of the Near East, and particularly the Arab countries, are economically and socially underdeveloped; in fact some of these territories are among the most underdeveloped in

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the world. On the other hand, in some sectors high levels of development have been reached. In this cradle of Western civilization the past rose to far greater levels of achievement than the present. The monuments of Arab architecture still standing intact and the remains of ancient Roman cities and of irrigation systems overrun by the desert are evidences of levels of prosperity and development from which these lands have fallen during the past millennium of decline and darkness. Thus we are not only behind others; we are behind ourselves. It follows that what was possible once is in some respects certainly possible again.

The measure of present underdevelopment and poverty can be seen from a comparison of the per capita incomes of the countries of the Near East with those of the advanced countries. The following figures of per capita incomes of the countries of the Near and Middle East are based on the latest estimates of the United Nations; those of the advanced countries of Europe and America are also compiled by the United Nations, but are based on reliable statistics of the countries themselves.

PER CAPITA INCOME IN DOLLARS

Arab Countries	
Lebanon	140
Syria	100
Egypt	100
Iraq	90
Saudi Arabia	60
Yemen	40
Other Near and Middle East Countries	
Israel	389
Greece	130
Turkey	125
Iran	85
Pakistan	51

Some Countries in America and Europe	
United States	1453
Canada	870
Switzerland	849
United Kingdom	773
Denmark	689
France	482
Czechoslovakia	371
Argentina	346
Portugal	250
Italy	235

The estimates of per capita income in the Arab countries are perhaps lower than is actually the case, but they indicate the low standard of living of the peoples of these countries as compared with the advanced countries of Europe and America. The standard of living of the majority of the people in the Arab Near East is even lower than is indicated by figures of per capita incomes. Being averages, these figures do not reveal the true extent of poverty in the region. The inequality of wealth and income is such

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that the majority of the people live on a bare subsistence level while a minority lives in luxury. Vigorous social consciousness and responsibility simply do not exist. It is perhaps safe to estimate that 10 percent of the population receive more than half the national income and so live on a level comparable to that of people in Western Europe, while the common people constituting 90 percent of the population have an average income which is only half the per capita income for the whole population.

The basic cause of the poverty of the countries of the Arab Near East lies in the semi-feudal agrarian structure of their economy. This economy is predominantly agricultural, as shown by the fact that over two-thirds of the population derive their livelihood directly or indirectly from the land. In spite of the considerable growth of manufacturing industry in recent decades, particularly in Egypt, Lebanon and Syria, the proportion of labor employed in industry is still very low; in fact, all the indications are that it has fallen with the growth of population and with the decline of handicrafts and the shift to mechanized factory production. The backwardness of the agrarian structure limits agricultural productivity and so keeps down the living standard of the majority of the people. To this basic cause of poverty must be added a special cause in the case of Egypt, namely the pressure of population on a limited area of cultivable land.

The semi-feudal structure in agriculture still predominates in most Arab countries to a smaller or greater extent. It manifests itself in the existence of large landholdings owned by a small number of landlords who are mostly absentee owners and who constitute a rentier class drawing comfortable incomes from the land but taking little or no interest in its utilization. The extent of large landholdings varies from one country to another. In Egypt statistics of land ownership show that .4 percent of the landowners with holdings over 50 feddans each (one feddan is approximately one acre) own 36.8 percent of the total area, while 72.2 percent of the owners with holdings of one feddan or less own only 13.1 percent of the area. In Syria it is estimated that about half the land is owned by large landowners. In Iraq, where this semi-feudal agrarian structure is superimposed on an old tribal structure, the proportion is still higher.

Besides the class of absentee landlords, there is the class of poor share-tenants and landless agricultural workers who cultivate the land and constitute the great majority of the rural population.

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The share-tenants, who are usually burdened with debts contracted at excessively high interest rates, have no incentive to improve the land. The difference between this semi-feudal share-tenancy and individual farm ownership is illustrated most vividly by the contrast in Lebanon between the mountain farmer who owns his land and the share-tenant of the plains. The mountaineer who won his title to the land scarcely a hundred years ago has transformed the barren and rocky mountain terrain into fruit orchards and vegetable gardens. He is literate, healthy, clean and progressive. His counterpart on the plains has done nothing to increase the productivity of the soil and remains in a state of poverty and degradation. The plight of the landless agricultural workers is even more pitiful than that of the share-tenants.

This semi-feudal agrarian structure is not only a basic obstacle to the development of agriculture in the Arab Near East but is also a limiting factor in the development of manufacturing industry. The low productivity and low purchasing power of the rural population, constituting a large majority of the people, limit the growth of manufacturing, which cannot develop large-scale low-cost production in the absence of a sufficiently large market.

The capital resources internally available for economic development are small, except in those Arab countries which receive substantial income from their oil resources. The governments are financially weak not only because of low national incomes but also because of the corruption and inefficiency of the taxation system. Their financial resources are generally insufficient to provide the basic social services needed by the people and to undertake projects of economic development. Expenditures on education are limited and consequently illiteracy remains high.

The growth of industry and trade in recent years, though still limited, has brought into being new social forces that are beginning to challenge the domination of the landlords. The industrial working class is organizing itself into unions and is beginning to have influence in public affairs. A new class of business and industrial enterprisers is rising and taking an increasing interest in economic and social development. The intellectuals are leading in new movements of national revival of much wider scope and greater depth than the old purely political struggle against foreign imperialist domination. But all these nascent social forces are still weak and without adequate leadership. The future therefore is docile in the extreme.

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The possibilities of economic development in the Arab countries of the Near East are limited by a number of factors, the most important of which are natural resources, capital resources, labor efficiency and in some cases the growth of population.

Except for oil, the Arab countries are poor in natural resources. As far as is known there are no important coal and iron ore deposits. There are no non-ferrous metals worth mentioning. There are almost no forests. The most important resource is agricultural land which is of high fertility in most of the Arab countries. But the limiting factor in this case is water. The Arab territories receive little rainfall and are mostly desert and semi-desert. Nevertheless, large rivers, such as the Nile, the Tigris and the Euphrates, as well as small rivers flowing from the mountains of Lebanon and Syria, provide considerable water resources for irrigation and hydroelectric power. Where irrigation is highly developed, as in Egypt, agriculture is highly productive. There are vast possibilities for irrigaton development in Iraq and Syria which would enable them to support twice their present populations at an appreciably higher living standard. But a large investment of capital over a long period of years would be required for this purpose.

The oil resources of the Arab Near East are concentrated in the Persian Gulf area. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq, and to a lesser degree Bahrein and Qatar, have very rich oil deposits which constitute about one-third of the world's known reserves. These countries are at present receiving considerable income from the concessionary companies exploiting these resources and are expected to receive more as production increases and higher royalties are agreed upon.

The second general limiting factor is capital. The capital resources that are currently available in the Arab countries or that may be mobilized in the future are small. The present rate of capital formation would enable economic development to keep up with population growth and, except in Egypt, to raise per capita incomes and standards of living at less than one percent annually. The possibilities of an increased rate of capital formation are very limited except in the case of those countries with large oil revenues, namely Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. It has been estimated by a United Nations group of experts that the countries of the Middle East, including the Arab countries, are saving on the average about 6 percent of their national incomes and that they need to invest at the rate of 15 percent of their na-

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tional incomes in industry and agriculture in order to raise their per capita incomes annually by 2 percent. This estimate is roughly applicable to the Arab countries. With increased income from oil and increased efforts in the mobilization of internal capital resources it would be possible to increase the rate of national savings to 10 percent on the average. Capital from foreign countries will still be needed to the extent of 5 percent of the national incomes of the Arab countries taken together, if their per capita incomes are to be raised by 2 percent annually. This would amount to an annual capital inflow of $175,000,000. An annual increase of 2 percent in per capita income represents a fairly rapid rate of development and would result in an increase of 50 percent in 20 years.

A third limiting factor is labor efficiency. A technically efficient and trained labor force in agriculture and industry is necessary for economic development. This means a greater degree of literacy, better education, improved public health services, increased technical training and a government extension service for the improvement of agricultural techniques. The Point Four Program has a real and important contribution to make in this field. However, the introduction of new technology into agriculture, industry, public health and government administration is very difficult and complex. It cannot simply be imported from the West but requires much cultural readjustment and assimilation.

The growth of population is a special limiting factor where, as in Egypt, the pressure of population on a limited area of cultivable land makes it difficult to increase per capita income and so raise standards of living. It is believed by some students of Egyptian economic development that in the last 50 years the standard of living of the majority of Egyptians has fallen because of the growth of population at a rate greater than the increase of national production.

The question is not whether it will be possible to promote the economic and social development of the Arab Near East in the next 50 years but whether it will be possible to achieve such a rapid rate of development as would not only keep pace with population growth but also raise living standards sufficiently to transform the life of the people from misery and despair to decency and hope. The question is further whether material conditions comparable to those obtaining elsewhere, such as in America, Europe, Russia or certain parts of Asia, can be developed in

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the Arab Near East so as to support a vigorous culture that will make a real positive dent upon the world.

To attempt an answer to these questions, one must at least consider certain prerequisites of rapid economic and social development in the Arab Near East. I would like to suggest four internal prerequisites and two of an external character.

The first internal prerequisite is land reform which would give the cultivator a stake in the land and transform the agrarian structure from its present state of stagnation and hopelessness to a state where free and progressive farmers acquire the incentives for raising the productivity of the soil and developing a new way of life in rural communities. The rural population constitutes the large majority of the people in Arab countries, and as long as they remain in their present degradation there is little hope for developing strong, prosperous, forward-looking and stable nations in the Arab Near East.

The second prerequisite is an efficient government administration. In the Arab countries, local private enterprise cannot be relied upon to undertake the tasks of rapid economic and social development because its resources and experience are limited. On the other hand, foreign private enterprise (even if interested) either will not be trusted because of past experience or will not be allowed to make the high profits which it would require in return for the risks of foreign investment. The conclusion is that government enterprise, or at least government participation and guidance, is necessary in many fields of development where neither local nor foreign private enterprise would be available or acceptable. It is therefore essential, if governments are to undertake programs and even specific projects of development, that government administration attain a high degree of efficiency.

The third prerequisite is wise, enlightened and strong national leadership. Without it no basic reforms can be carried out, efficiency in government administration cannot be ensured and maintained at a high level, capital cannot be mobilized and directed to the most productive fields of development, and the necessary efforts and sacrifices by the people will not be forthcoming.

Fourthly, one of the most important prerequisites of economic development in the Arab Near East is a social and economic order in which freedom and equality of opportunity are ensured to all members of the community; where special economic, social and political privilege has been eliminated; and where every per-

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son will receive the rewards of his own efforts and exertions. Rapid economic and social development consciously planned and directed requires for its success the participation of the people in a democratic national movement involving sacrifices and rewards that are fairly distributed in an environment where freedom, justice and responsibility abound.

These four prerequisites of land reform, efficiency in government administration, wise and strong national leadership and an environment of freedom and equality of opportunity will enable the Arab countries to embark, each in its own territory, on a vigorous policy of economic and social development. To be fully successful, however, such a policy would require not only separate action, but also coöperation among all the Arab countries. Such economic coöperation is necessary in order to promote territorial division of labor, establish a wider market as a basis for industrialization and counter the economic threat of Israel.

One final requirement which is essential for the rapid economic development of the Arab Near East is foreign, and particularly United States, economic assistance. Foreign economic assistance in the form of technical aid, grants and loans would be needed at least in the first ten years of a large-scale program of development in order to set the wheels in motion, to acquire badly needed capital equipment and to help make the basic capital investments in such fields as irrigation, hydroelectric power, communications and basic social services in public health, education, agricultural extension and rural credit. But even if foreign assistance is not available on the required scale, the Arab countries can and should make all the efforts and sacrifices necessary for shouldering the burdens required for their economic and social development.

V

In the present politico-ideological situation—with Communism eating into the body of the great Eurasian continent until only the fringes of that immense land mass remain outside its clutches, with even those fringes and the lands beyond considerably softened in diverse ways from within, with the Near East occupying the most strategic position in the world, and with the well-known Soviet-Russian aspirations in the direction of the Persian Gulf—the question of the relationship between the Near East on the one hand and the Communist and non-Communist worlds on the other is of the greatest importance.

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The total impact of these two worlds upon the Near East today can best be gauged by the performance of a radical intellectual experiment. Truth reveals itself most clearly at the limit, and in the inner relationships between cultures and peoples war is one of the limits. Let us assume, then, for the purposes of this experiment, that war has broken out between the Communist and the non-Communist worlds. With this assumption, the experiment consists in answering seven questions for each Near Eastern country on a comparative tabulation sheet. The situation is so transparent that it is perfectly possible to reach truthful answers within a very small margin of error. The questions are:

1. What is the attitude of the government towards the war?
2. What is the attitude of the people, as distinct from the government, towards the war?
3. Whatever the answers to the previous two questions, what is the possibility of Communist sabotage and fifth column activity?
4. In case of a Communist invasion and the elimination of Western influence from the Near East, who in each country in question will really miss the West?
5. In case of the Sovietization of the Near East, what is the possibility of the rise of underground resistance movements?
6. In case the West succeeds in pushing back Communism from the Near East (some time limit here must be assumed, say five or ten years of Sovietization), what will be the attitude of the people to the returning West?
7. What tentative blueprints can be made of the shape of things to come after the Communist onslaught is swept back?

This experiment is purely hypothetical, but the questions raised are exceedingly critical. They touch the very heart of the situation. Nothing is likely to illuminate the student of these matters more profoundly than an honest, thorough, objective execution of this experiment. If the West wants to know where the Near East stands, let it face up honestly to this experiment. Let it further summon its deepest genius to inquire at each stage why the results of the experiment are what they are. In all this the West must make four precise distinctions: what is proper for propaganda and expediency, namely for "kidding" people along in times of crisis; what is the real truth; what is the Near East's responsiblity for this truth; and what is the West's responsibility for this truth.

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VI

"Whither the Near East" is ultimately, for the most part, "whither Islam." This question raises the profoundest issues, which I shall try to face as truthfully as I can.

First it is important to note that the question concerns not only the Moslems, but the entire world. For Islam is a vigorous force in the world and therefore much depends on its development. Just as the Moslems must inquire "whither this or that system or culture," including their own, so the non-Moslems must in this amazingly shrunk world ponder deeply and with absolute responsibility "whither Islam." Certainly the Near East cannot be understood apart from this problem. We have all become one another's neighbors, and no man can remain indifferent to where his neighbor is tending.

And for the Christians of the Near East it is obvious that this is a peculiarly crucial issue. The fate of Islam is in a certain sense their fate. For Islam is more than a religion: it is a total outlook. Thus for the Christians of the Near East, Moslem culture, whether Arab or Turkish or Persian, is in a deep sense their culture. They have always shouldered civic, economic, political and intellectual responsibility with their Moslem brethren. Therefore they cannot be too deeply interested in the development of their common heritage.

In varying degrees of metaphysical depth men have brooded on this issue: Toynbee has done so in England, as well as Gibb and his assistant Hourani; so has Massignon in France and so have Hocking and Hitti in the United States; and many others elsewhere. In the Near East, Taha Hussein in Egypt and Zurayk in Syria wrestled with it somewhat. But I do not expect the final word on this matter, on the plane of theory, to emerge before many years. We are at the earliest stages of a most important cultural-historical-existential investigation. In the nature of the case, the utmost that can be done now and for some time to come is to clear the ground, lay the foundations, indicate the vast scope of the problem, suggest the sort of questions that must be gone into, and define the moral and intellectual prerequisites for any inquiry that will really face and yield the truth. It is enough if the mind is whetted in absolute love and humor and seriousness to face the issue; for truth has a way always of revealing itself in time to the inquiring mind.

The following outline only raises issues. Its suggestion of

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"solutions" (an awful word) is meager. But the very raising of an issue is itself of the utmost importance. The proper facing, the adequate description, the real understanding, the living appreciation, the honest and full apprehension—in short, the *being*—of these issues is a matter of the distant future. Whether it will be a Toynbee or a Gibb or a Hourani or a Hussein who will finally wrestle with these great questions to their uttermost depths I do not know. One thing I know: that the *whole truth* of these matters is known somewhere, certainly in the quiet bosom of eternity, and that it takes only a purity of heart and a single and sustained determination of the will to find it.

1. Nothing is more important than to contemplate the desert and the mode of being proper to the desert, and to understand how this mode of being differs radically from that of the most temperate zones, such as Europe, where there are rain and snow and green mountains, where there are sharpness of transition and variety, and where nature is prolific with forms of life.

2. The "whither" we are seeking raises the prior question of the complete significance of the mentality of the *badu,* who are the inhabitants of the desert.

3. The existence and persistence throughout Arab history of overwhelming numbers of lower classes and the absence of the middle class. Hence the phenomenon of the masses and of the mob. To please them you must in the long run cater to their imagination and desires: you must become one of them. The all-absorbing, self-avenging, overwhelming phenomenon of the mob: in the end they dominate, not you.

4. Hence the great difficulty of being a leader, really leading and not in fact following. The ultimate tribulation of leadership in the Moslem-Arab world: you must conform. In the light of this difficulty the achievement of Mohammed appears utterly superhuman.

5. Hence also the phenomenon of the court poet. To rule you must employ a rhetorician or a poet or be one yourself. The incredible magical power of the Arabic language to rouse and satisfy the masses. The "whither" we are seeking raises the entrancing question of the nature, mystery, significance and "whither" of the Arabic language.

6. In one great agony of his life, Ibn Rushd (Averroes) distinguished between that which is proper to the masses and that which is proper to the intimate circle. The tragic existential sig-

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nificance of this distinction. The *batiniyyah* (esoterism) that follows from this dualism must mean that not everything that is hid shall be revealed.

7. An inquiry into the discontinuities, gaps, divisions, interruptions (geographical, social and historical) in Arab society. The distinction between the unity of community and unity by reason of an identically inherited pattern. The "whither" we are seeking raises the question of the essence of community.

8. The bearing of this on the possibility in Islam of compromise and modification and on real awareness of others. Distinction between real change (appropriation, assimilation, inner adjustment) and apparent change (repeating, copying, "using").

9. The strength and the weakness of the immense mixing of races that has occurred in Islam. The geographical determinism of this phenomenon.

10. The ontological significance of the pull and the lure which the past exerts on the Arab. His prodigious memory and his vivid imagination. The dreams of reënaction of exactly what happened in the past. The "whither" we inquire into can never be determined without knowing the bearing of all this on decision, creation, freedom, indetermination, the will, the future, real change, the perception of the objective realities of the world.

11. The phenomenon in recent decades of "the Orientalist." How much good and how much harm has Orientalism done? Why a corresponding phenomenon of "the Occidentalist" did not arise?

12. The dearth of great works of reason, great *summas*. The important works of Moslem-Arab and Christian-Arab philosophers and mystics did not transform life and literature: they influenced West more than East. Connectedness and unity of reason soon overwhelmed by imagination, language, fatigue. Breath of reason short. If reason is the creator of the world, is there any future, whether to Christianity or to Islam, without reason being properly enshrined in the hearts and minds of men?

13. If instinctive nature is given, can it nevertheless be controlled by reason? The order of the emotions.

14. The question of fatalism, for after all the "whither" may have no meaning at all.

15. The significance of the repudiation by Al-Ghazzalli of cause and effect. Cause and effect in Arab life and its bearing on the "whither."

16. No deeper confrontation occurred in Arab history than

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that between Al-Ghazzalli and Ibn Rushd in the two *tahafuts*. Here for the first time East met West internally within Islam. It has never happened since.

17. The Christian and Moslem doctrines of revelation (*al-wahi*).

18. The problem of the pluralization of history. Is there an absolute beginning? If not, where do we start? Is it possible to compare cultures on an absolute scale? No deeper question can be asked and therefore we cannot be too careful in answering it.

19. Now the "whither" means asking, questioning, wondering, reflecting on oneself, tearing one's clothers, beating upon one's breast, "where am I going?" This requires fundamental self-criticism. But so far striking absence of a strong line of reformers, critics, thinkers, prophets, rebels. There is room for a hundred Mohammed Abdou's: kindled by one another, building upon one another, absorbing and reflecting one another, criticizing, reinterpreting, creating, departing from one another, accepting profound spiritual responsibility. The "whither" is a function of the joy of free, grounded, responsible reflection and self-criticism.

20. Nature and destiny of man; the individual human soul; immortality; reason, nature, rebellion, vision, joy; freedom of thought, of being and of becoming.

21. There is an amazing ignorance of Christian literature, doctrine and life, despite the fact that Christ and His Mother are deeply revered by Islam. There isn't a single Moslem scholar in all history, so far as I know, who has written an authentic essay on Christianity; whereas Christian scholars, both Arab and non-Arab, have written authoritative works on Islam, and on other religions too. Inquiry into the mystery of this estrangement. There will always be fear, uncertainty, embarrassment, uneasiness, lack of joy, lack of freedom, a predisposition to self-defense, until this intellectual and spiritual balance is redressed.

22. Islam explicitly grounds itself in the Judaic-Christian tradition and conceives itself as completing and sealing that tradition. There is room here for a responsible investigation into what it has adopted and what it has rejected from this tradition, and into the sort of Christianity Islam came in touch with. Since the Christian tradition persists independently of Islam, and in all likelihood is not going to be displaced, it is obvious "whither Islam" is inseparable from "whence Islam."

23. In this connection the infinite importance of the history of

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the seventh and eighth centuries, particularly in regard to the relationship then and afterwards between Islam and the Graeco-Roman-Christian-European synthesis.

24. Three central Christian doctrines are repudiated: the Incarnation, the Cross and the Church. Significance of this repudiation for the "whither." Suffering then is not of the essence, personal sin need not be atoned, the divine does not take the form of an actual total man. The fact of the Church raises the tremendous question of the difference between the Christian and the Moslem conceptions of history.

25. Contemplative existence in Islam and in Christianity. The recent growth of contemplative orders in the West. Inwardness, interiority, contemplation, pure vision, asceticism, in Islam.

26. An inquiry into the ontology of Moslem art.

27. An inquiry into the possibility of the separation of state and religion in Islam.

28. "Whither Islam" must depend in part on how much the Christian and Moslem worlds can in this materially and existentially interdependent world sit together and inquire, on the deepest possible plane, through their scholars and thinkers, in all patience, humility, love and openness, into the truth of Christianity and the truth of Islam, and into their common spiritual and temporal problems. Nothing is more crucial for the future of Islam and indeed for the history of the world than to provide objective, political, social and existential conditions under which this intellectual and spiritual getting together can fruitfully take place.

29. The growth in recent years of Western interest in Islam and the Moslem world. The phenomenon of institutes of Islamic and Near Eastern studies in the United States. No greater service can be done the cause of truth, understanding, peace and concord between East and West than the promotion of these institutes. Distinction, however, between dedication to truth alone and the utilization of historical, sociological and economic information for political and commercial purposes. Truth the only savior of the world.

30. There is room for 20 first-class universities in the Near East, where the disciplined mind can range all subjects in absolute freedom, joy and responsibility. No greater service can be done the Moslem world and in the end the cause of understanding between East and West than the promotion of liberal education in the Near East where the humane tradition, both of Islam

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and of the West, can be vigorously brought to the fore, and where freedom of thought and inquiry and a complete trust in the life-giving power of the truth penetrate the atmosphere on every level of existence.

31. On the level of the universal, and therefore of truth, peace and understanding, the following five great achievements of the Moslem world in the ages of its greatest brilliance cannot be stressed enough: the humble receptivity of important thinkers and seekers to the truth of cultures outside their own; the great achievements of Arab science, especially in mathematics, physics, astronomy and medicine; certain brilliant achievements of Moslem theology (*al-kalam*); the wonderful line of Moslem-Arab philosophers; and perhaps on the deepest level the unbelievable spirituality of certain *sufis*. The "whither" we are seeking is in my opinion largely "whether" these five solid achievements can be rediscovered, reappropriated, reinterpreted, developed and perfected. If only Ibn Rushd and Jalal-al-Din Al-Rumi can be loved, understood and transcended!

32. The greatest single intellectual thing that can happen in the Arab world is a responsible movement for publishing in Arabic one or two hundred volumes of the world's finest classics, both from the Moslem-Arab and from the Western traditions.

33. An inquiry into dependence and independence: on every level—political, geopolitical, economic, cultural, historical, intellectual, spiritual. Meaning of justice and equality in an order of interdependence. The Aristotelian principle of the priority of actuality.

34. The complex relationship between the existentially strong and the existentially weak. The free obligations of the existentially strong.

35. The *Logos,* the Word, the intermediary between God and man in Christian and Moslem theologies. The significance of the rejection of the Trinity.

36. Is a Christian Arab possible? Is a Christian Arab culture possible?

37. Has there been sufficient love and concern for the Moslem-Arab world? Have sufficient tears of love been shed in its behalf?

38. Where are these things fully and responsibly discussed and faced: discussed not spectatorially, but with a view to the truth, and faced not inquisitively, but in absolute love? Can objective material and human conditions be developed whereby the mind

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will be able to articulate the truth of these questions in a manner that will live for a thousand years?

These are the topics that the question "whither Islam" seems to me to involve. It is very well for people to be "interested" in the Near East. It is very well to think in terms of independence and of economic and social advance. But politics and economics will lead absolutely nowhere until these deeper issues are faced. Well-meaning good will need not wonder why it does not always succeed: it must first open up these horizons and acquire an existential grounding in them. The degree of superficiality with respect to the Near East, both in the Near East and in the Western world, is simply astounding. It is an expression of the crisis of the West.

VII

The Western world is responsible for the situation in the Near East on every level of that situation. In the end this is an exemplification of the *Western* principle that "unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required." Near Eastern existence is largely derivative from or a reaction against Western existence. One can set up a one-to-one correspondence between the problems and great crises through which Western civilization has gone during the past centuries and the reflections these problems and crises induced in the life of the Near East. The Near East mirrors, by deposit or by reaction, the problems of the world. Whatever face the Arab East shows today is fundamentally a reflection of the face which the West has shown it; and whatever weaknesses the Arab East exhibits are largely an expression of the weaknesses of the West. In a deeper sense the problem of the Near East is the problem of the West.

On the one hand there is a reflection of some of the virtues of the West: the beginnings of a new administrative structure, of social and health services, of an improvement in standards of living, of great public works (*e.g.* in Egypt and Iraq) and of a revival of learning (largely due to Western schools and books). In all this we see reflections of the great dominating ideas of the modern West: order, health, worldly happiness, science, social consciousness.

On the other hand the Arab East shows another face: the existence of a million Arab refugees, deep divisions between the various Arab states, estrangement between the Arabs and their

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neighbors (hostility to Israel, suspicion of the Turks, indifference to the Persians), the growth of tension between Judaism, Christianity and Islam, the lack of progress towards social justice (it is not certain that social organization today is more just than what it was before the coming of the West), and above all a universal and profound hatred of the West (although this does not prevent friendly personal relations and the desire to obtain new and efficient tools of thought and action from the West).

To say that all of this is due simply and purely to the West is of course nonsense. There is fundamental superficiality, negativity, unreality, darkness, distortion and error in the Near East which made all this in the first place possible. Unless these defects are brought to the surface and remedied there is no hope for us. East and West can come together in peace only if they repent together under transcendent judgment.

With these qualifications, of what can we accuse the West?

1. Lack of unity. The strife and rivalry of the Western Powers. This led not only to the weakening of the West, but also to the divisions and rivalries among the Near Eastern states. I do not agree that Western lack of unity is a good thing for us, for I refuse to believe that the West can only reach agreement upon our corpse.

2. Lack of responsibility. Failure to accept the fact in all honesty that they were responsible for shaking the whole life of the Near East. No long-term planning; day-to-day opportunism; hence no stable political life in the Near East. In particular, the instability due to the alternation in British policy between interference and noninterference: interference when a Western interest is at stake (*e.g.* oil and Suez), and refusal to do something —under the pretense that the states are independent—when what is involved is merely the welfare or interests of the peoples themselves. All this bespeaks halfheartedness in facing up to one's responsibilities.

3. Lack of sincerity. There has been from the beginning an element of hypocrisy in Western policy: Napoleon's claim to be the protector of Islam, the use of Christian missions for political ends, the use of minorities by all Powers, a façade of morality given to the mandate system when as a matter of fact it was decided upon for quite other reasons, the invoking of moral principles to justify their own actions and the ignoring of them when they were inconvenient, and so forth.

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4. Lack of understanding of the deeper issues at stake. In particular, failure to understand that all political problems in the Near East are interwoven with religion, so that a true attitude to those problems can rest only upon a basis of true doctrine, and a false attitude to them will have disastrous effects upon the whole relationship between the great religions. The West did not offer the highest goods of its positive tradition, but the false gods of modern Western civilization: nationalism, materialism, Communism. Thus the Near East has been given the choice between embracing the falsehoods of Europe and falling back upon its own inadequate past.

5. Lack of love. Strategy, commerce, exploitation, securing an imperial route: these were why the West for the most part came to the Near East, not because it loved us. Add to this the immense racial arrogance of modern Europe. The West has not been true to itself, and therefore it could not have been true to us.

This sad, privative face is of course not the authentic face of the West. But it has called forth in the East its exact unhappy image. One can show that if there is lack of unity, lack of responsibility, lack of sincerity, lack of understanding and lack of love in the Near East, the Near East caught on these things largely from the West. The disturbing rise of fanaticism in the Near East in recent years is a reaction to the thoughtlessness and superficiality of the West. When you are not loved, what is there to prevent you from hating yourself and the world? There is no escape from the fundamental metaphysical principle that actuality is in every way prior to potentiality, and that the latter takes on the form of the former.

In all this we are really touching upon the great present crisis in Western culture. We are saying when that culture mends its own spiritual fences, all will be well with the Near East, and not with the Near East alone. We are saying it is not a simple thing to be the heir of the Graeco-Roman-Christian-European synthesis and not to be true to its deepest visions. One can take the ten greatest spirits in that synthesis and have them judge the performance of the Western world in relation to the Near East. The deep problem of the Near East then must await the spiritual recovery of the West. And he does not know the truth who thinks that the West does not have in its own tradition the means and power wherewith it can once again be true to itself.

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VIII

Those who live and die in the Near East (and in certain parts of it more than others), namely, those who suffer our existence from within, are granted the opportunity—which very few of them seize—of beholding something eternal, of seeing right before their eyes the deepest problems of humanity almost in shimmering physical embodiment. Elsewhere these problems certainly exist, but they are usually *resolved* one way or the other, rightly or wrongly, or else they are judiciously covered up. But with us they remain in eternal suspension, as though there must be one place in the world to remind us all of the essential problematic character of human existence, of the utter folly of "resting in peace" when we have cleverly covered up our problems or supposed that we have "solved" them.

The great moments of the Near East are the judges of the world. The Near East is of course today utterly unworthy of them. But it is these moments alone, properly understood, that can bind East and West together, in judgment and in truth. What is the ultimate trouble with the world today? It is the loss of the dimension of transcendence, the fact that the world hugs itself in happy self-sufficiency; it is—to use the concept of a certain modern philosophy—the belief that the world is self-creative. But the one message deposited by the Near East in the whole of its history is the absolute negation of this belief. There is an original transcendent order, full of meaning and power, open to the faithful and pure: an order creating, judging, disturbing, healing, forgiving. The Western world today is disturbed by the challenge of Communism. But this is nothing; for Communism will pass away, and so will "heaven and earth," but the vision and world of the Near East will never pass away. In fact, Communism with its radical immanentism is a challenge only because the transcendental challenge of the Near East has long ago overcome the West and will never let it go. Only as the West comes to the cradle of its civilization, recognizing in all responsibility, truth and love the relics of its origins; and only as the Near East regains a glimpse of its own lost transcendent visions, casting aside all doubt, negativity and childishness and clasping hands with all those who first drank from the well of its life: only as these two movements reach for and meet each other can peace and righteousness come, not only to the Near East, but to the whole world.

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THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE

By General H. J. Kruls

THE postulates of a study of the defense of Western Europe can be stated briefly.

We can assume in the first place that the Soviet Union strives to spread Communism throughout the world and to dominate the world. It is true that very little of the doctrine of Marx and Engels is left in present-day Soviet Russia, and that a state based on Stalinist dictatorship and state capitalism can hardly be said to seek to advance Communist ideology. But the fact remains that Soviet Russia strives to spread Stalin's version of it, and that the series of actions which express and promote that political aim show that she seeks to control the rest of the world.

A second assumption is that the rulers in the Kremlin will employ every means they consider expedient to attain their goal and that, should it be necessary, they will employ the means of war.

Another assumption is that, in the present world situation, an open resort to armed force by the Soviet Union will launch the Third World War. Despite the immense masses of population in Russia, her satellite countries and her Chinese ally, their military potential is and will remain considerably below the potential of their opponents. The conclusion must be that as long as the Soviet dictators base their decisions on reason they will not openly resort to war unless—an important qualification—they see an opportunity of changing the present unfavorable ratio between their resources and those of their enemies by gaining some quick successes in a surprise offensive.

It must not be forgotten that for some time the Soviet Union has maintained in readiness great land forces supported by strong air forces, thereby creating the possibility of a surprise attack and initial success. These land and air forces are so grouped as to be capable of aggression in several directions, as well as of general defense. A large part of the Russian industry has been dispersed so as to enable it to supply the various groupings in the vicinity, even though "vicinity" is naturally a relative term in view of the vast Russian distances and the condition of the transport system. Indeed, these factors make warfare on widely separated fronts a decidedly risky undertaking for the Soviet Union.

Should the rulers of Soviet Russia decide upon open war—per-

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haps after gaining further successes in the cold war—then only one road exists by which they may hope to progress toward final victory through the expansion of the Russian war potential at the expense of the West. That is the road to Western Europe, to the shores of the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. And if Soviet Russia sets out on that road, she will also have to seize the Middle East.

The occupation of Western Europe would bring Russia raw materials, industrial capacity and skilled labor in enormous quantities; its coasts would provide bases from which Russian submarines could further damage the Western war potential; its fields would provide space for airports and launching sites for the guided missiles which would help toward the destruction of Western power. The Middle East produces oil; once it has been overrun it opens the door into Africa; and, in any case, it is an obvious place for severing the Western link with the Far East. The Mediterranean, from the Middle East to the Iberian Peninsula, is the ancient World Sea which has in such great part shaped the history of mankind through so many centuries.

If Soviet Russia goes to war to win the hegemony of the world she will finally, of course, have to impose her will on the United States of America. Now it clearly is impossible to conquer the American continent and occupy it with land forces. Russian strategic air forces would therefore have to play the decisive part in destroying the American war potential. But the Russians will never be able to subdue the United States unless they have Western Europe and possibly also the Middle East in their power.

Here and there in the world there are other prizes which the men in the Kremlin might like to pick up. But only a chance to seize Europe will tempt them to open war. The Soviets hardly can want a third world war to start in Asia. The concentration of Western forces in Korea, directly threatening important Russian centers, would, at the outbreak of an open conflict, subject the Soviet Union to the dreaded prospect of a war on two fronts.

During the Second World War the Western Allies were unwilling or unable to remember the everlasting objectives of the Soviet Union. Now they have awakened and are preparing their defenses. This task must not weaken their determination to prevent war by all means possible. It is a fact, however, that weakness and leniency are simply grist for the Russian mill. Only strength and power impress the Soviet leaders. The Western strength now be-

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ing built up will therefore have to be greatly increased. This is an arduous task and demands resolute leadership.

The decision whether the West will be able to stand firm against Moscow and attain its political aim will turn on three factors. For purposes of discussion the first may be described as the question of *leadership,* the second as the question of *means,* and the third as the question of *information.* Let us take them up in that order.

II

To understand better the different elements entering into the factor of Western leadership we must review the political and strategic positions of East and West. The end of the Second World War found Soviet Russia in a strong situation, and subsequent gains in the cold war have built up buffers of friendly and satellite states both east and west; in the north she is protected by the Arctic Sea and to the south by strong natural frontiers and neutral states. At two points on this protective perimeter fighting is at present going on, with the Soviet Union a nonbelligerent but highly interested onlooker—Korea, where joint United Nations forces (with the United States as the driving power) have taken up the Communist challenge, and Indo-China, where the French Union is doing the same with American support.

The United States and adjacent Canada must be the ultimate objectives of the Soviet Union's effort at world domination. They are almost wholly surrounded by oceans. On the other side of the Atlantic and Pacific are states and islands which either border on Soviet Russia's protective perimeter or dominate her coasts. All save China, now under Communist control, are friendly to North America and wish to avoid coming under Soviet control because they dislike the dictatorial government, the low standards of living, the absolute denial of human rights and the slavery which prevail alike in the Soviet Union and the satellite countries. In principle, therefore, although there may be various differences in short-term interests they have the same primary interest as the United States.

In the West the situation is especially plain. The countries of Western Europe afford the United States protection because their geographic situation has so far prevented the Soviet Union from reaching the Atlantic coast. Should they be overrun, Russia

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would be in a far stronger strategic position for the final battle with the United States. The United States would still be far from lost, since it could considerably reduce the value of this Russian advantage by destroying (either during or after the Russian advance) all the installations and much of the resources which give Western Europe its strength.

The prospect for these countries themselves is altogether different. To be overrun by the Soviet Union would mean the end of their existence. Like the present satellite countries, they would be sucked dry for the benefit of the Soviets; their populations would be terrorized and scattered; their industries would be dismantled and transferred to Siberia unless previously destroyed by American bombs. Perhaps after many years they would be liberated—if the United States finally came out on top. By then, however, the worst would have happened. The United States would have had temporary protection at the price of their obliteration. Clearly they cannot feel attracted to such a feat of heroism and naturally they can have but one principal aim: to assure their own survival.

More precisely defined, therefore, the fundamental common interest of the United States and Canada on the one hand and of the Western European states on the other lies in preventing the Soviet Union from starting a third world war while denying her victory through the cold war. To make certain that if war comes Soviet Russia will lose it, and that the Soviet leaders know this, must be the ultimate goal of Western strategy. The necessities for the success of that strategy will, in turn, determine the structure of the joint Western military organization and the size of the force to be created.

The build-up of the organization and the preparations for its use in the event of war require the direction of a strong and determined leader who has the above ends very clearly in view. If it is agreed that the Western forces, after some initial withdrawals, should be able to halt the aggressive hordes from the East, the first question is whether they could hold out long enough for the further build-up which would enable them in turn to push the Russians back. And could they then conceivably press the counterattack so far as to rout and destroy the Soviet land and air forces within the Russian border?

If the Western land and air forces were developed to a pitch of perfection they might, with the assistance of strong fifth column

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activity, succeed in liberating the satellite countries and possibly might start a revolution in Russian states like the Ukraine. It is not justifiable to believe, however, that they would be able to cope with the obstacles presented by the vastness of the Soviet Union, its bad roads and railways, its gruelling climate. The Soviet Government has made full use of its geographical advantages by dispersing its productive machine throughout Asiatic Russia. Napoleon reached Moscow, and Hitler was halted just outside the city gates; but armies seeking to conquer and occupy Soviet Russia this time would have to continue far beyond Moscow. In the end they would choke in space. The West can defeat Soviet Russia only by neutralizing her main source of strength—her vastness—by an overpowering air arm.

This air arm, the strategic air force, would first have to drive the Russian strategic air force from the skies by destroying its airfields, bases, aircraft factories and, so far as possible, its sources of raw materials. After that, it would have to embark upon an unrelenting effort against the rest of the industries and establishments which form the basis of Russian military might. Only then would the West be able to impose its will on the Soviet Union; only then would the West have won. If the Western Powers are determined to keep Moscow from going to war their task, then, is dual: to build an air arm sufficient to achieve the objective just described; and to create the means of preventing the Soviet Union from conquering the whole of Western Europe during the time which the strategic air force needs to perform its task. I mention these general strategic considerations here because they are controversial, and conflicting views upon them affect the plans for building up the necessary forces. The primary requisite is that the Western countries work together under a leader who knows what he is doing and sees where he is going.

Obviously the United States must supply this leadership. This is not because of the Atlantic Pact but because of the realities of America's strategic position and financial and economic power. The Pact is an agreement among the United States, Canada, the countries forming the Western bridgehead on the Eurasian continent, and the islands of Great Britain and Iceland, plus (since the recent invitation) Turkey and Greece. In this defense organization all members are equal. The equality causes difficulties, since it plainly is impossible for all of the 14 countries to exert an equal influence in the conduct of a war in which all the enemy's

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decisions would be centralized in one spot—the Kremlin. All the member states have a say in the matters under discussion in NATO bodies—and it is proper that they should, since the European countries are threatened most severely and directly. Only the highest permanent body of military experts—the Standing Group—to which the Supreme Commanders are directly responsible, is restricted in numbers, being composed of representatives of the United States, Britain and France; and there already has been much oppositon even to this degree of centralization.

There is another important reason why NATO will never offer an effective solution to the problem of thwarting the Soviets or ensure the efficient conduct of operations in the event that war comes. The struggle between the Soviet bloc and the countries which resist Stalinist domination is world-wide. The United States, Britain, France and, to a lesser degree, certain other countries as well, must bear in mind that they have interests in other parts of the world outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and that sometimes these interests must determine their attitude within the NATO bodies. Moreover, the United States knows that although most of the "North Atlantic" countries are dependent on it for economic and military aid, American resources, which obviously have limitations, must support countries outside NATO—Japan and Korea, for example. The United States must look in all directions. To membership in the Atlantic Pact it has now added membership in the two agreements for Pacific security, one a tripartite pact with Australia and New Zealand, the other with the Philippines. The Atlantic Pact and the Pacific security pacts offer each member state the welcome certainty of support from the other members in case it is attacked. This alone makes these pacts indispensable; but none of them provides a guarantee that the build-up of the defense effort of the whole anti-Soviet world will be rapid or efficient or appropriate.

NATO has not succeeded in inducing all the participating countries to undertake their defense preparations energetically. It has been unable to prevent serious delays. It has not produced the necessary degree of subordination of national interests to the larger interests even of the Atlantic community. I repeat that in its present form NATO does not offer the necessary guarantees of quick decisions and effective leadership in war. Its best achievements have come as a result of the well-understood self-interest of the largest partner, the United States, which has increased its

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war production in peacetime to unprecedented heights, put the nations in economic distress on a firmer footing, given material assistance to others to enable them to build up their own forces, and sent troops to Europe ready to fight. In these ways the United States has spurred the other members to greater effort. Yet this is but a beginning.

The United States reproaches Europe for her disunity, and quite rightly. Her efforts could and should be far better coördinated. Certainly both the preparations for a fight against Stalin's schemes for conquest, and the fight itself, if necessary, would be carried out much more effectively if only the United States could join hands with a united Europe. How much simpler it would then be for the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe to visualize the structure of his command organization and the channel through which he would receive his political directives! Yet urgent as is the need for greater unity in Europe, we would be foolish to imagine that it can be attained at short notice, even against the background of the mounting danger. International relationships in Europe are too old, too strongly rooted in the history of the Continent and in the character and nationalism of the various peoples. All that cannot be wiped out in one stroke. Europe herself must seek hard and earnestly for an ever-increasing degree of integration, but the process will be so protracted that it will have no significant bearing on the present dangerous situation. A solution to NATO's inadequacies can emerge only from recognition of the fact that *no* defense against Stalinist imperialism is possible without the assistance of the United States. This is the undeniable reality which compels the whole free world to accept the leadership of the United States in the preparation for defense and the conduct of operations in case of war.

Since I have stressed this primary aspect of the problem, I would like to emphasize its corollary. Recognition and acceptance of American leadership must never mean that the other countries are excluded from consultation or from a very definite say where their interests are concerned. It is essential that all have a chance to make themselves heard. Only if the best experts from all countries are able to put their knowledge and experience in the service of the common cause will the United States be enabled to shoulder successfully the heaviest burden of the common security. The United States should undertake not to act without previous consultation with other countries in regard to their interests, as de-

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fined by their nature or the region of the world concerned. These are delicate matters, requiring tact and careful handling. On certain problems people in other countries have a deeper knowledge and a longer experience than do Americans. The possession of a strong financial, economic and strategic position does not justify the treatment of other countries as minors; to act as if it did breeds opposition and not the concord we all seek.

The lesson of the situation thus roughly outlined is that we must find a solution for the problem offered by NATO's inadequacies. The solution will require an agreement on the basic policy toward the Soviet Union which would be followed in time of war. It also calls for the creation of two supreme organs to carry out that policy, one in the political and one in the military sphere. As explained above, NATO cannot provide those supreme bodies, and for obvious reasons the United Nations is not the suitable organization to supply them. A Combined Chiefs of Staff Organization, consisting of no more than three high-ranking military men, with the American member in the chair, should be set up. To such a body all the non-Communist countries could, on the highest level, delegate the military conduct of operations in case of a global war. These Combined Chiefs of Staff, with their seat in the United States, would issue directives to the Supreme Commanders in all parts of the world and take decisions on the allocation and use of forces—especially long-range strategic air forces not allocated to any particular theater.

During the course of a war the Combined Chiefs of Staff would receive directives from a top-level political body, acting on behalf of all the countries united in the global struggle. I believe that it would be of the utmost importance for those countries to agree that this Supreme War Council would be composed of no more than three members, of whom the President of the United States or his representative should be the chairman. To enable the Supreme War Council and the Combined Chiefs of Staff to be advised quickly of the views of countries not represented in the two high bodies, those countries might station high-ranking political and military representatives in the United States, especially entitled to speak for the special interests of their countries before the Supreme War Council and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and to make suggestions to them. The difficult decision as to which countries should be represented in the two high bodies is beyond the scope of these preliminary proposals.

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III

The second question is that of means—the amount, type and quality of the armed forces which must be built up. Here the principal difficulty continues to be the fear of many Western countries that a stronger military effort might weaken their economies and thus cause social unrest that would play into Stalin's hand. But the United States cannot be expected to go on indefinitely adding to the number of American troops in Europe. Were it to do so it would fail in its main task—not always understood—which is to act as controller of the whole global effort. Reserves must be at the disposal of the central headquarters if it is to take action where needed, and the larger the reserves the more opportunities for effective action.

It is obvious that armed forces are significant instruments of power against the Soviet Union only if they are ready to be deployed immediately the Soviet Union starts aggression. It is clear, too, that those ready forces must be capable of preventing the Soviet Union from gaining its first objectives by surprise, and that there must be among them a large slice of the air arm to open the counteroffensive immediately against the enemy war potential. To prevent Russian aggression in Europe, and to stop it if it occurs, there must be locally available land forces, coöperating closely with air forces whose task it would be to keep the enemy out of the skies and give tactical support to ground troops. Calculations of the number needed must be based on the strength of enemy forces available for use against Western Europe and the most probable way they would be employed. The personal evaluation of all the factors involved by the commander who will have to handle the Western forces is an inseparable part of those calculations. This evaluation will not be attempted here. But it is plain that the forces now available or planned for the near future are insufficient, not only on the European front but in the Middle East and in other theaters where Soviet Russia might attack with her own troops and those of her satellites.

In the circumstances the essential problem is how to obtain the maximum effect with the smallest means, not only in the use of ground forces but in airfields, communications, the command organization and all other establishments essential to the conduct of a war. The principal task of the ready forces is to hold out during the first phase of the fighting. They must be highly mobile,

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stripped of everything not absolutely essential. However, greater mobility is not to be sought by increasing the number of vehicles but on the contrary by decreasing them through eliminating services that are necessary only during prolonged warfare. The soldier's fighting spirit and efficiency are much more likely to be high if he is allotted a task he can accomplish than if he is pampered in the attempted execution of an impossible task. Such streamlining would result more or less automatically in a needed reduction of the size of headquarters and staffs. The very best equipment available should be put in the hands of the ready forces and not saved for a later stage; the objective is maximum firepower and minimum encumbrances. These forces will have to be superbly trained, which means long-service personnel as far as possible. The air arm should receive first consideration.

Safeguarding the sea lanes is the obvious task of the great naval Powers, assisted by the smaller countries whose geographic position makes it desirable for them to have naval forces. The strategic air force which is of such great importance for the attainment of the ultimate goal can be provided only by the advanced industrial countries already in possession of large aircraft industries, namely, the United States, Canada and Great Britain. The tactical air forces, destined to act in close coöperation with the land forces, should be provided by the same countries that provide the land forces, but reinforcements by other countries are both possible and permissible.

In principle, the European land forces must be provided by the European countries themselves, including Germany, with Britain providing an important share since her first line of defense against operations on land lies on the Continent. As outlined earlier, United States ground forces should not be heavily committed to a certain front from the beginning, since the United States must retain immediate control over the general reserves and be able to deploy from its advantageous central location. But American troops must remain in Europe as a token that the people of the United States are fighting shoulder to shoulder with European people all over the world. And as long as Europe has not achieved the minimum required strength American forces must fill the gap.

If the political integration of Europe were an actual possibility in the near future a European Army would naturally be part of that development, but since it is as yet little more than a distant target, it is a mistake to reckon on a single European Army Corps.

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After all, is not the possession of armed forces the principal attribute of state sovereignty? While the European nations cling jealously to other aspects of sovereignty the emergence of a European Army seems improbable. The Pleven Plan seems to be an attempt to get ahead of the clock. If it is motivated less by the desire for such an army than by fear of a new or reborn Wehrmacht, then it must be said that fear is a bad teacher. But though we should do well not to count too heavily on the success of the Pleven Plan we may hope that it will be possible to reach agreement on a common strategic doctrine, to standardize arms and equipment, and to set up European staff colleges and military academies. These are the right measures to pave the way for a European Army. The European countries must produce their own equipment, with assistance from the United States in making full use of their industrial potentialities.

IV

It is a grim and depressing thought that as long as the ready forces in Europe are too weak to do their job, we shall have to reckon very seriously with the possibility that, in the event of war, large parts of the vital regions of Europe may have to be abandoned. But the vital interests of both Europe and the United States call for the defeat of the Soviet Union if it attacks, and the concentration of all available forces on a single front, important as the particular region may be, would never prevent the Kremlin from winning the war. We cannot be confident that we can keep Western Germany out of Russian hands should a war break out in the near future, nor can we be certain that all or part of Western Europe west of the Rhine will remain in our hands. But the way to ward off such a catastrophe is not to adopt a strategic plan that would merely play into the Kremlin's hands, but to redouble our efforts to inform the European people of the realities of the situation and the need for herculean efforts.

It is of paramount importance to keep a solid hold on the great bastion of Africa, and to make due preparations for integrating Spain—a bridgehead to Africa—into the defense of the European continent. It is no less essential to prevent the enemy from dominating the Mediterranean, gaining entrance into the Middle East and extending his sphere of influence in the Far East. The primary purpose of the West is to prevent war. To do that we must be prepared to wage it on many fronts, while at the same time

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holding over the rulers of the Kremlin the threat of utter devastation by Allied air operations if war is their choice. Denmark's opposition at Ottawa to the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO, and the horror shown by most European countries at the thought of military coöperation with Franco Spain, prove how far many Europeans still are from understanding the character of world-wide collective security. Europe cannot be saved if the problem is looked at from a narrowly European point of view.

We come back, therefore, to the theme with which we began—the urgent need of stronger leadership, and NATO's incapacity to move with the needed speed and energy. The increased effort required from each Western European citizen will come only if there is stronger faith that the goal is feasible. Faced with Soviet domination and exploitation, which would mean the degradation of living standards to the Russian level, the loss of all personal freedoms, a reign of terror and the extinction of European civilization, it is hard to believe that the European nations are not now making the most intense effort possible to save themselves. But they are not. Many people seem not to understand the reality of the danger or the possibility that it can be averted if they will summon their full energies. It is hardly conceivable that even the numerous Communists in the various European countries have a clear notion of what is in store for them if once the Soviets rule their country. Certainly the idealists and theorists do not, or they would not assume that the Soviet Union is merely engaged in an ideological effort to popularize the doctrine of Marx and Engels. Their fifth column activities are supposedly for the sake of abstract Communism but actually help to extend the iron rule of imperialist Russia and of Stalinist state capitalism. And of course the naïve are reinforced by the despairing and the cynical, who seek to float with what they imagine is the wave of the future.

The third requisite for the defense of Europe is, quite simply, better information about the crisis with which we are all faced. Information must be spread, in an organized and intensive way, not only about the nature and extent of the danger but about the means of averting it. The pessimism and indifference which prevent the West from exerting its full strength can be overcome. When every European is aware of what he can expect from a Russian victory and of what he can to do help prevent it there will be a unison of devoted effort which will prevent war or, if necessary, bring victory.

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THE TURN OF THE SCREW IN SOVIET AGRICULTURE

By Lazar Volin

THE forced drive for a merger of collective farms and the resettlement of peasants, which was begun about two years ago in Russia, has once more brought Soviet agrarian policy into the spotlight. Since it has come at a time of high international tension and feverish military preparations by the Kremlin —a process in which agriculture, as all other sectors of Soviet economy, is expected to play its part—the significance of this new turn of policy warrants examination. Is it a revolutionary development? How does it bear on the probability of war or peace? And what will be its effect on the Russian peasant, who still represents the masses of the nation despite the lopsided advance of industrialization under the Soviet Five Year Plans?

It is safe to say that, after more than 30 years of activity, the magicians of the Kremlin are able to display few, if any, untried tricks. Huge farms have been tried before and have failed. The Bolsheviks inherited the predilection for bigness as part and parcel of the Marxist dogma, which postulates the superiority of large-scale methods of production in agriculture as in industry, uninhibited by the economic law of diminishing returns or by special factors peculiar to agriculture. Lenin's fascination and enthusiasm for that American invention, the tractor, was transmitted to his heirs and reënforced the old Marxist cult of bigness. It was natural, therefore, for the Bolsheviks to pin their faith on large-scale mechanized farming when, early in their rule, they were confronted by the need of greatly expanded supplies of low cost foodstuffs and fibers and yet were meeting with stubborn resistance from the peasant farmers. The latter were restive under the action of the so-called "scissors," that is, the effect of low prices paid them by the state for agricultural products, and high prices charged them for the manufactured goods of the nationalized monopolistic industries—goods which, in addition, were scarce and poor in quality. In the late twenties, the situation worsened as the Kremlin embarked on its ambitious program of industrialization under the Five Year Plans and the ruthless collectivization of peasant agriculture followed.

In organizing the collectives the Soviet leaders set no limit to

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the size of the farm unit and were guided by the maxim "the larger the better." This gigantomania was evidenced in the huge state farms which the government operated like factories with hired labor. Two such show farms, Gigant and Verblud, served as meccas for foreign tourists in Russia in the 1930's and were especially publicized. Similar though less exaggerated tendencies toward gigantomania also prevailed in the collectivization of peasant farming. But the bitter experience of this early period of collectivization seemed to have taught the Kremlin that the biggest farm is not necessarily the best, and that hugeness is not synonymous with good farm management. At any rate, many of the large state farms were subdivided and some of their land was turned over to collectives.

Inefficiencies resulting from the early unlimited growth were recognized in the collective farms, too. The subdivision of collectives into so-called brigades or sections, headed by a brigadier or foreman, began to be emphasized. Each brigade was to include from 40 to 60 workers and to be assigned a separate plot of land, with its own draft animals and farm implements, for a period of several years, covering a crop rotation cycle. In the late thirties a smaller operational unit in the collectives, the so-called *zveno* (literally "link") of about a dozen workers was encouraged. These squads were especially favored by the Soviet authorities in the growing of crops requiring intensive labor, such as sugar beets and cotton, but on the eve of the war they were also used in grain farming.

Some large collectives were broken up. For example, four in the Spassk district of Ryazan Province in central Russia were each divided in half. On the other hand, the very small collective farms in the northern and north central regions were considered inefficient and the "voluntary" merger of such collectives was recommended, even though the character of the terrain in the northern and north central regions, crisscrossed by forests, lakes and marshes, militated against large farms just as it favored them in the level southern and eastern steppes. In any event, the average size of the collective farm was increasing in the middle thirties in the north and decreasing in the south and east. In general, such divisions and mergers of collective farms as took place before 1950 were carried out in a quiet and orderly way, without the fanfare of a campaign so characteristic of the Soviet organizing methods. All this changed, however, in 1950.

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II

The change was heralded by a bombshell in the form of an unsigned article in *Pravda* of February 19, 1950, severely criticizing A. A. Andreev, a member of the Politburo and Chairman of the Council for Kolkhoz Affairs, who had long been the Kremlin's spokesman on agricultural policy. He was condemned for championing the use of the *zveno,* which had become widespread with the increase of hand labor on farms during the war. It was now declared to be an obstacle to mechanization and detrimental to large collective farming; and immediately following the publication of the article, a campaign was begun in the Soviet press extolling the superior merits of the brigade. In characteristic Communist fashion, Andreev publicly confessed his errors a few days after the *Pravda* article.

Sporadic reports of collective farm mergers in the Moscow Province began to appear late in 1949. But on March 7, 1950, a member of the Politburo, N. S. Khrushchev, who had not long before been transferred to Moscow as Party boss from the Ukraine, made an "election" speech which was the opening gun in a far-reaching campaign for mergers of collective farms. The campaign began in the Moscow Province and spread over the whole Soviet Union, including the Baltic Republics and other regions incorporated since World War II. Thus, in Soviet Latvia, the 4,115 collectives which were originally created after the Soviet occupation were reduced at the beginning of 1951 to 1,792. Large collectives in the south and east were merged, as well as small farms in the northern and north central regions. In the Dnepropetrovsk Province of the Ukraine, for instance, where the farms certainly were not small, 866 collectives were consolidated into 342, with an average area of 7,400 acres. One district of the Odessa Province where 22 of the 40 collectives had an area of tillable land up to 2,000 acres (800 hectares) was left with 17 farms, all above 2,000 acres, 14 of them with more than 3,750 acres (1,500 hectares). The Minister of Agriculture of the U.S.S.R., I. A. Benediktov, stated that the number of collective farms decreased during 1950 from 252,000 to 123,000. More than two-thirds of all collectives were merged into 60,000 super-farms. The number of collectives consolidated to form these new giants varied from two to 14; mergers involving seven to nine collectives were not uncommon. However, as Khrushchev pointed out, many of the mergers were affected only "legally," *i.e.* administratively,

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with actual unification yet to be carried out. Judging from some reports, many independent collectives have merely been turned into "brigades" of consolidated farms, and operations carried on as before.

The phase of the merger campaign which created the most furor was the resettlement of the rural population. Official speeches and press reports suggested that the merger of collectives was to be accompanied by the integration of numerous villages into a number of larger settlements, sometimes called *agrogorod,* or agro-towns. Such a move was justified by Khrushchev and other Soviet spokesmen on the ground that the cultural and other communal needs of the collective farmers could be better met in larger settlements, since it is not economical to build hospitals, schools, clubs, etc., in small villages. From an ideological standpoint, also, the *agrogorod* would represent a major step in the achievement of that much publicized aim of Bolshevik policy—the elimination of economic and social contrast between the town and the countryside, the city workers and peasants. So much the better, from the Bolshevik standpoint, if, in this process, the historic bonds which united neighbors in small villages were torn asunder and the historic association with the land that dates back to the period of serfdom were dissolved. Conceivably, this may well have been the underlying, though unspoken, motive for the resettlement drive.

An intensive building campaign in the Russian countryside was projected. For instance, a consolidated collective farm called Pobeda (literally "Victory"), in the Moscow Province, which comprised seven villages, was to be replaced by a single settlement built around the largest village. For this purpose a construction fund was established, to which members were to contribute five percent of their earnings. It was obvious that such mass construction would be seriously handicapped by the shortage of building materials and skilled labor, and that the resettlement was, therefore, bound to be a slow process. However, in order to speed up the process, Khrushchev recommended in the spring of 1950 that existing peasants' dwellings be moved to the proposed settlements without waiting for the construction of new housing.

Had such a policy been pursued on a large scale it would indeed have created turmoil in the Russian countryside and diverted a vast amount of energy from badly needed agricultural produc-

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tion, now only slowly recovering from wartime decline. And peasant morale, which cannot be entirely disregarded by the men in the Kremlin, would have suffered greatly, since there is a vast difference between helping collective farmers build new and better homes, and uprooting them from ancestral farmsteads and deporting them along with their old houses. But the whole scheme of moving peasant dwellings rapidly was unrealistic, and it was never attempted on a large scale.

When Khrushchev returned to this theme, in a speech made on January 18, 1951, and not published in the press until March 4, he did not again raise the issue of moving the peasant houses. He dwelt instead on the advantages of constructing multiple family dwellings in the villages—even two-storied houses with four flats. He contended that farmers did not demand individual homes. To keep down the amount of land set aside for the new villages, and to economize on various public utilities, Khrushchev suggested, as did others, that the size of the kitchen garden plots, immediately adjacent to the peasant houses, be reduced. The peasants were to be compensated by plots outside the village limits which could be cultivated with the aid of tractors, just as are the collective fields. However, the day after Khrushchev's speech was belatedly published, a curious statement appeared in all the papers to the effect that "an editorial note that Comrade N. S. Khrushchev's article was being printed for purposes of discussion was omitted by editorial oversight. This statement rectifies the mistake."

Obviously, an editorial "oversight" could not have been committed simultaneously by all the Soviet-controlled papers that published Khrushchev's speech, especially in the case of so important a personage. Apparently there had been a hitch in the resettlement drive. That this was so was soon confirmed, not by news from Moscow but from faraway Erevan, the capital of Soviet Armenia. On March 21, the local paper, *Communist,* published a speech made by the Party boss of Armenia, G. A. Arutyunov, at the Fifteenth Congress of the Armenian Communist Party, which, without naming Khrushchev, contained severe criticism of the whole resettlement policy which he advocated.

Arutyunov declared that the emphasis on resettlement of the rural population "brings confusion and relegates into the background the principal objective of enlargement of small collective farms, that of a further and speedy advance of agriculture and

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development of socialized collective production." He remarked scathingly that the idea of the agro-town was a "hybrid" which was nearer to "fantasy" than to "realistic demands of the kolkhoz villages." And he said that the advocates of resettlement erred in that "they mechanically identify the historic necessity of uniting small collective farms as production units into one large collective with the integration of small villages into one large village." Arutyunov appealed to the experience of the large state farms to demonstrate that single large settlements are not essential from the standpoint of farm production, and are not dictated, therefore, by the production requirements of consolidated collective farms. "Therefore," he concluded, "the suggestions of some comrades about the integration of small villages are unsound in substance and do not follow from the policy of the Party and the Soviet Government with respect to the organizational-economic strengthening of collectives." Arutyunov also cast aspersions, in passing, on Khrushchev's schemes of multiple family dwellings and reduction of kitchen garden plots.

Such criticism by a minor party functionary of the views of an official of Khrushchev's stature, who is supposed to speak with the authority of the Politburo behind him, is most unusual, to say the least. It is true that Arutyunov's strictures never reached the Moscow press, which merely gave a perfunctory summary of his speech. They were most vigorously echoed, however, by the party boss of neighboring Azerbaijan, M. D. Bagirov, whose speech was published in *Bakinskii Rabochii* on May 26, 1951. But this aspect of Bagirov's speech was not mentioned in the Moscow press either.

Of course it is possible that the speeches of these party bosses were intended to apply only to local conditions of the two mountainous Caucasian republics, where the conditions of the terrain, the attitude of the native population, the proximity to Iran and Turkey and various other special factors made the resettlement drive inadvisable. On June 7, 1951, *Pravda* said editorially that "Capital investment and labor of the collective farmers must be directed, in the first place, to the development of the socialized economy—the building of livestock shelters, irrigation canals and ponds, the clearing of the land, planting of tree shelterbelts, construction of various farm barns and sheds and electric power stations." No mention was made of resettlement. A similar statement was made by the Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the

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U.S.S.R., P. Lobanov, writing in *Bolshevik,* No. 10, May 1951.

It is, of course, impossible to say whether it was the shortage of building materials, the fear of adverse effects on agricultural production and on peasant morale, opposition to Khrushchev in the Politburo, something connected with war preparation, or a combination of all these factors that led to the sudden soft-pedaling of the resettlement part of the general scheme. There is certainly no visible evidence that Khrushchev fell from grace. The fact remains, however, that resettlement is no longer a live issue in the Russian countryside. That it will be revived at some more propitious time is, of course, perfectly possible.

III

The Kremlin did, however, push through the merger of collectives, as we have noted. It is interesting to review the reasons that have been given in the U.S.S.R. in support of this move. Khrushchev, in his speech of March 8, 1950, complained: "Small collective farms cannot achieve the powerful expansion and development of all branches of agriculture. Is it possible to introduce systematic rotation of crops on an area of 90 to 100 hectares [225 to 250 acres]? Dividing the land into eight or nine fields, you get a field of approximately ten hectares [25 acres]. . . . The tractor and the combine cannot be utilized on such a field as they should be. . . . Many collective farms in Moscow Province have found the correct solution—they have embarked on a path of uniting and enlarging the kolkhozy. . . . The merging of small kolkhozy is a correct and progressive measure. The task of party and Soviet organs is to assist collective farmers to carry out this important task. . . ."

We may note, incidentally, that the merger of collectives is emphasized by Khrushchev as an entirely voluntary procedure, the great advantages of which were presumably discovered by the collectives themselves.[1] In his version of the development, the Soviet authorities are merely assigned the function of rendering assistance in the process. This has been the leitmotif of the whole merger campaign. It is significant that no legislation on the subject, and no directives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, have been published so far. There are some references

[1] It was admitted by the Ukrainian Party boss, L. G. Mel'nikov (in a speech reported in *Pravda Ukrainy,* June 3, 1951), that there were some cases of violation of the voluntary principle, and undue haste in mergers of collectives.

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to directives, however, and one cannot doubt their existence. But to publish a decree or Party directive would have spoiled the fiction that all was being done voluntarily by the peasants, a pretense which, for some reason, the Kremlin deems it advisable to maintain. Perhaps it has been maintained to impress the public in the satellite and foreign countries, since the Kremlin's subjects are familiar with the degree of regimentation which exists in the collectives and know the full meaning of suggestions for "voluntary" action. The suddenness, the wild-fire speed and the extensive character of the campaign are sufficient evidence that it has been ordered from on high.

In the speech mentioned above, and in several others dealing with the theme of farm consolidation, Khrushchev presented a long list of the supposed benefits of huge collective farms. He maintained that they would facilitate tractor operations, substantially reduce administrative personnel and expenses (the inflation of which has long bedeviled the collective farm economy) and offer greater possibilities of employing specialists and of obtaining qualified and experienced managers, and further that they would result in increased production, higher incomes for collective farm members and larger marketable output and, implicitly, therefore, an increased share for the state. There has been no lack of articles in the Soviet press, both general and special, since the spring of 1950, supporting Khrushchev's thesis by factual evidence purported to be derived from the experience of newly merged or older large farms.

How much of this evidence is authentic and how much is fabricated for propaganda purposes cannot, of course, be ascertained. The volume, uniformity and timing of the outpourings in the press certainly suggest a synthetic product. It is doubtful, in any case, whether the technical advantages of large-scale farming really weighed heavily in the minds of those who decided upon the merger campaign, for, as we have seen, it has not been confined to consolidating small collectives but has aimed at the merger of farms which would already have been considered very large anywhere outside the Soviet Union. The general advocacy of rapid, indiscriminate merging of farms, without regard to the wide regional variations in topography, soil and climatic conditions or types of farming, suggests strongly that greater efficiency is not the central objective of the policy. In the small collectives of the north it would in theory be most advantageous, but small

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tracts of tillable land dotted with forests, lakes, marshes, etc., such as are found there lend themselves with great difficulty to the process. Of course, there are instances in which mergers of two or more collectives might be conducive to more efficient operation. But it is a far cry from this to a revival of the gigantomania of the early 1930's, which was officially condemned as inefficient.

What, then, is the principal motive of the merger drive? It is significant that Khrushchev stressed the key rôle of managers in the consolidated farms and the necessity of paying them higher salaries. After the merger campaign got under way, much was made in the Soviet press of the consolidation of Communist Party organizations in the collectives, and it was noted that this enhanced the relative importance of the Communists in the new farm units and strengthened the mechanism of Communist control. But the cat was really let out of the bag in a recent Soviet book, by G. I. Aksenenok and others, dealing with the collective farm law:

> The problem of improving state control of collective farms assumes especial significance with the merger of collective farms. . . . Previously when there were a larger number of collectives in the *raion* [district], it was difficult to keep an eye on each one, to know what was going on in each farm. Now it is another matter when there are fewer collectives as a result of the consolidation. . . . Now the *raion* agricultural authorities can work with each collective farm individually, give each one timely aid, note defects in the work of the manager and administration of the collective farm, and suggest the better and more correct solution to this or that problem.

The desire for more effective government control of collectives is evidently a basic reason for the drive. The smaller the number of collective managers, the easier it is to find persons who are not only capable but also politically reliable. Furthermore, while it has always been largely a fiction that the management in the collectives is "elected," there will be a wider gap than ever between the de-personalized management and the rank and file. The government will be able to exercise stricter controls in the super-collectives, and thus the driving power of managers will be increased and labor discipline tightened. This represents a return to the trend of Soviet agrarian policy of the late thirties, which was relaxed during the war to some extent.

In the Soviet view this leads to the most important objective of all—the increase of agricultural production. To Westerners it seems an anomaly to institute a program which in reality has little concern for efficiency, when the major aim is a great increase

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in production. There is no inconsistency here by Communist reasoning, however. When more production is needed, the Communist mind has one plain answer to the question of how to get it: increase the pressure upon the producers; in short, tighten the screws. The postwar recovery of agricultural production in the U.S.S.R. has been slow, particularly in view of the growing number of mouths to feed and the intensive preparation for war. Since the Kremlin wants badly to increase production, it has resorted, quite naturally and logically, to a policy which will enable it to get the peasants under closer control, and thus to drive them more ruthlessly. In the West the resort would be to increased economic incentives for farmers. In the Soviet Union such incentives would have to be in terms of consumer goods; they are scarce, due largely to the emphasis on armament. To the Communist way of thinking, the course to be followed is, therefore, obvious.

And, naturally also, this is in conformity with Marxist tenets. Marxism holds that the "maximizing" of production should be only along strictly collectivist lines. Here lies the explanation of the Soviet attitude toward the kitchen garden plots of the collective farmers. These small plots have been an Achilles' heel of Soviet collective agriculture. Soviet administrators have frequently complained that the peasants, particularly women, cultivate these little plots so intensively that they neglect the collective fields. They do so especially when their returns from collective farms are small, as they often have been; and then the very preoccupation of the peasants with personal farming has tended to keep the collective farm returns small.

In 1939 measures were taken by the Kremlin to curb personal farming by collective farmers, but during the war, when the country was faced with an acute food shortage, its expansion was winked at by the government. Since 1946, however, the Kremlin has reverted to its restrictive policy. The addition of a few hundred thousand acres to the several hundred million acres of collective land is not, of course, what the Kremlin cares about; but it is very much concerned about the diversion of peasant labor to personal work, and the example of poor collective discipline which that produces. Now the importance of full utilization of farm labor for state purposes in the U.S.S.R. has been enhanced by the manpower shortage occasioned by war and postwar reconstruction.

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The merger of collectives provides new opportunities for limitation of personal farming, and for advancing the Soviet goal of bringing the peasant nearer to the status of its ideal—the docile factory proletariat. When several collective farms have been merged, the size of each peasant's kitchen garden plot has often been scaled down to the level of the collective with the smallest plots; those were the best and "most efficient" farms, it is said. The speeches of Arutyunov and Bagirov referred to above criticized the reduction of the size of the plots, and so have other statements in the Soviet press; it may have been a case of deliberately locking the barn after the horse was stolen.

IV

What may we conclude from such evidence of the new development as is now in? First, it is not "revolutionary," as some have been inclined to believe. The super-collective farms may prove too unwieldy to manage, as did their predecessors in the early 1930's, but should the Kremlin be convinced of this, it would not hesitate to reverse itself. Strategic retreats are no novelty to the Bolsheviks, who were taught by Lenin that the road to their goal is not straight, but twists and turns like a mountain path. In the 1920's the liberal N.E.P. replaced the régime of war Communism, only to be supplanted by the collectivization drive late in the decade and in the early thirties. This in turn was followed by some concessions to peasant individualism in the mid-thirties; but these were being undermined by a new collective wave on the eve of the war, which, once again, was relaxed in the war period. The current campaign is not a revolutionary phenomenon, but a surge forward in the wave-like evolutionary process which the Soviets believe will carry them to their goal.

Second, it seems reasonable to suppose that the Kremlin does not expect war instantly, but that it is intensifying preparations for a possible war a few years from now. The confusion created by the mergers may hamper production in the short run, but in the long run the tighter control of the super-collectives makes an increase in output probable—certainly an increase of the share of output going to the state. And an iron grip on agriculture is essential for the Soviets in wartime, as the experience of the last war proved. The selection of new managers for the super-collective farms has not proven an easy task, and even more time will be required to consolidate collective fields, build new farm centers, etc.

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But by 1953 Soviet agriculture should be better organized to do its part in any Soviet emergency plan.

The conclusion that the new drive will in the long run increase Soviet agricultural production must, however, be qualified in one very important respect. The response of the Russian peasant is the factor on which success or failure will turn. The whole scheme of super-collective farming is predicated on the continued submission of the Russian peasant to the increasingly strict regimentation. That there is smoldering peasant unrest in Russia is hardly doubted by anyone familiar with Russian history and contemporary agrarian conditions. Every tightening of the collectivist screw is bound to increase agrarian discontent. The Kremlin, however, has usually been willing to open the safety valve just enough to prevent an explosion, resuming the collectivist offensive as soon as the danger of open revolt has passed. This has occurred in every decade. Should the new agrarian offensive affect the peasant morale too adversely, it is probable that the Kremlin will make another of its famous zigzags.

Some observers speculate on the possibility that the present movement may push right on to a logical conclusion in the complete integration of collective peasant agriculture with state farming—that is, in a single "Socialist" type patterned essentially on the state farm. It is argued that the trend toward growing operational control of the collectives by the government, the increase in their size, and the influence of ideological considerations (always strong in long-range Communist policy) make such a unified system the likely outcome. It may indeed come to pass eventually, but one may doubt that during the next few years the Kremlin will be willing to substitute the method of wage payment for labor which prevails on the state farms for the system under which members of the collectives are merely residual claimants to its income. The latter is much more profitable to the Soviet Government, and so long as it is so, the fiction of "self-government" for collectives, and separate existence of collectives and state farms, will be maintained. Whichever happens, the Russian peasants (as Karl Marx said of the proletarians) "have nothing to lose but their chains."

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TRADE POLICIES OF THE NEW JAPAN

By Ryutaro Takahashi

THE foreign trade of Japan has only recently succeeded in recovering from the extreme contraction which it suffered following World War II. Now considerable attention is being given everywhere to the question of its future development. There are misgivings in certain quarters as to the quality of Japanese exported goods, and there also may be some concern that Japan will revert to dumping practices, or that she may be creating undue complications by exercising export and import controls not called for by the realities of current commercial transactions. It is my hope that an understanding of the actual economic conditions which form the basis of Japanese trade, and of the trade policies now being followed by the Japanese Government, will show that such misgivings are groundless.

In terms of value, Japan's trade has shown a remarkable recovery since the end of the war. The total value of exports and imports in 1950 was more than four times higher than in 1946, reaching $820,000,000 for exports and $970,000,000 for imports (including United States aid to Japan). This rise is still continuing at a steady rate. The transition from a buyer's market to a seller's market, brought about by the Korean war, has given further impetus to the rise in exports ever since the latter half of 1950. Some difficulties have been experienced in purchasing critical raw materials, however, which indicates that further expansion in the volume of trade is imperative before Japan can attain economic self-sufficiency.

The problem of how to expand the volume of trade is accompanied by a no less important problem of how to attain equilibrium in the balance of payments. Before the war, Japan's adverse balance of payments in visible trade was offset by a favorable balance in invisible trade. For example, in 1933, the receipts in invisibles, of which services for shipping and insurance comprised 70 percent, came to about 50 percent of the receipts from visibles. After the war, the almost complete disappearance of a merchant fleet and the restrictions upon overseas activities made receipts from shipping and insurance negligible. Even in 1950, when the receipts from invisibles markedly increased, they amounted to only 20 percent of receipts in visibles. A large part of this im-

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provement in the Japanese international balance of payments comes from purchases made by the United States Government procurement agencies in Japan (called "Special Procurements"), whose orders totalled approximately $470,000,000 from the outbreak of the Korean war to October 14, 1951. And American aid, amounting to some two billion dollars, was the main factor which enabled Japan to balance her trade and even to accumulate some foreign exchange after the war.

II

As a result of the drastic change in the world economic pattern brought about by the Second World War, Japan, like many other countries, is confronted with the task of adapting herself to new conditions. In the prewar period her closest trade relations were with the adjacent Asiatic countries. About 50 percent of her total trade was carried on in the Asiatic area, and the favorable balance from this was always sufficient to cover the deficit in her trade with the United States. Trade with China, Korea and Formosa has only partially recovered since the war, and Japan has come to depend on the United States for some 50 percent of her imports. Although Japanese exports to the Asiatic countries continue to exceed imports from them, the balance is far too small to make good the excess of American imports. Prevailing monetary restrictions make the situation even more difficult. In the circumstances, the termination of American aid will tax to the utmost Japan's efforts to rectify this trade disequilibrium. However, we are resolved not to fail in the task thus laid before us.

When we analyze Japan's foreign trade in terms of commodities we see that it is characterized by the importation of raw materials and foodstuffs. These constituted 87 percent of imports before the war, and industrial products accounted for 88 percent of exports. The same fundamental pattern prevailed after the war. In 1950, 95 percent of imports were raw materials and foodstuffs, and 91 percent of exports were industrial products. But the proportion which foodstuffs occupied in the total value of imports showed a marked increase in comparison with the prewar period. Textiles, a leading export item, accounted for 49 percent of total exports in 1950, followed by sundries, metal and metal products, and machinery. While the ratio of exports of textiles to total exports showed a relative decrease in comparison with the prewar period, there was a notable expansion in the export of metals,

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metal products and machinery supplied for the industrialization of India and other countries of Southeast Asia.

Japan's trade is characterized by the export of manufactured goods and the import of raw materials, and hence trade relations have tended to be closest with countries which produce raw materials, or with underdeveloped countries. In the period from 1930 to 1934, 51 percent of total exports of Japan went to Asiatic countries and 30 percent to North America, while 46 percent of total imports came from Asiatic countries and 29 percent from North America.

Japanese trade was resumed after the war under a government-operated system which was subject to supervision by SCAP. On August 15, 1947, a system of limited private trade was inaugurated within the larger framework of the government system. In August 1948, Japanese exporters were permitted to make contacts directly with foreign traders; but importation, covered as it was by large aid from the United States, was kept entirely in government hands. Stress was laid on foodstuffs, and the United States was looked to as a source for both imports and exports.

Japanese exports maintained an upward trend in 1949 in spite of the decline of American commodity prices and the devaluation of the British pound sterling. Soon it was discovered, however, that intensified competition for exports among the major countries and a tightening of import controls, due to the world dollar shortage, made further expansion in Japanese exports hard to achieve. As a result, bilateral trade agreements were concluded with a larger number of countries; the hope was to increase the volume of trade through an "import first" policy. Parallel to this, the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law was enacted in December 1949, establishing the principle of free export and private import.

The outbreak of hostilities in Korea brought a general expansion of armament and stimulated the purchases of strategic materials. This in turn gave rise to export restrictions, by various countries, and confronted Japan with a new problem.

The principle of license-free export which became effective in December 1949 aimed at promoting exports by simplifying export procedures and encouraging the activities of private traders; government authorization for exports was required only for exceptional commodities. However, the sharp turn in the international situation necessitated much more stringent restrictions on

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exports to Communist China at the end of 1950, and drastic additions to the list of commodities requiring export approval. Moreover, the rush for strategic and basic raw materials by various countries, and the world-wide tightening of export controls, has created a high demand for Japanese products. From considerations of domestic supply and consumption, Japan has had to establish export restrictions on certain basic materials. The list of restricted items is being gradually expanded, and it may be that the principle of free exports will have to be revised.

III

Under such changing conditions, the question how to increase the Japanese export trade is vital to the success of her effort to achieve a stable economy. One of the important problems which the Japanese Government faces on the eve of the country's return to the international community is that of dumping. In the past this has been the source of many complaints against Japan. Even one case of dumping by an inexperienced trader who is eager to clear his stock can have serious repercussions upon all Japan's foreign trade. The Japanese Government, accordingly, has repeatedly warned against such practices. The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law stipulates that exporters must take into due consideration legislation prohibiting unfair competition in the final country of destination, and the Government is obliged to investigate thoroughly to determine whether exports are being made in accord with its provisions. Violators are penalized. The Government's criteria of whether an export transaction comes under the head of dumping are in compliance with the definition set forth in the I.T.O. Charter.

When export prices, domestic prices and exports of light industrial commodities including cotton goods fell sharply in May 1951, due to the depression in the international market, certain traders with small capital began to sell their stocks at unduly low prices. Since this might lead to suspicion of dumping, the Government took measures to check it by requiring prior examination of export prices of cotton yarn, fabrics, secondary textile goods, porcelain, china, canned tuna and other items which constitute major Japanese export commodities. Export prices were thus stabilized and have remained stable. As a result, the value of exports increased and anxiety abroad concerning dumping by Japanese exporters was alleviated.

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There is a strong feeling in Japanese business circles that some democratic organization to help prevent unfair practices such as dumping is needed. Fundamentally, dumping problems may be ascribed to the financial weakness of Japanese traders and the diminutive scale on which they operate, as well as to the weakness of the Japanese economy itself, vulnerable as it is to the effects of overseas fluctuations which constantly and with a magnified impact bring pressure upon domestic prices. Thus a long-range effort at accumulation of capital is required. By pushing economic stabilization measures the Government is resolved to remove violent fluctuation of domestic prices and thereby prevent dumping practices at their source. Complaints abroad about dumping by Japanese traders often attribute it to Japan's cheap labor, calling it "social dumping." It is fair to note, however, that Japan's postwar economy has been completely democratized, and that with the enactment of the Labor Standard Law every effort is being made to improve working conditions. The position of the worker is now incomparably better than it was in prewar days. Some quarters point out that, nonetheless, the level of wages for Japanese workers is low by international standards. But wages in Japan are a reflection of the general state of the economy and of the levels of the Japanese people; wages of the workers engaged in export industries are not lower than others in Japan.

The question of the quality of Japanese goods is also part of the problem of dumping. Certain types of Japanese export goods have been criticized for bringing discredit upon Japanese goods in the international market, a condition ascribed to a lack of adequate examination of these goods. The high quality of a large number of Japanese commodities has, however, already been recognized internationally—optical instruments are an example—and the Japanese Government is endeavoring, above all, to improve the quality of goods manufactured for export and is seeking to turn out products which will be considered first-rate by the highest standards. A system of inspection for quality has been adopted for major export items, and the Export Commodities Control Law requires the labelling of grades of export items so that the importer can plainly identify their quality. It also fixes minimum standards and packing conditions for given export items. Moreover, since the mere inspection of finished products was not deemed sufficient to achieve improvement in quality, the Industrial Standardization Law was enacted. This law sets up

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standards for particular commodities and makes it possible to apply scientific tests of quality at the very outset of the production process. A specially designated mark is attached to the products of a qualified firm, and a large number of standardized goods are now finding their way into the export market. Finally, test and inspection agencies are being established to bring the results of governmental and private research to bear on this problem, and the introduction of foreign techniques is being studied. In short, the Government is striving assiduously to raise the reputation of Japanese exports in the international market.

IV

The question of imports is likewise receiving attention. Japan is dependent upon imports for the supply of foodstuffs, cotton and wool, iron ore, coking coal and many other vital raw materials. Under the private import system, which has been effective since January 1950, the Japanese Government approves imports within the scope of the foreign exchange budget which is drawn up after consideration of the availability of foreign exchange. In order to facilitate the imports of necessary materials and to encourage the initiative of private traders, the import procedures were partially amended in August 1950 and a method called the Semi-Automatic Approval System was established. This system makes possible the approval by private banks of certain listed imports upon application by importers, up to a certain limit fixed in the foreign exchange budget. In October of the same year, the long-term budget system was established, authorizing the conclusion of long-term contracts on iron coking ore, coal, bauxite, phosphate rock, sugar and pulp which require a period of delivery of a year or more. Foreign exchange cover is guaranteed by the Government for approved imports. Moreover, the Bank of Japan gives special consideration to the internal needs for yen of importers and consumers.

Immediately after the Second World War, as explained above, the breakdown of multilateral trade, caused by a general dollar shortage, which resulted in keen export competition and import restrictions, left Japan with no other alternative but to enter into a series of bilateral arrangements in trade. This system is playing an imporant part in our endeavor to achieve an expanded trade equilibrium and to stabilize fluctuating market conditions. Such trade and financial agreements have been concluded with 24

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countries, excluding the United States, Canada and the countries of the Soviet bloc. These 24 countries are divided into three groups; dollar open account, dollar cash and sterling cash agreement. In the dollar cash and sterling cash accounts, each transaction is settled on a cash basis either in dollars or pounds sterling; in the open accounts, current transactions are settled on the books maintained by the Governments concerned and actual transfer of foreign exchange takes place only for the periodical settlement of the over-all balances in the manner specified in each agreement. Generally the United States dollar is used as the currency of settlement. This system offers a typical example of bilateral trade.

With the outbreak of the Korean war, however, the world market changed from a buyer's to a seller's market. Purchases of critical commodities through the open accounts became difficult, and trade between Japan and those countries with whom she had such arrangements tended to balance on a lower level. There is a general feeling that the system of bilateralism needs to be reconsidered. The formation of the European Payments Union in July 1950 gave a strong impetus to the principle of multilateral trade, and this resulted in a marked advance of European exports to Southeast Asia. In order to cope with this situation, certain revisions were introduced into the open account system to reduce the frequency of cash settlements by the mutual granting of permanent lines of credit (the "swing"). Japan strongly desires to participate in world trade on a multilateral basis and will advance in this direction at every possible opportunity. She also desires to participate actively in the organization of the European Payments Union, if that is possible.

It must be admitted, however, that Japan still continues to depend heavily on imports from the dollar area, which have increased further since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. Under these circumstances, the signing of the new Anglo-Japanese Payments Agreement in August 1951 was an event of considerable importance. If this new agreement can be operated successfully, Japan will be able to purchase many vital raw materials which have so far been available only from the dollar area. Furthermore, any surplus sterling holdings may be used for purchases from certain countries outside the sterling area. It is to be hoped that in this way our trade with the sterling area will be considerably increased and our dollar shortage mitigated.

Trade with Southeast Asia is a particularly important question.

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In the past, China has been Japan's traditional market; and our desire to maintain this relationship is natural. But this must be subordinated now, out of considerations of friendship with democratic nations and adherence to the principle of coöperation with the United Nations. Geographical proximity and historical background have also produced close trade relations with Southeast Asia. After the war, the countries of that area drew up programs of development and industrialization which are now being vigorously carried out. As a result, the demand for capital goods is very high there. Japan, on her part, wishes to import raw materials from Southeast Asia. Since her economy and the economies of these countries are interdependent, and because Southeast Asia is in fact finding it difficult to obtain capital goods due to world rearmament, the Japanese Government will give priority to the export of goods to be used for the development of these areas. The purchasing power of these countries is none too high, however, and the further implementation of the Colombo Plan and the Point Four Program is much to be desired. Japan has established an Export Bank in order to open the way to long-term financing on plant and machine export. She is also trying to alleviate losses suffered by exporters through a credit insurance system.

Despite these measures, the export of capital goods from Japan to Southeast Asia has decreased recently, since her prices for some machinery are higher than international prices—a result of the fact that she is obtaining iron and steel and other basic raw materials from distant countries and freight rates have risen considerably. We hope to lower the cost of production through the rationalization of enterprise, with technical coöperation from the advanced industrial nations. To keep pace with the progress of the world economy, Japan must constantly strive to modernize her industries and raise technical standards. The Japanese economy developed on a fairly high industrial level, but owing to the ravages of war and the inadequacy of capital accumulation it is now far less up-to-date than that of other countries. For example, over half of the rolling machines in the iron and steel industry were installed before 1935. In the machine tool industry, more than about 30 percent of the equipment is superannuated and falls short of precision grade. Conditions such as these lower production, raise costs, affect the quality of goods and seriously hamper the development of export trade. This is one of the

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most important industrial problems confronting Japan, and every effort is being made to tackle it.

The stabilization of exports requires an elastic home market, and the level of production and employment must be raised if this is to be achieved. If Japan is to be able to contribute her productive strength to the general upbuilding of democratic countries, she must above all overcome the domestic shortage of electric power. The problem of raising capital for the development of power resources is a crucial part of this question. The Japanese Government is taking energetic steps to find the solution to this question of electric power. Moreover, in fostering our export industry, I would like to see in Japan the growth of industries which require a high degree of technology. Specifically this would be in the heavy chemical industries, for thereby we should be enabled to keep pace with the trend of the world market and to obtain higher returns in foreign exchange.

Shipping also constitutes a factor of primary importance in the drive for exports. The 6,000,000 gross tons which Japan possessed in the prewar period fell to around 1,400,000 gross tons at the end of the war. Although the total gross tonnage has increased since then, it is as yet insufficient to transport even half of the volume of trade.

The path of Japan's war-devastated economy has been a rugged one in the six postwar years. Nevertheless, there has been a steady and reassuring expansion of the volume of trade during this period, and gradual and sure progress toward attaining equilibrium in the balance of international payments. The signing of the Peace Treaty, which offers Japan hope of rejoining the international economic community, is a source of great satisfaction. Japan also wishes to contribute to international economic welfare through accession to such international economic organizations as the International Monetary Fund and GATT, and by concluding various agreements with the other countries of the world. To this end she will make every effort to stabilize and improve her domestic industries and, externally, will respect the standards of international integrity and fair trade.

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LORD GREY AND THE PROBLEM OF AN ALLIANCE

By Byron Dexter

THIRTY-FIVE years have passed since Sir Edward Grey left the office of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, which he had held longer than any man in Britain's history, in the middle of the world war which was the climax of his life's work for peace. It was Grey who determined the form of the French-Russian-British Entente, as it was Grey who was held responsible when the arrangements which he had made failed to restrain the Central Powers. He was pursued by a volley of abuse from a generation of critics: "weak," "stupid," "vacillating," "an amateur diplomat." Shaw's gibe set the fashion on both sides of the Atlantic: "an incompetent Machiavelli."

Events disposed of the abuse. The generation of the twenties condemned Grey for failure to maintain British neutrality in the First World War; in that era of debunking, "the German menace" became the favorite myth. Even so able an historian as Harold Nicolson found the Germans under Hindenburg and Ludendorff merely rather admirable Elizabethans. In due course Hitler's demonstration of what German domination of Europe actually meant put an end to this interpretation, and the publication of G. M. Trevelyan's biography, "Grey of Fallodon," on the eve of the Second World War, gave us Grey at his full stature. Nevertheless, history seems still to treat Grey paradoxically. Though his political judgment was in important respects more penetrating than that of any major statesman of his time, and the fineness of his character is everywhere generously recognized, who names this Foreign Minister "great"?

Edward Grey was drawn into the field of foreign relations by his appointment as Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Rosebery, in Gladstone's Ministry of 1892. He was 30. He had earlier served as Private Secretary to Sir Evelyn Baring (later the famous colonial administrator, Lord Cromer) and then to H. C. E. Childers, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The brilliantly-gifted Rosebery, then engaged in a sharp inter-party conflict with the Little Englanders among the Liberals, could hardly have picked his young understudy by chance. Grey had been dismissed from Oxford for idle-

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ness, but his feat in taking the Tory seat in Northumberland from the Percy family at the age of 23 had revealed his qualities. His strength was his simplicity of speech and grasp of essentials. In campaigning they were a product of careful, and hated, preparation. "I had no difficulty in making a speech when I had something to say," he said of his first contest. "Then it was only a matter of arranging one's materials. But to find new materials for speeches was a most wearisome matter, and I soon became nauseated by it." Grey had no pose. Perhaps the tendency of a later age to undervalue him is to some extent a result. Statesmen, like actors, perform on a stage; it seems to be easier to understand them when they play a part than when they play themselves.

The post of Under-Secretary was one of much responsibility, since Grey spoke in the Commons for a Foreign Minister in the Lords. He was retained in the post under Lord Kimberley when Rosebery succeeded Gladstone as Prime Minister. His famous statement in the House in 1893 that Britain would look upon a French occupation of territory of the Upper Nile as an unfriendly act was made virtually on his own responsibility. He confessed at the end of his life that he did not know whether it had been wise. It may have challenged France to action which caused much embarrassment. It may have averted the disaster of a Franco-British war. At any rate, the strength which he displayed as Parliamentary Under-Secretary left him without a serious rival in his party for the position of Foreign Secretary for the next 20 years.

When the Liberals resumed office in 1905 there was a strong effort, by Germany and by a section of the Liberal Party, to reverse the trend of British policy which, through the Lansdowne Agreement of 1904, had moved toward rapprochement with France. In a notable preëlection speech Grey took the initiative in defeating the attempt. Even his mentor Rosebery misjudged the full situation and advised the reversal. Grey stood firm. In the Moroccan crisis of 1905, which broke as he took office, he repulsed decisively von Bülow's effort to destroy the budding agreement with France, under circumstances of much political confusion and extreme personal anguish caused by his wife's sudden death.

Precisely what—and who—is "professional" in government is seldom made plain by those who most confidently disparage "amateurs." But we may note certain of Grey's credentials. Unlike most predecessors and colleagues of Cabinet rank he never shifted his field. He never yielded to the impulse, ruinous to so

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many in diplomacy, to say more than he meant in order to please the man he was talking to. He never promised what he could not produce. Quite apart from whether he should have said different things, the words he used were the words he intended to use. In his delicate conversations with Cambon, Grey spoke in English and the French Ambassador in French, by mutual consent without an interpreter and with Grey under the most intense pressure, external and subjective, to soften hard truths; but the question of misquotation never arose. And Grey's written minutes are models of precision.

Nor was there ever a question of where responsibility lay within the Foreign Office. Grey's ambassadors and permanent officials were men of highest caliber—Hardinge, Cromer, Nicolson, Crowe. Has any Foreign Minister ever had a more brilliant group? There were important differences of opinion between certain of them and Grey. Grey took the decisions: he was master in his own house, as Professor Trevelyan says. And the notion that he must have neglected his work because of his enjoyment of the countryside is superficial, a result again, perhaps, of the frankness with which he expressed his desire to get away from London. On a few occasions in that nerve-racking 11-year stretch John Morley substituted for him during brief vacations; otherwise the stream of dispatch boxes sought him out everywhere.

His work was his duty, however, not his pleasure. He travelled abroad almost not at all. The Foreign Office messages found him, when not in London, in Hampshire or Northumberland or Scotland. In his book, "Twenty-Five Years," there is an interpolation in a factual narrative of an episode of 1911, dealing with an ultimatum sent by the British Government to the despot Abdul Hamid, which reveals the complexity of his character. Surely no important political memoir can hold a passage like it.

> There are a few days in the first part of May when the beech-trees in young leaf give an aspect of light and tender beauty to English country which is well known but indescribable. The days are very few, the colour of the leaves soon darkens, their texture becomes stiffer; beautiful they are still, but "the glory and the dream" are gone. Unless Whitsuntide is unusually early, Sundays in the first half of May are the only days on which those who have business in towns can be sure of a whole day spent in the country at leisure. The first Sunday in May was a little too early for the perfection of the beeches in the country round my Hampshire cottage; the second Sunday in May was the perfect day. In my calendar it was known as "Beech Sunday," a day set apart and consecrated to enjoyment of the beauty of beech-leaves and to

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thankfulness for it. It was my habit on that morning, each year, to bicycle to a beech-wood some nine miles from the cottage. There I lunched once every year on that day at the foot of a certain tree. . . . I thought of it, looked forward to it, counted on it.[1]

But Abdul Hamid's failure to capitulate to the ultimatum until Sunday, May 13, caused Grey to miss the beech trees that year. The disappointment seems to have risen in his mind 15 years later with irresistible force. All his life he was looking for meanings other than those which politics offers. The effect that this preoccupation may have had on his political imagination at crucial times is one of the incalculables of his career.

Grey visited India in 1887. In 1897 he went to the West Indies with a commission of inquiry. In 1914 he accompanied King George V on a state visit to Paris. He crossed the Channel on no other occasion before the First World War. In one major respect, at least, his comprehension of Britain's foreign relations plainly suffered from this restriction of first-hand knowledge—the failure to perceive the degree of closeness between the political and military aspects of diplomacy and the obligations which they incur. In Grey's mind "diplomatic" and "military" were related, but distinguishable. So they are; the question is one of degree, and since it is so, and is ever in process of development, it will forever be debatable. But today few will doubt that Grey differentiated the two kinds of measures too sharply. His failure to bring the fact of military collaboration with France to the attention of the entire British Cabinet until 1912 was a result of his belief that, until then, it had not increased the degree of obligation assumed in the political agreement. We see that the error was damaging to Grey's reputation, and confusing to those who followed him: it furnished a point of attack for those who later sought to discredit the entire policy of support for France in favor of an opposite policy of neutrality, with such tragic effect upon the political judgment of Englishmen and Americans in the interwar years.

Perhaps a better theoretical knowledge of continental military literature would have saved Grey from this mistake. In any case, he might have absorbed this useful lesson by a process of osmosis, had he at some time immersed himself in continental life. European thought about the relationship of political and military was more sophisticated than British thought, still reasoning in the main from the uncontradicted experiences of centuries of sea

[1] "Twenty-Five Years," by Viscount Grey of Fallodon. New York: Stokes, 1925, p. 124.

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power which made Britain seem able to take as much or as little of a European war as she saw fit. We may note, however, that such cosmopolitan colleagues as Ripon, Campbell-Bannerman, Haldane failed to correct Grey's error. Morley, who had roamed the Continent, saw the significance of the Franco-British military consultations so little, even when the facts were laid before him in writing, that in all good faith he later denied having known about them. Foreign reporting is a complex business. Travel in itself is not the key that turns the lock.

And one further aspect of Grey's competence should be noted —his success in the negotiations with the United States in the Mexican problems of Wilson's early years and later in the dangerous problems of blockade and submarine warfare, in which his fairmindedness and patience did much to save Wilson from the consequences of a narrow legalism. Most revealing of all perhaps was the skillful diplomacy through which Grey dislodged Leopold from the Congo and brought healing to that offensive sore. These matters were not unconnected with one another, or with the major problem of Germany. Grey's ear had caught the early, often contradictory, yet arresting intimations of a new force in international politics, one on which all other questions hypothetical and immediate, including the question of the future of the German Empire, would presently depend—the force of world opinion. In the question of the Congo slave trade it came (outside Britain) only from the United States. To England and America only, among the Powers of the world, did the questions of the right and wrong of Leopold's transactions seem interesting. Grey's estimate of the significance of this new element of world politics was the most important single piece of foreign reporting of the years before the First World War. It was presently to save his country, and Europe. Grey saw the picture whole.

Yet Grey's policy failed of its objective. It did not avert the first German war. His speech to the Dominion delegates in 1911 is a fair sample of the position he took. There is no "appreciable danger of our being involved in any considerable trouble in Europe," he said to the delegates, "unless there is some Power or group of Powers which has the ambition of achieving what I call the Napoleonic policy. That would be a policy on the part of the strongest Power in Europe, or of the strongest group of Powers in Europe, of first separating the other Powers outside their own group from each other, taking them in detail, crushing them if

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need be, and forcing each into the orbit of the strongest Power." This, of course, was a warning that there was danger. The Dominion delegates knew which was the strongest Power in Europe; all knew Grey meant Germany. Yet he did not name Germany. Should he have done so? This was the precondition for an effort to transform the loose French-Russian-British Entente into a binding alliance to resist German expansion. Should he, that is to say, then and on every other fitting occasion, have described the danger from Germany in stronger terms, as a means of preparing Britain and the Dominions to fight?

The construction and maintenance of a defensive alliance to meet the threat of war from a Great Power is diplomacy's hardest task. From its inception it confronts the potential aggressor with a check to his plans, and thus it challenges him instantly to adopt the one measure most likely to separate any allies—the infliction upon one of them of a defeat which the others are unable or unwilling to prevent. And since the formation of such an alliance implies the shift from a passive to an active policy by the threatened nations, it puts into the hands of their antagonist the conqueror's most powerful political weapon—the opportunity to make the victim appear the aggressor. Every conqueror is a lover of peace, as Clausewitz remarked. No one so sincerely dislikes a "warmonger" as the invader who wishes to cross a border unopposed. The fighting begins only if the victim resists the invader; similarly, an armament race begins only when the weaker state looks to its defenses. And only the aggressor can offer to every antagonist a sure method of avoiding war: surrender. In the diplomatic conflict which ensues, the high cards are in the hands of the most warlike Power. Little wonder that even in the days when public opinion played a small part in the maintenance of an alliance, defensive coalitions were unstable quantities.

In the classical view of the problem, "only well-defined systems, geared to a concrete purpose and comparatively modest in scope, can take a firm grip on international realities."[2] The question of scope is thus the crucial one. If the alliance is to succeed in its purpose of discouraging a Great Power from the use of war as an instrument of policy, it must embrace a sufficient number of states to make its strength preponderant; but at the same time it must maintain its concreteness of purpose, for if that is

[2] "Diplomacy, Old and New," by André Géraud ("Pertinax"). *Foreign Affairs,* January 1945.

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lost, the cohesiveness of the coalition and all its utility disappear with it. In the classical view, no more than a very few Powers can hope to maintain a clear view of their common interest.

An incident which took place not long before Grey first entered politics suggests the complexity which had been added to this problem by the development of modern parliamentary government. In 1889, Hatzfeld, the German Ambassador in London, told Lord Salisbury, on Bismarck's instructions, that peace could best be secured by an Anglo-German defensive alliance *against* France. Salisbury, professing gratification at the proposal, nevertheless replied: "We unfortunately no longer live in Pitt's time, when the aristocracy ruled and we could conduct an active policy. . . . Now the democracy rules, and with it come personal and party government, which has made every English Government absolutely dependent on the *aura popularis*. This generation can only be taught by events."[3] The reply was somewhat disingenuous, since one may guess that Salisbury himself was none too sure where the threat to Britain actually lay. But it indicates well enough the dilemma which the problem of an alliance presents to the Foreign Secretary of a democracy. To wait for events of war to make plain the need of a commitment to fight is to lose any hope that the alliance will forestall the war; but to make the commitment before public opinion in all the allied countries is convinced of its necessity is to risk starting the war and losing alliance and war both. In short, the formation of the alliance brings matters to a head, and invites an attack at the most vulnerable point of the coalition—the area in which the immediate interests of the allies are most uneven. The Soviet-supported attack upon Korea in our own time, with its apparent ultimate aim the destruction of the North Atlantic Alliance, is the simple illustration. Grey's description of the hallmarks of a Napoleonic policy has a grim familiarity.

But the immense differences in the particulars of Grey's problem and our own throw a sharp light backward. Until the evidence of Soviet aggression was unmistakable, the implementation of a policy of collective security by the West did not enter the field of practical politics. The determination to "contain" the U.S.S.R. followed the armed invasion of Greece by Soviet-auxiliary troops. To read the government of a great nation out of the

[3] "Britain in Europe, 1789–1914," by R. W. Seton-Watson. New York: Macmillan, 1937, p. 566.

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community of law-abiding states is a terrible matter. To do it literally by reading is impossible. Grey deliberately did not look extensively into the writings of the Pan-German expansionists. He wished to keep as free as possible from emotional judgments. But he did not misread the Germany of his own time.

Dangerous to Europe Germany had certainly become. She was looking for something: "a place in the sun"—an expression of general restlessness more than a particular program. The German diplomatic method was that of ransom—to spring to an exaggerated position and negotiate to be brought out of it. In so far as her fleet-building program had a rational objective it was to force England to be neutral if Germany engaged in a war with France. With so erratic, vain, childish, intelligent, irresponsible a man as Wilhelm II in command of the strongest country in Europe, and the strongest army in the world, anything could happen. The dangerous results of Bismarck's successful bullying of the German people and their neighbors were real and mounting.

Yet this was but half the picture. The fact was that Germany was a deeply respected nation. The world's scholars still turned to her for inspiration and guidance. In our time, a Great Power has lowered an Iron Curtain about its borders and thus provided a yardstick for measuring its aggressive intentions. There was no Iron Curtain around the Reich. In the 1900's German citizens went freely abroad, sought and welcomed for the gifts they brought with them. Bernard von Bülow, Foreign Minister and then Chancellor, Bismarck's heir (or so he called himself), was cultivated, witty, cosmopolitan. He was a former Hussar, but a career diplomat. He thought he safely could build the navy which von Tirpitz and Wilhelm wanted if he talked about it soothingly. He thought he could divide Britain and France if he rattled the sword. He was an accomplished courtier and spent prodigious amounts of energy and time in court feuds. It was impossible to tell where he stood in regard to Russia, since he did not perceive the significance in that connection of a German attachment to the fortunes of the dissolving Austro-Hungarian Empire. He wanted no war with England. He was apparently not averse to a war with France, if he could separate England from her. He left for posthumous publication an incredibly petty, vindictive and naïve autobiography which revealed him a mountebank. "The only man who ever succeeded in committing suicide after his death," the Kaiser is said to have remarked.

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Grey's policy was intended to cope with a government of which von Bülow was typical—that is to say, to deal with it by firmness but not by threats. His policy recognized that the German Empire was off balance; but it assumed that there was hope that time, and the experience of self-government which time might bring to the German people, would restore them to balance without a terrible bloodletting. In a word, Grey chose not to bring matters to a head.

Moreover, there was Russia. The unity of French and British interests, though perceived only recently, was established. To maintain it was Grey's unswerving purpose. But a binding alliance intended to amass preponderant force against Germany was an alliance that must make binding commitments to the Tsarist Empire. Grey had had experience of Russia. He called the Tsarist Empire "a despotism without discipline." With brilliant assistance from Nicolson and Hardinge, and from Morley in the office of Secretary of State for India, he had arranged the settlement with Russia which divided Persia into British and Russian spheres of influence, thus effecting a truce in Russian-British conflicts in Southwest Asia and making possible the loose arrangements of the Entente. But the open conflict was ever on the point of boiling up again: the simple sequel to the arrangement had been a Russian military occupation of her sphere. Grey was also well aware of Russian intrigues in the Balkans. And always vivid in his memory was that odd episode in the North Sea when the Russian fleet, setting out for the Far East, had met a group of British fishing boats and blazed away with all their guns. No one had ever found out how the guns happened to go off.

Grey's policy, then, was to play for time. A policy of drift? Not necessarily. There were two sides even to the Russian coin. Campbell-Bannerman had read everyone's thoughts in his calculated indiscretion of 1905: *La Duma est mort! Vive la Duma!* Stolypin was assassinated in 1911, yet it was in the period of his land reforms that Lenin despaired of revolution in his lifetime. Five years, Bismarck believed, are the furthest any statesman can hope to read the future. Suppose Grey had had five years more? We must force our minds back and remember, again, that his problem was not to meet a peril that had matured, but to prevent a perilous situation from crystallizing. The German Empire was not a self-proclaimed and demonstrated enemy of Western civilization. It was a nation which considered itself bone and sinew of

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European society. Grey's problem was to hold it there. If the relationship of Triple Alliance and Triple Entente were allowed to harden there could be but one outcome.

Grey's policy was sound; his analysis broad and remarkably steady, considerering the strength of the cross-currents hammering against him. The valid charge against him is that he did so little with his policy. He believed, and often said to the German Ambassador, that the arrangements of the Entente did not preclude the development of friendlier relations between England and Germany—always with the proviso that such a development was not to be at the expense of France. He sought to dampen the acrimony of German-British press exchanges; and indeed on the eve of the war England's relations with Germany did seem to be improving. He was certain that war would be ruinous and always thought there was a hope that in crises the realization of its destructiveness would restrain governments from the irrevocable step. But there he stopped.

Obviously, restraint upon Germany was necessary if she was to be held. In the event—in July 1914—the ease with which Germany took the bit in her teeth and chivvied Austria-Hungary into complete intransigence verified the accuracy of the French estimate that much restraint would be needed. Where could it be obtained? Grey had no atomic bomb which might hold the German Army within its frontiers while he conducted a campaign for a vast increase in the size of the British Army; and indeed he had no reason to believe that really preponderant force could be amassed by the Entente. Britain had an expeditionary force of seven divisions, prepared by Haldane, Grey's closest political associate and closest friend, for use on the French left flank. There is no evidence that Grey knew of the Schlieffen Plan for attack through Belgium, but it seems almost inconceivable that he did not. Knowledge of it would not have conferred upon him the power to prevent a European war, however, as is sometimes said. In 1910, Sir Arthur Nicolson, recommending to his chief the reconstruction of the Entente as a binding alliance, assured him that "Great Britain, France and Russia were more than equal to any combination." But they were not. The German General Staff had figured correctly that they were not. Even after they had strained every nerve to develop their resources they were barely equal in strength to the combination against them; and in 1917 their strength became inferior. The one hope of restraint

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powerful enough to avoid the final break between Alliance and Entente lay in lifting the whole issue into a larger framework. Grey sensed that there was a larger framework; indeed he saw it. He did everything except speak out about it.

In the course of a discerning analysis of Grey's conduct of office Algernon Cecil has speculated on some of the "ifs" of the situation. If Grey had made an early flat statement that Britain would fight for Belgian independence . . . if Italy had placed her troops in support of the French right flank . . . if Theodore Roosevelt had been the American President. . . . If, that is to say, all the Powers had acted together!

That the 1917 partnership of the Allied and Associated Powers could have been called into being in the prewar years by a common bond of hostility to Germany is unimaginable. Yet there was a common interest, very near the surface and rooted in the political force which is still the strongest by far of any in the twentieth century: not the common interest in avoiding war, but the common interest in national freedom. Its corollary was the need of all to protect the freedom of each. Wilson worked the principle out for himself later. Is it inconceivable that he would have accepted a lead from Grey in this direction a little earlier? Grey's understanding of the American democracy was sympathetic and penetrating. From the time he took office he put British-American relations first among British interests, not only in his thoughts but explicitly. "The growing friendship with the United States . . . is first in our policy," he said in 1905. "Your Continent is making a new race and a new type," he wrote to Theodore Roosevelt in 1906. And though he noted that a common language helped draw Britain and America together, he placed the emphasis elsewhere. "More than all this, I should say that some generations of freedom on both sides have evolved a type of man . . . that looks at things from a kindred point of view, and a majority that has a hatred for what is not just or free."[4]

"Disarmament" had come to a blind alley. Germany would have none of it, nor indeed, after war had come so close in 1906, could any of the European Powers risk it. But just over the stone wall was room for movement, and, perhaps, a few years' time in which the problem of Germany might evolve. Had Grey ventured to discuss his problem, in the generous terms in which he saw it, with his own people and in the hope that a wider audience would

[4] "Grey of Fallodon," by G. M. Trevelyan. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1937, p. 133.

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listen, one thing, at least, might have been accomplished. It might have prepared Britain, and Grey himself, to deal with the issue of Serbia when it so suddenly arose. For it was the issue of Serbian independence, not Belgian independence, that in the event was primary and crucial. Grey was caught off guard, and in his hasty proposal for mediation between Austria and Russia over Serbia's fate he committed a serious error of judgment. He had not intended to depart from his fixed policy of support for France, and when French alarm made clear to him the danger of his move he quickly withdrew the suggestion. But he had undercut the principle on which his policy was based. The German deduction was that the solution most expedient for her was a localized war—in short that she could hold the ring while Austria destroyed Serbia. With that decision the situation crystallized. Whether the German General Staff would have reflected before sending those fatal promptings to Vienna in July if the principle for which the First World War was about to be fought had been brought a little nearer the front of men's minds in Britain and the Dominions and America can be only the final speculation.

Grey was marvellously close to his own people, though for much of his life he underestimated his influence with them. Perhaps it must be said that he possessed great influence with the British people for the very reason that he never tried to use them. In that case, however, we must go on to say that he failed of greatness in his work because he did not try to use his influence. But this north-country Englishman was a tall man, and the direction in which he was looking for justice and freedom for the peoples of the world is the direction in which the world has moved. Whether the structure of alliances that the parliamentary nations have devised to meet the new Napoleonic threat will be powerful enough to discourage the Soviet adventurers from an irrevocable trial at arms, no man can tell. Yet through all the natural hazards of the situation, the Atlantic Alliance which is the focus of power in the free world has held. It has held because underlying it, and making good its deficiencies, is the world-wide organization which, hesitantly, imperfectly, yet so far effectively, has drawn short-term and long-term interests of free nations closer in the areas where they are most uneven. This is the indispensable function of a world organization; and this is the particular in which the classic formulation of the conditions of a defensive alliance has had to be amended to meet the realities of the modern world.

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ALTERNATIVES TO APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA

By J. W. Patten

SOUTH Africa's policy of apartheid, or separation of the white from the colored races within its community, has been denounced abroad as repressive. Most South Africans are at a disadvantage in meeting this charge—with which a great many of them agree—because they still do not know, in spite of earnest questionings of themselves and others, exactly what the policy is. In theory there are two kinds of apartheid. South Africa has not yet made up its mind which kind it wants, and it stands in fretful indecision between them like an ass between two bales of hay.

Last year there were disturbances in the small Witzieshoek Native Reserve, an offshoot within the Union of South Africa of the British Protectorate of Basutoland. The natives there opposed orders to cull stock on their overgrazed lands, destroyed government-erected fences and ignored summonses to appear before the Native Commissioner. They contended that the remedy for overgrazing was more land, and that much of their traditional land had been taken away from them last century. The dispute eventually led to a clash with the police. Lives were lost on both sides.

A commission of inquiry investigated. It recommended additional land for the natives, but noted that the Reserve could not permanently hold the whole of its population and the natural increase. Many had already migrated to the towns of the Free State and Transvaal, and the commission proposed that they should be formed into communities there with some measure of local self-government. It recommended that natives who have been absent from the Reserve for many years should no longer regard it as their home to which they are entitled to return at any time; after two years they should be considered to have left permanently.

Apart from the clash with the police, the dispute and the report caused little stir. The Reserve is small and unimportant and few natives are involved. Yet there were two significant reactions to the report. The first came almost automatically from the neighboring white farmers, who instantly condemned the

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proposal to give the natives more land. The same thing has happened wherever an attempt has been made to extend the Native Reserves. That is one reason why the promise of some 15,000,000 more acres made in General Hertzog's "final solution" of 1936 remains only half fulfilled after 15 years.

The other reaction, which is more to our purpose here, came from the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs. SABRA is of fairly recent origin and provides a center for Afrikaner intellectuals devoted to the cause of apartheid. In general it stands in opposition to the long-established South African Institute of Race Relations, which makes a study of race relations on liberal lines. SABRA thus enjoys government patronage and is intended to rationalize government policies.

The Witzieshoek report, although signed by a prominent supporter of the government, was instantly condemned by SABRA as the negation of apartheid. The recommendation that the majority of the natives should be integrated into the European economy was described by the Bureau as "extremely dangerous." The commission, it said, had rejected the theory that the Reserves should be the national home of the natives and advocated their permanent residence in urban areas, with local self-government. To imagine that in such circumstances they would be content with local self-government was wishful thinking. The recommendations, in SABRA's view, gave the impression that the commission was indifferent to the implications of the rival policies of integration and separate development. It regarded the Reserves as undeveloped farming areas and ignored the need for their industrialization. This reaction from the purists of the apartheid theory exposed once again the controversy within the apartheid controversy.

II

To understand what this argument is about it is necessary to look at the over-all picture. When the expanding white settlement at the Cape of Good Hope met the slowly advancing Bantu tribes 400 miles east of Cape Town at the beginning of the nineteenth century, repeated attempts were made by the governments of the time to set up a boundary between the two and keep it intact. The attempts broke down again and again, and for more than 50 years Cape history is the history of the struggle for the border lands. By the time the last of the long series of Kaffir Wars

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was fought the boundary had been pushed nearly 200 miles eastward. In the process large numbers of the Bantu had either been isolated in scattered groups on the white side of the frontier or had become landless and had been absorbed into the Colony as laborers on white farms and servants. The frontier was at last fixed at the Kei River, and the Transkei became the first permanent Native Reserve, in which no white man might acquire land.

Long before this had happened, however, the head-on collision of these two forces and the consequent pressure on land had burst the Colony's seams and produced the Great Trek into the vacant lands to the north. These plains were vacant for two reasons. The Bantu in their slow progress down Africa had followed the fertile, well-watered eastern seaboard. Less numerous offshoots had turned westward, skirted the Kalahari Desert and reached the Atlantic in southwest Africa, or settled on the eastern edge of the desert in what is now Bechuanaland. They had spread thinly over the interior plateau of what are now the Orange Free State and Transvaal; but the Great Trek was preceded by a period of intense tribal warfare, and the trekkers found the interior between Natal and Bechuanaland almost cleared of inhabitants by the Zulu and Matabele impis which had passed that way. They drove the Matabele across the Limpopo to found the dynasty which Cecil Rhodes was to extinguish in his settlement of Rhodesia.

In Natal the trekkers from one side, and the British from their settlement at Port Natal on the other, cut a broad corridor through the long strip of Bantu land in the east, isolating the Transkei in the south from Zululand and the great mass of black Africa in the north. The patchwork pattern of black and white with which South Africa entered the twentieth century derived from these movements and conflicts.

But although boundaries are fixed, populations are fluid. The trekkers in their progress overran and absorbed many sub-tribes before halting at the main tribal boundaries, just as they had done on the Cape eastern frontier. They had been accustomed to Hottentot servants and imported slaves long before they came into contact with the Bantu, and although slavery was never revived, the familiar pattern of colonial life with its ample colored labor on the farm and in the home remained unchanged, although it now came to include squatting by native groups on European farms, labor-tenancy and sharecropping.

This sudden fixing of boundaries had a profound effect on

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Bantu economy, which had from time immemorial been based on shifting agriculture and grazing. This way of life had carried the tribes down Africa; if white settlement had been delayed another 200 years Europeans landing at the Cape of Good Hope would undoubtedly have found the Bantu instead of the less powerful and more nomadic Hottentots in occupation there. This impetus continued and still continues to carry the Bantu forward; but they move across the boundaries now as hired laborers, leaving their cattle and often their families behind. The movement is inescapable. Their primitive methods of agriculture have not changed greatly, their cattle still serve a social rather than an economic purpose. The Reserves, devoid of towns or industries, are overstocked and overcrowded in terms of a peasant economy and are in danger of deteriorating into agricultural slums.

In these circumstances the able-bodied men move out of them at a steady rate, at first as migrant laborers in the mines, farms and industries, after a time as permanent emigrants. The great South African gold mining industry is almost entirely dependent on the first kind of migration; secondary industry is responsible for a great deal of the second type. The unsatisfied demands of the cities and farms for labor of all kinds, including domestic labor, with the consequent steady rise in cash wages offered, provide additional inducements. But in fact little inducement is needed, for the flight from the land is a result of hard necessity.

Various South African Governments have tried to do by legislation what the frontiersmen did by warfare. The "pass laws" and controlled entry to the towns were designed to check the exodus and place some sort of governor on the rate of flow. Natives were prevented from acquiring land outside their Reserves (which are likewise closed to white ownership) except in restricted areas in a few townships. The great mass of urban natives are municipal tenants. The Hertzog laws of 1936 were aimed at the abolition of squatting and tenant farming. Segregation, as apartheid was still called, seemed a realizable ideal. But the success of these measures was limited. South Africa was already in the midst of its industrial revolution, with growing demands for labor and a steady movement away from the land by both white and black.

That this was seen as a continuation of the old battle in a new form is shown by an address delivered by Dr. D. F. Malan, now Prime Minister, on the occasion of the centenary of the Great

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Trek in 1938. Speaking at Blood River in Natal, where the decisive battle between the trekkers and the Zulus was fought a hundred years before, he drew attention to the fact that whereas the European population of the towns had increased in the last 15 years by 460,000, the non-Europeans had increased by 812,000 in the same period.

"If you think that in this New Great Trek of the Afrikaans-speaking section to the towns the centers of our industrial and commercial life are becoming whiter you are indeed mistaken. They are becoming blacker. On this new Blood River battlefield our people and the non-Europeans meet one another and come into very close contact. And they are in much more stressful struggle than 100 years ago, when the white-tented waggons protected the laager and rifle and assegai clashed. . . . The Afrikaans-speaking men of the New Great Trek meet the non-European at the new Blood River half or completely unarmed, without the entrenchment between them and without the protection of the river. They meet him defenceless in the open plain of economic equality." The significance of this long-forgotten speech can now be seen. Ten years later Dr. Malan's party came to power on an apartheid program, and it at once set about disposing its forces for the new Blood River battle.

III

The situation with which it found itself faced was this: In round figures the total native population at that time was 8,000,000 (as against 2,400,000 Europeans). Of these natives some 3,000,000 lived in the Reserves. The rest were distributed throughout "white" South Africa, outnumbering the whites by more than two to one. Nearly 2,000,000 were in the towns, forming a growing industrial proletariat; the remaining 3,000,000 were on the farms or settled in "black spots" outside the Reserves.

The pure theory of apartheid was, and still is, that the Natives' Reserves are the "national home" of the Bantu. There they shall develop "on their own lines" apart from the Europeans, although under European tutelage. In this way conflict and competition, the clash of a higher with a lower civilization, are to be avoided and justice and harmony will prevail. The obstacle in the way of this ideal is the knotty figures just quoted. If 60 percent of the Bantu are now outside the Reserves, how are these to become their "national home?" And if they could in fact all be put back

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there, what would happen to the South African economy, based as it is on unskilled native labor, and the South African way of life with its almost unlimited supply of black servants?

The apartheid theorists have ridden uneasily over this problem. More than 25 years ago a commission of inquiry formulated the position to which "practical" apartheid has now returned: "If the Native is to be regarded as a permanent element in municipal areas and if he is to have equal opportunity of establishing himself there permanently, there can be no justification for basing his exclusion from the franchise on the simple ground of colour . . . [therefore] the Native should only be allowed to enter urban areas, which are essentially the white man's creation, when he is willing to enter and to minister to the needs of the white man, and should depart therefrom when he ceases so to minister."

This formula is still serviceable, not only for the urban areas but for the whole of "white" South Africa. It is, of course, completely unreal. The Fagan Report (the Native Laws Commission), the modern textbook of native policy published just before the change of government in 1948, quoted the passage with distaste, and remarked that "now, 25 years later, we cannot get away from the fact that there is indeed a considerable Native population permanently settled in the urban areas, and that an argument about the desirability or undesirability of that state of affairs is purely academic—it is a state of affairs that is going to remain and that simply cannot be altered."

Nevertheless the formula is fundamental to the apartheid policy for the very reason given by the earlier commission. It is realized that in the long run no permanent part of the population can be denied some form of political rights irrespective of the stage of development reached. As political rights for natives are in any circumstances inadmissible, it is necessary to maintain the fiction of impermanence indefinitely. Thus the 60 percent of the Bantu population outside the Reserves are officially regarded as expatriates from the Bantuland beyond the border, from which they are temporarily absent in search of employment. They have been compared with Italian laborers in France.

It is not, of course, only political rights that are involved. Dr. Malan's picture of the white man meeting the impact "defenceless in the open plain of economic equality" is of crucial importance. The entrenchments must be dug, the laager must be drawn

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against the invasion of the skilled trades and professions which are the white man's preserve. This is being done; but it must be defended. In theory it is defensible only on the assumption that the native is a "foreign worker" holding a conditional passport.

There are, however, many earnest and honest believers in apartheid to whom these polite fictions are unacceptable. Early in the régime one of them, Dr. Eiselen, was taken out of an academic post and made Secretary for Native Affairs because, it was said, it was necessary to have in this position a man who supported the apartheid policy. When he was still Professor of Social Anthropology at Pretoria University in 1949, Dr. Eiselen published a paper in which he dismissed any inherent inferiority in the natives as unscientific and the "master and servant" relationship as unfair and unacceptable. In a mixed society, he said, the natives would never be given the opportunities to which they were entitled. A caste society was being produced, with an increasingly resentful black proletariat. His solution, therefore, was complete separation, the break-up of the present white-and-black society into two distinct and autonomous societies.

He therefore proposed the withdrawal of all native labor over a period of 20 years. White South Africa would have to pay the price in poverty and hard work. They would have to bend their backs, encourage immigration from Europe and maintain a high standard of quality to hold their own against the competitive industries in the native areas. They would also have to give up much land. The chief difficulty, he foresaw, would be to convince the whites that they were not a Herrenvolk entitled to cheap labor. But the only alternative would be for the white group to "cling frantically to its master-people complex, to become embroiled in progressively more inescapable economic, social and political entanglements, and ultimately to forfeit its cherished superiority and perhaps its racial identity."

His was not a voice crying in the wilderness. His views, already shared by many apartheid intellectuals, were soon to be powerfully reënforced. In April 1950 the Federated Dutch Reformed Churches, which claim the adherence of the great majority of Afrikaans-speaking people and therefore have very close affiliations with the government, held a congress in Bloemfontein to discuss native affairs. It agreed on a policy of complete racial and territorial segregation, for which it would be essential for all native labor to be systematically and gradually superseded by Eu-

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ropean labor in all European industry, including farming. The natives should be removed into an industrial system of their own to be established in the Reserves. This policy, said the congress, would mean the complete reorientation of European industry and economy, and would call for "great sacrifices."

In a document prepared by the "action committee" and privately circulated among the delegates, the arguments in favor of this policy were set out. The authors point out that "we cannot keep Natives in our service, educate and develop them, and keep them pegged to unskilled occupations. On the other hand we cannot expect that if we give them full opportunity for economic development and allow them to rise to the highest rungs they will be satisfied to leave their economic, political and social interests to the care of others. They will fight for a say in national affairs, and in this struggle they will seek support from various sides and even abroad."

The treatise goes on to discuss, although in no great detail, a transition period lasting possibly 50 or 100 years, and including "intensive" native development. Elsewhere it reiterates that "no people in the world worth their salt will be content indefinitely with no say, or only an indirect say, in the affairs of the State or in the socio-economic organisation of the country in which decisions are taken about their interests and future."

This formidable challenge was politely declined by the government. The Minister of Native Affairs said the government would treat the resolution with "great respect," but was in no way committed to it. He described it as an "idealistic extension of and not in conflict with the Government's stated policy."

The Prime Minister, Dr. Malan, was also somewhat equivocal when taxed in Parliament with the Church's views. He described total territorial separation as "an ideal" but not practical policy nor the policy of the Nationalist Party. Europeans and natives must continue to live together "for a time." The first aim would be to check the flow of natives from tribal areas without harming the demand for labor in European areas. This policy, he said, was not in conflict with that of the Church. The government would further the Church's aim but much would have to be done before it was achieved. Meanwhile, as many natives as possible would be returned to their tribal homes. A "great increase" in native areas would be necessary for this.

It is nevertheless legitimate to believe from these pronounce-

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ments that the government is fundamentally in agreement with the Church and that its appointment of Dr. Eiselen to a key post was not without significance. The new Minister of Native Affairs, Dr. H. F. Verwoerd, has indicated that present policies are the first step toward a distant goal. It would, however, be politically inexpedient, perhaps suicidal, to announce a program that would, even in the long run, deprive white South Africa of its native labor and so revolutionize the whole pattern of its life. It is seldom really wise to go to an electorate with talk of "great sacrifices."

The apartheid program, therefore, has taken the form almost exclusively of popular apartheid. When the Prime Minister was asked, not for the first time, what apartheid is, he pointed to the separation of Cape colored passengers on Cape Town's suburban railway trains and said: "You ask what apartheid is: this is it." Separate queues were instituted at Post Office counters. Large notices at Johannesburg railway stations and elsewhere indicated that certain entrances were for "Europeans only" and "non-Europeans only." Legislation began with the prohibition of marriage between white and colored and the extension of the Immorality Laws to make casual unions of this kind illegal. It proceeded to the Group Areas Act, which is intended to bring about social separation by defining areas of residence, ownership and trade, although only in the local sense as between one part of a town and another. The next move was on the economic front, where provision for training native builders was balanced by a ban on their employment outside the native townships and areas.

Finally the government turned to the difficult but vital political problem. The franchise is already confined to whites everywhere except in the Cape Province, which entered the Union with a liberal tradition not shared by the other provinces. General Hertzog segregated the native vote in the Cape in 1936 by removing the native voters from the common voters' roll and giving them three (white) representatives of their own in the Assembly and four in the Senate. Now the government proceeded to apply the same policy to the colored voters in the midst of a stormy constitutional controversy arising from the fact that the requirement of a two-thirds majority of both Houses sitting together for any such change was set aside. The effect of this is to confine the 1,000,000 colored people to four (white) representatives in the Assembly and one in the Senate, and to prevent them from influencing elections in the other Cape constituencies.

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At the same time a move has been made toward modifying the 1936 settlement by abolishing the Natives' Representative Council, an advisory body designed to create an extra-parliamentary institution in which the natives of all provinces could discuss legislation affecting themselves. In practice this body was neglected and ignored and was in open revolt against its own impotence before the change of government. General Smuts had proposed to meet the situation by extending its functions and giving it some executive powers with a view to developing a kind of subordinate Native Parliament. The new policy, however, is to establish a number of tribal and regional councils with some return to native tribal institutions. A central assembly which could be a focal point of native nationalism is viewed with disfavor.

The apartheid pattern as it has so far evolved, therefore, is one of social, economic and political separation within the framework of a mixed society. The National Register about to be compiled will fix the race and with it the status of all the inhabitants of the country. Europeans, natives, colored and Indians will each be confined to their own residential areas (as the natives have long been by the Urban Areas Acts), many trades and occupations will be similarly divided by barriers which will in theory be vertical but in practice often horizontal, and all political power will be concentrated in European hands, with some local self-government for each ethnic group. This system, it is contended, will preserve racial purity, maintain white political supremacy, and minimize economic conflict.

It was set out recently by the Minister of Labor, Mr. Ben Schoeman, in Parliament: "We have never advocated total apartheid. We accept the position that there will be a permanent Native population resident in the urban areas." It was absolutely essential, he continued, that secondary industry should have non-European labor and there was no intention of withdrawing it from them. "We have no intention of disrupting the economy of this country by withdrawing non-European labour from secondary industry." Already many thousands of natives were doing semi-skilled jobs, and he agreed that the native must be allowed to advance and that, with some training, would be able to do operative jobs. "The whole crux of the policy of the Government is that we do not want to create a permanent stratum of European unskilled labour and then allow Native labour to advance beyond the European."

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This somewhat confused policy might succeed for a time. It would be acceptable to most Europeans, who regard an adequate supply of non-European labor within easy distance as essential, yet combine a fear of economic competition with a strong distaste for any form of social contact except in a master-and-servant relationship. Above all, they dislike the possibility of miscegenation which economic and social equality might bring. Antagonisms, economic and racial, also exist between non-European groups. Separation so far as it is possible seems to be the answer. It is certainly not an entirely new policy.

IV

In the long term, however, it is clearly no solution. It is theoretically possible to create "separate but equal" social amenities. In practice the equality is usually lacking, and the separation is costly, as the duplication of transport and other services is already proving. It is not even theoretically possible to offer separate but equal economic opportunity in an integrated society. The whole range of industry and other economic activity cannot be duplicated in a single city, yet without such duplication the best jobs must remain permanently closed to those on the wrong side of the dividing line. And it is not even theoretically admitted that there should be equality of political opportunity. In order to justify this bar-in-perpetuity to political evolution it is necessary, in spite of Mr. Schoeman, to invoke the doctrine of impermanence previously referred to—the doctrine, that is, that "the Native should only be allowed to enter urban areas, which are essentially the white man's creation, when he is willing to enter and to minister to the needs of the white man, and should depart therefrom when he ceases so to minister." Yet this doctrine conflicts violently with the conception of parallel development that the kind of apartheid just described is designed to bring about.

There is, in fact, no escape from the moral and practical dilemma to which the Dutch Reformed Church, Dr. Eiselen and others have drawn attention. It remains true, as Dr. Eiselen said, that in a mixed society of this sort the natives would never be given the opportunities to which they are entitled. It remains true, as the Church pointed out, that "we cannot expect that if we give them full opportunity for economic development . . . they will be satisfied to leave their economic, political and social interests to the care of others."

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Now the leaders of apartheid thought are by and large neither unintelligent nor lacking in moral sense. They believe firmly, it is true, in white supremacy because throughout the history of their people in Africa the white man has represented civilization, and it has always been true that any real dilution of his power or his blood would have threatened civilization itself in this continent. They see no reason to believe that this is not still true. But they are well aware of the political stirrings going on among the non-white races of the world, on the African continent and among their own subjects. They would like to believe, as many South Africans do, that these movements can be kept at arms length, and they will do their best to control and discourage them; but they know that the line cannot be held indefinitely against the whole world. For these reasons the tidy pattern of local segregation and the Group Areas Act cannot be the final solution. The logical end of apartheid can be only the total apartheid which Dr. Malan recognized as "the ideal."

Thus while Dr. Malan has announced that the government has almost reached the end of its apartheid program, cautious steps are being taken toward a reversal of the trends of a century. Not much can be hoped for from the stricter control of native migration, although this is being tried. It is realized that the native can be drawn back into the (possibly enlarged) Reserves, if at all, only by powerful economic counterattraction. There is much talk of developing industries in these areas and thus diversifying and enlarging the peasant economy and opening up large new fields of opportunity. A government commission is at present investigating the industrial possibilities.

The prospects, however, are not encouraging, and the over-all task so formidable that only the conviction that national survival is at stake would impel any people to undertake it. That conviction is present, but it is still necessary to disguise the full scope of the operation from those who would have to attempt it.

Many of the Reserves, it is true, lie in the most fertile and best-watered parts of the country. But their fertility has been greatly reduced by misuse and overcrowding. No minerals have been found in them and no industrialists have yet been tempted to transfer their enterprise from the big centers of population with their modern power and transport facilities and ready-made markets to these depressed agricultural areas. The Social and Economic Planning Council, whose reports are a modern textbook of

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South African society, surveyed the Reserves situation and disclosed possibilities of planned development which included some cautious industrial beginnings based on the processing of agricultural produce. It visualized, too, the creation of villages (now almost entirely lacking) in which landless natives would find occupation in providing local services. But the Council emphasized that these steps are necessary if the Reserves are to retain their present populations and some of the increase, and if they are to be raised above a subsistence economy. There could be no question of making room for more from outside.

Whether the new commission will be able to report more hopefully may well be doubted. Even the improvement of native agriculture is a slow and thankless task in the face of immemorial African conservatism. It is certain that the transformation of the Reserves into modern industrial states—and nothing less would be required— would call for an enormous expenditure of capital, if indeed it could be done at all. There are no signs yet that this or any South African Government would be prepared or able to devote large capital sums to these purposes.

The effects on the European economy if such a policy is ever seriously attempted are incalculable. Not only would it create an acute and apparently insurmountable manpower shortage, while calling into being a whole new white laboring class which is now nonexistent, but it would set up a parallel Bantu economy which would be a formidable threat to South African standards of living. These standards are based on high wage levels made possible by the wide gap between white skilled and non-white unskilled labor. Given expert white direction, which would in any case be necessary for a long time to come, Bantu industry, mechanized and using operative labor, could become highly productive at low cost. Only the color bar has prevented this happening before on a larger scale, although a pilot textile industry on the borders of a Native Reserve is already proving that it is possible. Indeed, this form of industrial organization is being tried with success in some of the cities, for the color bar is still customary rather than statutory and can be overcome.

These difficulties in the way of real apartheid have not yet been squarely faced, and it is unlikely that they will be unless and until the policy is openly admitted and discussed. Meanwhile the attempts to achieve it by stealth, as it were, are so puny as to be insignificant. The stream is flowing so powerfully the other way

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that something much more heroic will be needed to turn it back. The preliminary census figures for 1951 recently released show that whereas the European population of Johannesburg has remained almost stationary during the last five years, the Bantu population has increased by nearly 100,000. Johannesburg, the Union's largest city and preëminently the "white man's creation," has a European population of some 330,000 and a native population of 480,000. And the process goes on apace. The National Resources Development Council estimates that the new Orange Free State gold areas will by 1966 have a European population of 146,000 and a native population of 277,000. This was until a few years ago virgin soil. The same pattern is repeated wherever a new project comes into being. Thus a large power station is being built on a Free State coalfield to supply the new mining area; 200 Europeans and 3,000 natives will be required to operate it.

All this is happening while the theorists discuss apartheid, and timid measures are being taken to sweep back the sea with a mop. It is plain that the frontiers so tenaciously defended 100 years ago have been crossed, and the onward march of the Bantu goes on irresistibly.

V

Dr. Malan's apartheid government can therefore be seen (as it sees itself in moments of emotion) as the last gallant stand of the white man in Africa; or merely as an anachronism. A new kind of society is being created in South Africa, and for better or worse it is a multi-racial society. Its pattern has not yet been worked out. Residential separation on Group Areas lines will undoubtedly remain its social design for many years to come, but solutions have yet to be found for the economic and political problems such a society presents. Economic opportunity cannot be indefinitely withheld from any section of a community; political representation in some form cannot indefinitely be denied. In other words, if total apartheid cannot be applied, then the alternatives, not unfairly stated by the Church and other apartheid theorists, must be faced. Similar problems are being faced elsewhere in Africa and tentative solutions are being tried. The Union of South Africa has the problem in a much more advanced stage than any of these territories and can also draw upon a much longer experience.

The real misfortune of the apartheid policy is that it postpones,

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but only postpones, the day when a real attempt will be made to solve the problems of a multi-racial society composed of layers at several different stages of development and civilization. Valuable time is being wasted on impracticable and wishful policies when time is the one thing South Africa cannot afford. No South African can, however, afford to be self-righteous in dismissing the apartheid solution as illusory, for few of those who condemn it are prepared to come to grips with the real problems South African society presents. No political party has yet ventured to produce a formula and stand by it.

It is, of course, not difficult to put such a formula on paper. The Native Reserves are to a great extent self-contained units with a way of life of their own not yet too greatly influenced by direct European contact. They are, in fact, South Africa's "colonial" territories, and it is still possible to apply to them a "colonial" policy of indirect rule. As with other colonial territories in Africa, they are in urgent need of economic aid and development, and the need is the more urgent in South Africa if their populations are to be stabilized and prevented from erupting into South African society. Indeed, all the energy apartheid can muster in its treatment of the Reserves will not be too much for the task in hand there. Politically, tribal institutions are capable of adaptation to modern conditions, and would stand in the same relationship to the Union Government as other colonial institutions stand to their colonial powers. Their ultimate destiny, however, would be a federal relationship rather than complete independence; in the meantime Senate representation would be appropriate.

This policy differs from that of the apartheid policy in only one important respect: it is complementary to and not a substitute for a native policy. The Planning Council's report on the Reserves commented that "no Reserve policy, not even the policy advocated in this report, will make it possible for South Africa to evade the issues raised by the presence of Natives in European farming and urban areas."

Outside the Reserves, therefore, the large Bantu population might be divided into two classes—those capable of exercising a direct franchise, and those for whom some less direct method is more suitable. The first class, to whom educational and other "civilization" tests would apply, might be entitled to enrolment on a special roll for the election of a specified number of native representatives to the Assembly, which is the main legislative

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chamber of the South African Parliament. These voters would be the equivalent of the *évolués* of French and Portuguese colonies, but would nevertheless be confined to communal and therefore relatively inelastic representation. This is necessary to prevent the voters' rolls being overwhelmed in a short time by "advanced" natives, who would thus replace the Europeans as the dominant political group. Faced with this possibility there would be every inducement to Europeans to check rapid Bantu progress.

The less advanced Bantu, who still form the great mass outside as well as inside the Reserves, might have local and regional councils on the lines now proposed as part of the apartheid policy, with suitable representation in the Senate. It should be noted that the South African Senate is a house of review with powers that are more apparent than real. It is, however, already an outlet to a limited extent for native opinion through representatives chosen for the purpose, and Senate representation in some form is conceded by apartheid. It might be necessary to make some more far-reaching change in the character and functions of this House, if it is to serve a real purpose in a system of multi-racial representative government.

An alternative solution, put forward by the South African writer and historian Dr. A. Keppel-Jones, is the federalization of South Africa, with a number of states in each of which one of the races (European, Bantu, colored and Indian) would predominate and rule. This is an extension of the apartheid idea without the need for physical separation, except in so far as racial groups chose to migrate to neighboring states in search of a more congenial régime.

Important as political arrangements are in a country in which racial security is regarded as of paramount importance, the economic problem is the more immediate. Color apart, a low wage group is always a threat to an artisan class with high living standards. The obvious defense—a minimum wage for all in skilled trades—is nevertheless regarded with misgiving by many of the white trade unions and most of the political parties. The color bar is more effective and avoids the complication of social equality at the workbench. Yet it is difficult to see how economic injustice is to be avoided in any other way than through a standard wage divorced from color; and, more urgently, how the country's economic problem of poverty and underproduction is to be solved if the straitjacket of the color bar is not removed.

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Such solutions as these are vague and unformed chiefly because South Africans refuse to discuss them, and policies that have not withstood the test of public controversy necessarily have an academic unreality. The reason why they are neglected is that most white South Africans have an instinctive belief that once they have set such a course they will be caught irresistibly in the current that will sweep them and their particular values into oblivion.

For the argument hitherto has been entirely between Europeans about the Bantu. The Bantu themselves have remained silent; or when they have spoken their views have been dismissed as the voice of agitators and extremists. Most of them, it is true, are inarticulate and politically indifferent. Yet events in other African territories and the subtle change in the South African atmosphere itself are a warning that the argument may soon be with the Bantu, not merely about them. The effective opposition to apartheid will eventually come not from an opposing political party but from the non-Europeans themselves. And that opposition may extend beyond apartheid to any policy that falls short of complete equality. The president of the African National Congress, the main Bantu political movement, Dr. Moroka, remarked recently, with the kind of tolerant understanding that Europeans find more frightening than threats, that the Afrikaner had not been satisfied in the past with anything less than equality; he could see no logical difference between the nature and purpose of the Afrikaner struggle and the nature and purpose of the African struggle. Each was a struggle of a nation to ensure for itself those conditions that make life possible. Dr. Moroka added that the outcome of apartheid would be the death knell of civilization in South Africa and the complete collapse of the edifice of white *baasskap* (boss-ship) which apartheid sought to construct.

The question has still to be answered whether the civilization, if not the boss-ship, can be preserved undamaged either with apartheid or without it. Mere repression is bound to fail, and any apartheid other than the unattainable total kind (and perhaps even that) will inevitably be repressive. But will concession fail too? To put the question in another way, will the education of the Bantu in Western culture and Western democracy keep pace with his political demands? If it does not, the well-meant alternatives to apartheid may not avert the conflict. The best that can be said is that in the one case the conflict is certain, in the other the way is left open for peaceful solutions in the future.

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General: Political, Military and Legal

SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1938. VOLUME II: THE CRISIS OVER CZECHOSLOVAKIA, JANUARY TO SEPTEMBER 1938. By R. G. D. Laffan. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1951, 475 p. $6.00.

DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1939–1946. VOLUME I: MARCH–SEPTEMBER 1939. Edited by Arnold J. Toynbee. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1951, 576 p. $9.00.

After a decade's interruption—the war years were too busy for surveying and the postwar years brought an "avalanche of new evidence"—these extremely valuable contributions to the study of international affairs have been resumed. The second volume of the "Survey" for 1938 (the first was published in 1941) deals with the crisis over Czechoslovakia from January to October. The corresponding volume on "Documents" was published in 1943. The present volume, while including a few important items on the Czech crisis which have become available since the war, is primarily concerned with developments in the eight months preceding the outbreak of the Second World War.

LE PROBLÈME DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE. By Olivier Philip. Neuchâtel (Switzerland): La Baconnière, 1950, 381 p.

A substantial volume dedicated to the propositions that European economic union is a necessity, that it cannot be achieved through normal channels of negotiation between sovereign states, and hence that a political and juridical union is also required.

LE PROBLÈME DE L'AUTORITÉ SUPER-ÉTATIQUE. By Boris Mouravieff. Neuchâtel (Switzerland): La Baconnière, 1950, 132 p. Sw. Fr. 4.80.

An attempt to resolve the old problem of creating a supra-national state by reforming the U.N. in such a manner as to have it represent peoples rather than governments.

THE SURVIVAL OF POLITICAL MAN. By Errol E. Harris. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1950, 225 p. 20/. (New York: Hafner, $4.00.)

A professor of philosophy at the Witwatersrand University urges world federation, following an intelligent examination of contemporary international conflicts and tensions.

FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE. By László Ledermann. Neuchâtel (Switzerland): La Baconnière, 1950, 170 p. Sw. Fr. 4.80.

Primarily a review of past projects for, and historical experience with, international federation.

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ASPECTS ET PROBLÈMES DE L' INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE. By G. A. Pordea. Paris: Bellenand, 1951, 187 p. Fr. 360.

A former Rumanian diplomat tinkers with the problem of European integration.

EL PACTO DEL ATLÁNTICO. By Camilo Barcia Trelles. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1950, 685 p. Ptas. 90.

A Spanish student of international law subjects the Atlantic Pact, its political and strategic implications and limitations, to extensive scrutiny.

TRAITÉ DE DROIT DES GENS. By Robert Redslob. Paris: Sirey, 1950, 473 p. Fr. 1200.

The dean of the faculty of law at the University of Strasbourg studies the evolution of international law, its structure, and the development of its particular institutions.

INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Sir Cecil Hurst. London: Stevens, 1950, 302 p. 30/.

A collection of papers by a distinguished international jurist.

ENABLING INSTRUMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS. PART I: THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Compiled by Walter H. Zeydel and Waldo Chamberlin. New York: Carnegie Endowment, 1951, 126 p. $2.50.

"A compilation of the legislation, executive orders and other instruments which determine the legal position of Members of the United Nations and specialized agencies with respect to that organization."

EUROPA UND AMERIKA. By M. T. Vaerting. Berne: Francke, 1950, 224 p. Sw. Fr. 4.80.

An effort to set up sociological principles for contrasting the structure and development of the state in Europe and America.

THE BEGINNINGS OF DIPLOMACY. By Ragnar Numelin. New York: Philosophical Library, 1950, 372 p. $12.00.

A sociological study of intertribal and international relations by the Finnish Minister in Brussels.

LA GUERRE POUR LA PAIX, 1740–1940. By Paul Léon. Paris: Fayard, 1950, 700 p. Fr. 700.

A French scholar, whose previous work has dealt with art and architecture, surveys the ugly pattern of European wars since Frederick the Great. He takes a rather limited view of diplomatic history in his search of the might-have-beens which could have altered the course of events.

STATI UNITI O RUSSIA? By Rocco Morretta. Modena: Società Tipografica Modenese, 1950, 234 p. L. 500.

Speculations on the prospect of war between the Soviet and Western blocs, on Italy's strategic function, and on the significance of new and potential weapons.

JE LES AI BIEN CONNUS. By Élisabeth Cerruti. Paris: Hachette, 1950, 316 p. Fr. 450.

Anecdotal memoirs of the wife of an Italian diplomat stationed in Peking (1923–26), Moscow (1927–30), Berlin (1932–35), Paris (1935–37) and Rome (1937–40). The Italian edition, "Visti da Vicino," was published by Garzanti, Milan, 1951, 344 p. L. 1000.

CARNET D'UN DIPLOMATE. By A. Mennan Tebelen. Paris: Denoël, 1951, 343 p. Fr. 495.

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Pleasant but not very revealing memoirs of a Turkish diplomat who was in The Hague, Cairo, Chungking and Washington during the war years.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

THE LOGIC OF LIBERTY. By Michael Polanyi. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, 206 p. $4.00.

Very stimulating and original reflections on liberty, especially with regard to scientific and economic activities. Of particular interest are Professor Polanyi's stress on the relations of the commitments underlying a free society and the scientific community, and his critique of economic planning.

MID-CENTURY: THE SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS. Edited by John Ely Burchard. Cambridge: Technology Press, and New York: Wiley, 1950, 549 p. $7.50.

A verbatim account of discussions in an international convocation held at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

THE WORLD IN CRISIS. By J. Salwyn Schapiro. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950, 429 p. $5.00.

An eminent American historian reviews the dominant political, social and economic movements of the twentieth century.

COLLISION OF EAST AND WEST. By Herrymon Maurer. Chicago: Regnery, 1951, 352 p. $4.50.

A study of the clash between Western and oriental cultures, with emphasis on the "four-cornered war" of the last decade among China, Japan, the United States and Russia.

THE RISE AND FALL OF CIVILIZATION. By Shepard B. Clough. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951, 291 p. $4.50.

An historical review, anti-Toynbeean in argument and temper, stressing the importance of economic developments to cultural achievement.

WARUM IST EUROPA SO? By Eugen Oskar Kossmann. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Hirzel, 1950, 286 p.

A geographically-determined interpretation of European history. Nebulous in many of its concepts, it is at least optimistic in its outlook for the future of European culture.

OF SOCIETIES AND MEN. By Caryl P. Haskins. New York: Norton, 1951, 282 p. $4.50.

A talented biophysicist undertakes to relate the development of societal patterns to the backgrounds of biology, paleontology and genetics. This background is interesting in itself, though its relevance to the problems of human society is not always clear.

MORALS SINCE 1900. By Gerald Heard. New York: Harper, 1950, 223 p. $3.00.

In a rather disorganized study the author pessimistically discusses the reasons for the decline in morals during the twentieth century.

AUTHORITY AND DELINQUENCY IN THE MODERN STATE. By Alex Comfort. London: Routledge, 1950, 112 p. 8/6.

A somewhat inconclusive effort "to relate the elements in the behavior of modern governments which lead to the international equivalent of crime to those with which we are already partly familiar in individuals."

THE HUMAN GROUP. By George C. Homans. New York: Harcourt, 1950, 484 p. $6.00.

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A Harvard professor makes an interesting attempt to develop some theoretical formulations about the nature and structure of relationships in human groups, from a street corner gang to a New England community.

PSYCHOLOGIE DES MOUVEMENTS SOCIAUX. By Paul-H. Maucorps. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1950, 126 p. Fr. 100.

A brief introduction to the techniques of social psychology, based largely on American activities in this field.

EDUCATION FOR A WORLD SOCIETY. Edited by Christian O. Arndt and Samuel Everett. New York: Harper, 1951, 273 p. $3.50.

Sixteen essays on the problem of educating people to live together in today's world.

ROADS TO AGREEMENT. By Stuart Chase. New York: Harper, 1951, 250 p. $3.50.

A sensible discussion of the roots of disagreement and dispute and of the possible techniques and approaches by which the reaching of agreement is facilitated.

LA LIBERTÉ DE LA PRESSE. By Jacques Bourquin. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1950, 621 p. Fr. 1250.

A lengthy and scholarly study of the freedom of the press, with particular emphasis on the Swiss experience.

LA PROPAGANDE POLITIQUE. By Jean-Marie Domenach. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1950, 127 p. Fr. 100.

A brief summary of the types and techniques of twentieth century propaganda.

WARRIOR WITHOUT WEAPONS. By Marcel Junod. New York: Macmillan, 1951, 283 p. $4.00.

The personal experiences of an International Red Cross delegate, from the Abyssinian invasion to Hiroshima.

EXODES, TRANSFERTS, ESCLAVAGE. By Jean de la Robrie. Paris: Gallimard, 1950, 280 p. Fr. 370.

A study of the uprooting of populations in Europe since the First World War.

CHILDREN OF EUROPE. By Dorothy Macardle. Boston: Beacon Press, 1951, 349 p. $3.75.

A study of the children of liberated countries, their wartime experience, their reactions and their needs.

INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS. By Lyman Cromwell White and Marie Ragonetti Zocca. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1951, 325 p. $5.00.

A survey of the functions and accomplishments of international nongovernmental organizations in various fields from 1850 to the present.

MONEY, TRADE, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: IN HONOR OF JOHN HENRY WILLIAMS. New York: Macmillan, 1951, 343 p. $5.00.

Like the interests and influence of John Williams, one of the country's foremost economists, these essays in his honor cover a wide range. Some are theoretical, others deal with economic practice and governmental policy. The papers on international economics consider devaluation, the theory of state trading, several aspects of Western European economic coöperation, and the relation of underdeveloped countries to the international monetary mechanism. Most of the other essays—they were all completed before June 1950—deal with monetary theory and central banking.

HAUPTFRAGEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK. By Adolf Weber. Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1950, 374 p.

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A collection of essays and reminiscences on economic issues.

WEALTH AND INCOME. By Brian Tew. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1950, 307 p. 21/.

A technical analysis of the economic and financial systems of Australia and Great Britain.

DER WELTGETREIDEMARKT NACH DEM ZWEITEN WELTKRIEG. By Roderich Plate. Hamburg (British Zone): Parey, 1950, 233 p.

A survey of world cereal production and trade since World War II.

CYCLICAL MOVEMENTS IN THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. By Tse Chun Chang. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1951, 223 p. $3.75.

A statistical survey of the balance-of-payments data of five different types of country—Great Britain, the United States, Sweden, Australia and Chile—to show a pattern of cyclical behavior.

LE SOCIALISME. By Georges Bourgin and Pierre Rimbert. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1950, 127 p. Fr. 100.

A summary statement on Socialism and the necessity of its advent.

TEN GREAT ECONOMISTS: FROM MARX TO KEYNES. By Joseph A. Schumpeter. New York: Oxford University Press, 1951, 305 p. $4.75.

Essays written by the late economist on some of his predecessors and contemporaries: Marx, Walras, Menger, Marshall, Pareto, Böhm-Bawerk, Taussig, Fisher, Mitchell and Keynes.

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF ATOMIC POWER. By Sam H. Schurr and Jacob Marschak. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950, 289 p. $6.00.

A scholarly and businesslike effort to examine the peaceful economic uses of the nuclear process, particularly in respect to industrial applications that seem most feasible for the near future.

ATOMIC ENERGY AND THE HYDROGEN BOMB. By Gerald Wendt. New York: McBride, 1950, 192 p. $2.75.

A popular exposition.

The Second World War

FLIGHT IN THE WINTER. By Juergen Thorwald. New York: Pantheon Books, 1951, 318 p. $3.75.

ES BEGANN AN DER WEICHSEL. By Jürgen Thorwald. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Steingrüben, 1950, 351 p. (New York: International News Co., $2.75.)

DAS ENDE AN DER ELBE. By Jürgen Thorwald. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Steingrüben, 1950, 415 p. (New York: International News Co., $3.00.)

The fearful story of the conquest of Eastern Germany by the Red Army from January to May 1945. The author, who has made use of official documents, newspaper reports, memoirs, private letters and diaries, plus many personal interviews, has created an absorbing narrative on the large scale. The two-volume German edition, more than twice as long as the English abridgment, contains a bibliography of the sources used.

ARMS AND THE MEN. By Ian Hay. London: H.M.S.O., 1950, 330 p. 10/6.

The first of a British series of popular histories of the Second World War, to serve as a prologue to official histories now in preparation. This volume is largely concerned with the creation of a modern citizen army.

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THE COMBINED BOARDS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR. By S. McKee Rosen. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951, 288 p. $4.00.

A critical account of the development of the combined boards which had the tasks of mustering the economic strength of the United Nations during World War II.

ALEUTIANS, GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS: JUNE 1942–APRIL 1944. By Samuel Eliot Morison. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1951, 369 p. $6.00.

The seventh volume of Captain Morison's "History of United States Naval Operations in World War II."

BATTLE SUBMERGED. By Rear Admiral Harley Cope and Captain Walter Karig. New York: Norton, 1951, 244 p. $3.75.

An informal history based on the actions and achievements of individual United States submarines in World War II.

LONE AND LEVEL SANDS. By Cornelius Vanderbilt Whitney. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1951, 314 p. $4.00.

The story of an Air Force staff officer's wartime tour of duty in India, North Africa, the Pacific and the Pentagon. Interesting side lights on El Alamein and Iwo Jima.

CONVOIS VERS L'U.R.S.S. By Georges Blond. Paris: Fayard, 1950, 277 p. Fr. 275.

LE DÉBARQUEMENT: 6 JUIN 1944. By Georges Blond. Paris: Fayard, 1951, 377 p. Fr. 500.

Brief accounts of two phases of the war: the North Atlantic convoy to Russia and the Normandy landing.

GERMANY AND AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, 1939–1941. By H. L. Trefousse. New York: Bookman Associates, 1951, 247 p. $3.75.

A study of the development of Germany's policies toward the United States during the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war between the two countries.

DAS WAR DAS ENGLANDSPIEL. By Joseph Schreieder. Munich (U. S. Zone): Stutz, 1950, 414 p.

German and British espionage and counterespionage activities in the Netherlands.

LA DÉLÉGATION FRANÇAISE AUPRÈS DE LA COMMISSION ALLEMANDE D'ARMISTICE: VOLUME II: 30 SEPTEMBRE 1940–23 NOVEMBRE 1940. Paris: Costes, 1950, 616 p. Fr. 800.

The continuation of an important compilation of documents. Volume I was noted here in July 1949.

DIE GEHEIME FRONT. By Walter Hagen. Zurich: Europa, 1950, 514 p. Sw. Fr. 14.80.

A German intelligence officer's story of the foreign activities of the Nazi *Geheimdienst* before and during the war. Largely undocumented, clearly inaccurate on certain points, and having an obvious propagandist interest, it should be used with much caution.

SPIONAGE. By Wolfgang Loeff. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Riegler, 1950, 326 p.

A German counterespionage officer's activities during the Second World War.

REGIERUNG DÖNITZ. By Walter Lüdde-Neurath. Göttingen (British Zone): Musterschmidt, 1950, 168 p.

Admiral Dönitz's aide-de-camp reviews the final days of the war in Germany.

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MAIS LE TEMPLE EST BÂTI: 1944–45. By Rémy. Monte Carlo: Solar, 1950, 250 p. Fr. 450.

The concluding volume of the memoirs of a French secret agent; previous volumes were noted here in July 1946 and April 1950.

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN 1939–1945. By Rear Admiral Raymond de Belot (Ret.). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951, 287 p. $4.00.

A translation of the French edition mentioned here April 1951.

LA GUERRA SUI MARI NEL CONFLITTO MONDIALE, 1943–1945. By Romeo Bernotti. Leghorn: Società Editrice Tirrena, 1950, 635 p. L. 1800.

The third and concluding volume of an extensive naval history of the war. Volumes I and II were noted here in January and October 1949.

SOMMERGIBILI ITALIANI NELL' ATLANTICO. By Antonio de Giacomo. Rome: Edizioni l'Arnia, 1950, 184 p. L. 450.

A brief account of Italian wartime submarine activities in the Atlantic.

GESANDTER ZWISCHEN DIKTATUR UND DEMOKRATIE. By Wipert von Blücher. Wiesbaden (U. S. Zone): Limes, 1951, 414 p.

While the German Minister to Finland during the war presents no sensational disclosures, he has written a careful and informing record of his activities. Finnish edition noted here April 1951.

THE SECRET ARMY. By T. Bor-Komorowski. New York: Macmillan, 1951, 407 p. $4.00.

General "Bor," commander of the Polish underground forces during the German occupation, tells his story of the resistance and the tragic Warsaw rising.

WITH TITO THROUGH THE WAR. By Vladimir Dedijer. London: Alexander Hamilton, 1951, 403 p. 17/6.

An abridged English translation of the first two volumes of an important Partisan wartime diary. The third volume, in Serbo-Croat, was reviewed here October 1950.

SUNBEAMS LIKE SWORDS. By W. F. Jeffrey. London: Hodder, 1950, 175 p. 10/6.

A soldier's account of Wingate's second Chindit expedition in Burma.

The United States

THE FORRESTAL DIARIES. Edited by Walter Millis with the Collaboration of E. S. Duffield. New York: Viking, 1951, 581 p. $5.00.

Of the growing number of memoirs by our leading officials in the recent past, these pages from the diary of the late Secretary of Defense are at once the most revealing and the least satisfying: they produce a remarkable sense of the author's bluntness and of the immediacy of his concern with many vital issues, combined with some uncertainty as to whether they are a complete representation of the situation as it was or even the full and considered judgment of their author. The task of editing, exceptionally difficult in this case, has been handled excellently by Mr. Millis.

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1900–1950. By George F. Kennan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, 146 p. $2.75.

In a series of much-discussed lectures the former Counselor of the State Department appraises the principles and application of United States foreign policy in the last half-century. With them he reprints two articles originally contributed to

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Foreign Affairs. The burden of his message, expressed in an undogmatic manner, is a critique of our "legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems."

THE GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT. By Richard H. Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1951, 336 p. $3.75.

The two authors, a historian and a *New Yorker* staff writer, have combined their talents to create an exceedingly readable and, so far as the subject permits, lucid account of the MacArthur controversy. While critical of the General's rôle, they are primarily concerned with trying to seek out the reasons why the Far Eastern issue has been such a tempestuous and explosive one in American public life.

WHITE COLLAR. By C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press, 1951, 378 p. $5.00.

A serious effort to anatomize the new middle classes of twentieth century America. Professor Mills' grimly impressive if perhaps overdrawn delineation reveals how hopelessly anachronistic are many of our popular myths. The white-collar man is seen as having little independence, no chance to express any "pioneer spirit"—"the hero as victim, the small creature who is acted upon but does not act."

U.S.A.: THE PERMANENT REVOLUTION. By the Editors of "Fortune" in Collaboration with Russell W. Davenport. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951, 267 p. $3.75.

A determinedly optimistic effort to break through the clichés regarding the character of the United States and indicate the movement, variety and open-endedness of our society. The material originally appeared in *Fortune* magazine.

THE BATTLE AGAINST DISLOYALTY. By Nathaniel Weyl. New York: Crowell, 1951, 378 p. $3.75.

As a sequel to his study of disloyalty in American history (reviewed here October 1950), Mr. Weyl now examines the history of American countermeasures against espionage and treason. A balanced and informative survey.

THE COMMUNIST TRAIL IN AMERICA. By Jacob Spolansky. New York: Macmillan, 1951, 227 p. $3.50.

Recollections of a former F.B.I. agent specializing in Communists.

UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION OF ITS INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. By Wallace Judson Parks. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1951, 315 p. $5.00.

The growing activity of the United States Government in international economic activities has produced considerable confusion about who does what in Washington. After analyzing a number of key problems, Mr. Parks makes specific suggestions for the handling of some issues and the re-allocation of a number of functions according to certain principles which he believes would make the government function more quickly and efficiently. He is well aware that the ramifications of most international economic problems are so great that a number of agencies will continue to be actively interested in each of them.

MILITARY MANAGEMENT FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. By John Robert Beishline. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950, 289 p. $5.00.

Colonel Beishline here investigates the possibilities of applying "scientific industrial management principles" to the problems of military management and organization.

INFLATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940–1948. By Lester V. Chandler. New York: Harper, 1951, 402 p. $6.00.

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A comprehensive factual review of inflation during and after World War II and an analysis of the public and private policies responsible for it.

HAWAII'S WAR YEARS, 1941–1945. By Gwenfread Allen. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1950, 418 p. $5.00.

An officially sponsored and comprehensive history of Hawaii's part in the Second World War.

PACIFIC OUTPOST: AMERICAN STRATEGY IN GUAM AND MICRONESIA. By Earl S. Pomeroy. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951, 198 p. $5.00.

American naval and foreign policy of the last half century as regards Guam and the islands of Micronesia.

HERBERT HOOVER'S LATIN-AMERICAN POLICY. By Alexander DeConde. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951, 154 p. $3.00.

A scholar's analysis, showing that the policy of good neighborliness has not been a Democratic monopoly.

CAREER AMBASSADOR. By Willard L. Beaulac. New York: Macmillan, 1951, 262 p. $3.50.

Informative and instructive memoirs of an American diplomat, most of whose career has been spent in Latin America and Spain.

LES AMÉRICAINS ET NOUS. By Léon Wanson. Paris: Julliard, 1950, 242 p. Fr. 390.

A Belgian industrialist's friendly report of a visit here.

Western Europe

GERMAN-SOVIET RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS, 1919–1939. By Edward Hallett Carr. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1951, 146 p. $3.00.

Six lectures on the fluctuating relations between the two losers of the First World War.

EUROPE BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND ANARCHY. By Ferdinand A. Hermens. Notre Dame (Ind.): University of Notre Dame Press, 1951, 291 p. $4.00.

A discussion of the political difficulties of Europe, with considerable concentration upon systems of voting as the key to necessary reforms.

THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE. By Donald C. McKay. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951, 334 p. $4.00.

The associate editor of the valuable American Foreign Policy Library series here presents his own contribution: a succinct, perceptive and well-composed summary of Franco-American relations and of the chief problems confronting the Fourth Republic.

TWO FRENCHMEN. By David Thomson. London: Cresset, 1951, 255 p. 12/6.

Interpretive biographies of Pierre Laval and Charles de Gaulle as a means of approach to an understanding of French politics.

LE FRANC, 1938–1950. By Jean-Guy Mérigot and Paul Coulbois. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1950, 426 p. Fr. 950.

From 1938 through 1949 the franc lost 95 percent of its purchasing power. The authors, who teach at Bordeaux and Paris, describe this process succinctly, digesting

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a great mass of material and commenting on it very intelligently. Half the book traces the franc's fall in terms of gold, foreign currencies and purchasing power; the rest describes the changes that accompanied this process in French central and commercial banking, exchange control, the monetary affairs of the French Union, and France's relation to the International Monetary Fund and the European Recovery Program.

LE PIÈGE OÙ NOUS A PRIS L'HISTOIRE. By Robert Aron. Paris: Michel, 1950, 311 p. Fr. 360.

Personal but primarily political recollections of the period 1940–1944, and of the author's escape from France to Algeria.

GRANDEURS ET SERVITUDES DES CHANTIERS DE JEUNESSE. By Jean Delage. Paris: Bonne, 1950, 314 p. Fr. 420.

An overly enthusiastic account of the youth groups originally formed by the Vichy régime in 1940.

DU SERVICE PUBLIC À LA PRISON COMMUNE. By Marcel Peyrouton. Paris: Plon, 1950, 313 p. Fr. 390.

Informative recollections of a French civil servant, for a time Minister of the Interior at Vichy, later arrested as a collaborator and eventually exonerated in 1948.

BREST AU COMBAT: 1939–1944. By Albert Vulliez. Paris: Ozanne, 1950, 236 p. Fr. 640.

The story of the French harbor and city during the war years.

À GAUCHE DE LA BARRICADE. By André Delmas. Paris: Éditions de l'Hexagone, 1950, 222 p. Fr. 240.

Recollections of a militant syndicalist and pacifist—a former secretary general of the *Syndicat National des Instituteurs*—concerning the struggles within French labor between 1934 and 1939.

FRANCE D'OUTRE-MER. By Henri Blet. Grenoble: Arthaud, 1950, 328 p. Fr. 650.

This third and last volume of a survey of French colonization covers the period since 1870. Largely devoted to military and diplomatic events.

LA BELGIQUE D'ALBERT Ier ET DE LÉOPOLD III, 1918–1948. By Frédéric Barbey. Paris: Perrin, 1950, 279 p. Fr. 375.

The greater and better part of this book by a Swiss diplomat concerns the period of his stay in Belgium from 1918 to 1937. The treatment of the following decade is less satisfactory.

STAATSSEKRETÄR UNTER EBERT—HINDENBURG—HITLER. By Otto Meissner. Hamburg (British Zone): Hoffmann, 1950, 643 p.

The recollections of the chief of the presidential secretariat who managed to hold his post through all the vicissitudes of the Weimar Republic and Third Reich. Apart from demonstrating a devotion to office that would do credit to the Vicar of Bray, the book contributes little new information and few insights.

HITLER'S INTERPRETER. By Paul Schmidt. New York: Macmillan, 1951, 286 p. $4.00.

An abridged English translation of the German edition, mentioned here October 1950.

DAS KRUPP-URTEIL UND DAS PROBLEM DER "PLÜNDERUNG." By Hermann M. Maschke. Göttingen (British Zone): Musterschmidt, 1951, 141 p.

A legal analysis and criticism of the Krupp trial.

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DAS GERICHT VERTAGT SICH. By Carl Haensel. Hamburg (British Zone): Claassen, 1950, 346 p.

The diary of a German counsel for the defense at the Nuremberg trials.

GESPRÄCHE MIT HERMANN GÖRING. By Werner Bross. Flensburg (British Zone): Wolff, 1950, 315 p.

Stenographic notes of conversations with Goering during the Nuremberg trial, by an assistant to the defense counsel.

GESPRÄCHE MIT HALDER. By Peter Bor. Wiesbaden (U. S. Zone): Limes, 1950, 267 p.

General Halder discusses wars, the history of the general staff, and other related matters with two young compatriots.

DIE ERZBISCHOFSCHRIFT: ANTWORT EINES DEUTSCHEN. By Hans Grimm. Göttingen (British Zone): Plesse, 1950, 232 p.

A defense of recent German history in the form of a response to a message to the Germans in 1945 by the Archbishop of Canterbury. Calculated to warm German rather than British hearts.

GERMANY: WHAT NOW? By Basil Davidson. London: Muller, 1950, 268 p. 12/6.

A quite unbalanced survey of postwar Germany. While constantly harping on the Anglo-Americans' "breach" with the Potsdam Agreement and their fear of "social change," the author overlooks or plays down the disruptive and ultimately menacing Soviet and Communist policies in Germany.

GERMANY AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE. Edited by Hans J. Morgenthau. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, 179 p. $3.50.

A series of lectures given in 1950 at the University of Chicago by a number of specialists in German affairs.

JUGEND UNTERM SCHICKSAL. Edited by Kurt Hass. Hamburg (British Zone): Wegner, 1950, 244 p.

An interesting cross section of the outlook and state of mind of German youth in the first years after the war, based on an extensive sampling of the accounts of their lives they are obliged to prepare in advance of matriculation examinations.

DE WONDE VAN EUROPA. By Reginald E. Colby. Amsterdam: Holdert, 1950, 307 p.

A British major's description of life in Berlin from 1945 to 1948, with some useful comments on the comparative policies and practices of the occupying powers.

THE EASTERN ZONE AND SOVIET POLICY IN GERMANY, 1945–50. By J. P. Nettl. New York: Oxford University Press, 1951, 324 p. $5.50.

The best study yet to appear on this important subject. As the author says, "the development of the Soviet zone of Germany is a partial cross section of two of our most vital problems at the moment, the Russian-Communist problem and the German problem."

OSTDEUTSCHLAND. Kitzingen/Main (U. S. Zone): Holzner, 1950, 168 p.

A statistical and historical handbook about the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line. Little current information except the changes in place names.

HEIMAT IM HERZEN: WIR OSTPREUSSEN. Edited by Gunther Ipsen. Salzburg: Akademischer Gemeinschaftsverlag, 1950, 405 p.

An anthology of writings about East Prussia, collected primarily to keep the memory green, but containing a few items of contemporary interest.

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HOSTAGES OF CIVILISATION. By Eva G. Reichmann. Boston: Beacon Press, 1951, 281 p. $3.00.

A serious inquiry into the historical, social and geographical sources of anti-Semitism in Germany.

L'ALLEMAGNE JUGÉE PAR UN ALLEMAND. By Alexander Abusch. Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1950, 324 p. Fr. 400.

A German Communist reviews Germany's history in search of an explanation for its disastrous career. Originally written in Mexico in 1944–45 and published in Germany in 1946, the French translation contains a postscript covering the years 1945–1949.

EUGENIO PACELLI: POPE OF PEACE. By Oscar Halecki. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1951, 355 p. $3.50.

A discussion, by a well-known Catholic historian, of the rôle of Pope Pius XII in world affairs.

MALE DI FRONTIERA. By Leopoldo Sofisti. Bolzano: Cappelli, 1950, 370 p. L. 700.

On Austrian and Italian claims and rivalry in the Alto Adige.

THE VILLA DIANA. By Alan Moorehead. New York: Scribner, 1951, 149 p. $2.50.

Articles (most of which have appeared in *The New Yorker*) on such facets of Italy today as life in Tuscany, postwar boom in Rome, Siena's particular brand of horse racing, Communism—all against a background of the past.

IL DRAMMA DEI SICILIANI. By Pino Modica. Palermo: Edizioni di Bella-Gorgone, 1950, 142 p. L. 500.

An impassioned essay on the torments and virtues of this long-suffering island.

Eastern Europe

MUST NIGHT FALL? By Major Tufton Beamish. London: Hollis, 1950, 292 p. 12/6.

A British Conservative M.P. reviews postwar developments in Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, discusses the perversion of justice, education and religion in these countries, and concludes with a sharp criticism of Socialism as the anteroom to Communism.

DIPLOMATICHESKII SLOVAR'. Edited by A. Ya. Vyshinskii. Moscow: OGIZ, 1948, 1950, 2 v.

A currently authoritative presentation of the Soviet view of diplomacy and international affairs. Written for specialists and avoiding much of the conventional vitriol of Communist journalism, it is valuable in showing how the Soviet diplomat should interpret the contemporary world.

THE SOVIET LINGUISTIC CONTROVERSY. Translated by John V. Murra and Others. New York: King's Crown Press (Columbia University), 1951, 98 p. $2.00.

A translation of the principal articles and statements concerning the proper Marxist view of linguistics. The implications of Stalin's verdict—"a Marxist cannot regard language as a superstructure over a base"—extend much beyond the field of language study.

THE JEWS IN THE SOVIET UNION. By Solomon M. Schwarz. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1951, 380 p. $5.00.

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A careful study of the position and treatment of the Jewish population in the U.S.S.R. The author distinguishes between popular anti-Semitism and the government's attack on Jewish nationalism, the latter having a quite distinct motivation. Nevertheless he finds definite traces since the war of the régime's making use of or fostering anti-Semitic sentiments.

SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD AUTHORITY. By Margaret Mead. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951, 148 p. $4.00.

An attempt, via the techniques of anthropology, to reveal "the patterns of behavior between those in authority and those over whom they have authority" in the U.S.S.R. Some of the conclusions are suggestive but the general picture seems familiar.

RUSSIAN PURGE AND THE EXTRACTION OF CONFESSION. By F. Beck and W. Godin. New York: Viking, 1951, 277 p. $3.50.

Writing under pseudonyms, a Soviet historian and a German scientist undertake an analysis of the great purges of 1936–1939 in which they were both involved.

LE VRAI STALINE. By Yves Delbars. Paris: Éditions "Je Sers," 1950, 439 p. Fr. 500.

A critical biography of the Soviet leader to 1939, by a competent French journalist. While the author attempts to get behind the official and unofficial legends surrounding Stalin's life, he frequently becomes involved in anecdotes of doubtful value.

ALL QUIET IN THE KREMLIN. By George Marion. New York: Fairplay Publishers, 1951, 183 p. $3.00.

He spoke with Vyshinsky; his visa application was approved; he visited the U.S.S.R. and found it peace-loving and industrious. It was that simple.

LA VIE ET LA MORT EN U.R.S.S. (1939–1949). By General "El Campesino." Paris: Plon, 1950, 220 p. Fr. 300.

The Spanish Communist general, Valentin Gonzalez, who sought refuge in the U.S.S.R. after the Civil War, only to be interned, adds his extensive evidence to the grim picture of the world of the Soviet prisons and labor camps.

MÉMOIRES D'UN RÉVOLUTIONNAIRE, 1901–1941. By Victor Serge. Paris: Seuil, 1951, 416 p. Fr. 600.

Autobiography on the run, by the author of "The Case of Comrade Tulayev." Many insights into the world of the twentieth century revolutionary.

THE SOVIET UNION: BACKGROUND, IDEOLOGY, REALITY. Edited by Waldemar Gurian. Notre Dame (Ind.): University of Notre Dame Press, 1951, 216 p. $3.50.

A symposium of papers, largely devoted to the more recent developments in the U.S.S.R.

THE SOVIET UNION. By Georges Jorré. New York: Longmans, 1950, 353 p. $4.25.

A translation of the French edition, reviewed here July 1947.

TWENTIETH-CENTURY UKRAINE. By Clarence A. Manning. New York: Bookman Associates, 1951, 243 p. $3.50.

A specialist reviews the troubled history of the Ukraine since the First World War, and favors its separation from Russia.

UKRAINIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN MODERN TIMES. By Oleh Martovych. Edinburgh: Scottish League for European Freedom, 1951, 176 p.

The author, a Ukrainian journalist writing under a pen name, presents the

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historical case for Ukrainian independence. The last chapter is devoted to events since 1944.

SUOMI–FINNLAND. By W. Evers. Stuttgart (U.S. Zone): Franckh, 1950, 167 p.
A compact survey of Finland's physical and economic geography.

TOTAL TERROR. By Albert Kalme. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951, 310 p. $3.50.
A member of the Latvian resistance movement gives a lurid account of the fate of the Baltic states under the Germans and the Soviets. Some of his data must be taken with reserve.

INVITATION TO MOSCOW. By Z. Stypulkowski. New York: Thames, 1951, 359 p. $3.50.
The author was one of the 16 Poles arrested by the Russians after an invitation to a parley. The first half of the book deals with the Polish underground; the second and more interesting half, with Soviet interrogation and trial techniques.

JAN MASARYK. By R. H. Bruce Lockhart. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951, 80 p. $5.75.
An admirable personal memoir by an old friend and diplomatic associate.

TCHÉCOSLOVAQUIE, CARREFOUR DE L'EUROPE. By Madeleine Braun and Robert Chambeiron. Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1950, 206 p. Fr. 220.
Two French deputies praise the Communist régime in Czechoslovakia.

ROUMANIE. By Joseph Ducroux. Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1951, 157 p. Fr. 180.
The Communist view of the Rumanian People's Republic.

DES GEÔLES D'ANNA PAUKER AUX PRISONS DE TITO. By Nicolas Baciu. Paris: Livre Contemporain, 1951, 298 p. Fr. 400.
A Bucharest lawyer's experiences in the Communist prisons and camps of Rumania and Jugoslavia.

TITO'S COMMUNISM. By Josef Korbel. Denver: University of Denver Press, 1951, 368 p. $4.00.
The Czech Ambassador to Belgrade, 1945–1948, gives a severely critical but dispassionate account of the Tito régime—largely before the break with the Cominform. It is of particular interest in depicting the Communist mistrust and dislike of the Czechoslovakia of Beneš and Masaryk.

LE SCHISME YOUGOSLAVE. By Claude Bourdet. Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1950, 124 p. Fr. 150.
A brief sketch of Jugoslavia after the break with Moscow.

LE PROCÈS TITO-MIHAILOVITCH. By Evgueniyé Yourichitch. Paris: Société d'Éditions Françaises et Internationales, 1950, 188 p. Fr. 330.
A former member of General Mihailovitch's forces discusses the latter's trial as a case study of Communist justice.

EIN VOLK—AUSGELÖSCHT. By Leopold Rohrbacher. Salzburg: The Author, 1950, 208 p.
On the expulsion of the German population from Jugoslavia, 1944–1948.

LE PROCÈS DES ESPIONS PARACHUTÉS EN ALBANIE. Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1950, 201 p. Fr. 200.
Translation of the stenographic report of the trial in Tirana, 1950, of three Albanians charged with espionage for the United States.

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The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION OF 1950. By H. G. Nicholas. New York: Macmillan, 1951, 353 p. $4.50.

A study of the campaign, press attitude, forecasts and results. A sequel to the McCallum-Readman study of the 1945 election.

OVERSEA SETTLEMENT. By G. F. Plant. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1951, 186 p. $3.00.

A history of migration from the United Kingdom to the Dominions, with particular emphasis on the organizing and financing of migration between 1919 and 1939.

CANADA. Edited by George W. Brown. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950, 621 p. $6.50.

A new volume in the useful "United Nations Series." A number of specialists have contributed chapters on Canada's geographical setting, historical background, politics, economy and cultural institutions.

ALLEGIANCE. By Robert Brennan. Dublin: Browne, 1950, 371 p. 15/.

The former Irish Minister to the United States reminisces about Sinn Fein, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, British jails and allied subjects. Though the history books will not have to be rewritten in the light of these memoirs, Brennan clarifies several episodes and has some interesting reports on De Valera, Griffith, Collins and Childers.

The Middle East

WELLS OF POWER. By Olaf Caroe. New York: Macmillan, 1951, 240 p. $3.00. (London: Hyperion, 15/.)

A well-informed, intelligent and sensitive study of the oil-rich lands on the Persian Gulf. The author was for many years an official in the Indian Civil Service.

BRITAIN AND THE MIDDLE EAST. By Sir Reader Bullard. New York: Longmans, 1951, 195 p. $2.00. (London: Hutchinson, 7/6.)

A competent and useful survey by the former British Ambassador to Iran.

THE NEAR EAST AND THE GREAT POWERS. Edited by Richard N. Frye. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951, 214 p. $3.50.

Essays by a number of competent specialists on current economic, political and cultural problems in the Near East.

SEVEN FALLEN PILLARS. By Jon Kimche. London: Secker and Warburg, 1950, 326 p. 15/. (New York: British Book Centre, $3.50.)

An English journalist with a number of years' experience in the Near and Middle East, sharply criticizes British policy in the area. Good reporting; at times intemperate judgments.

HISTORY OF SYRIA. By Philip K. Hitti. New York: Macmillan, 1951, 749 p. $10.00.

A good general history. Only the last chapter deals with the twentieth century.

THE NEW TURKS. By Eleanor Bisbee. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951, 298 p. $5.00.

A friendly, informative and optimistic picture of the new, or post-Kemalist, Turks by a former professor of philosophy at Robert College. The author's desire to obliterate traditional Western anti-Turk prejudices, many of which were quite unfair, may lead her to draw too sharp a line between the new and the old Turkey.

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PORTRAIT OF A TURKISH FAMILY. By Irfan Orga. New York: Macmillan, 1950, 306 p. $4.00.
The story of a well-to-do family in Istanbul from the last days of the Empire to 1941.

LET MY RIGHT HAND WITHER. By Daniel Spicehandler. New York: Beechhurst Press, 1950, 261 p. $3.50.
The battle report of a volunteer in the Israel army.

ISRAEL WITHOUT TEARS. By Ruth Gruber. New York: Wyn, 1950, 240 p. $3.00.
The lighter side of life in the new state.

South and Southeast Asia

ASIEN: HOFFNUNG EINER NEUEN WELT. By Anton Zischka. Oldenburg (British Zone): Oldenburger Verlagshaus, 1950, 391 p.
A substantial review of the problem and prospects of the Asiatic, or "neutral half of mankind."

LÄNDER DER ZUKUNFT. By Anton Zischka. Graz (Austria): Stocker, 1950, 475 p. Schillings 56.
An extensive description of the undeveloped areas of the world which hold promise as places of settlement or sources of raw materials.

FOR FEAR OF WEEPING. By Patrick O'Donovan. London: MacGibbon, 1950, 232 p. 12/6.
A British correspondent records his impressions of a tour of Burma, Malaya, Siam, China and Indonesia in 1948–1949.

VINGT-CINQ ANS D'INDOCHINE ET DE YUNNAN: SOUVENIRS (1919–1943). By Maurice Lécorché. Toulouse: Privat, 1950, 286 p. Fr. 550.
Recollections of the former inspector general of the French Railway Company in Indo-China and Yunnan.

SURSAUTS DE L'ASIE: REMOUS DU MÉKONG. By Pierre Gentil. Paris: Lavauzelle, 1950, 368 p. Fr. 800.
A French colonial administrator reviews the situation in Laos from 1946 to 1949.

HISTOIRE DE L'INDOCHINE. By André Masson. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1950, 128 p. Fr. 100.
A compact survey, in the "Que sais-je?" series.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

DE CHIANG KAI SHEK À MAO TSE TUNG (CHINE 1927–1950). By General Henry Casseville. Paris: Lavauzelle, 1950, 191 p. Fr. 420.
A former French military attaché in China follows the civil war from 1927 to 1950. Regarding the future, he favors the resumption of normal relations with China as the best means of combatting Soviet influence.

YANGTSE INCIDENT. By Lawrence Earl. New York: Knopf, 1951, 240 p. $3.00.
The story of H.M.S. *Amethyst*, which was caught in the Yangtse between Communists and Nationalists in 1949.

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THE LAND OF THE CAMEL: TENTS AND TEMPLES OF INNER MONGOLIA. By Schuyler Cammann. New York: Ronald, 1951, 200 p. $5.00.
The report on a journey to western Inner Mongolia in 1945.

TIME OF FALLEN BLOSSOMS. By Allan S. Clifton. New York: Knopf, 1951, 239 p. $3.00.
A Japanese-speaking member of the Australian forces gives a discerning picture of Japan under the occupation in 1946.

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE. By David H. James. New York: Macmillan, 1951, 409 p. $5.00.
An interesting account of the war against Japan as seen by a British combat intelligence officer, unfortunately weighed down by an attempt to convert it into a history book.

FIRST MALAYAN REPUBLIC: THE STORY OF THE PHILIPPINES. By George A. Malcolm. Boston: Christopher, 1951, 460 p. $5.00.
An American jurist with many years' experience in the Philippines has collected, in a rather unwieldy omnium-gatherum, a great deal of information about the islands and their history.

Africa

WHITE MAN BOSS. By Adamastor. Boston: Beacon Press, 1951, 240 p. $3.00.
A vigorous indictment of racial nationalism in South Africa.

THE TROPICS: WORLD OF TOMORROW. By Charles Morrow Wilson. New York: Harper, 1951, 275 p. $3.50.
An enthusiastic survey of the world's tropics and their promise for economic development and advance.

Latin America and the West Indies

MURDER IN MEXICO. By General Leandro A. Sanchez Salazar and Julian Gorkin. London: Secker and Warburg, 1950, 235 p. 9/6. (New York: British Book Centre, $2.25.)
A former chief of the Mexican secret service gives his version of the Trotsky assassination.

ECUADOR: DRAMA Y PARADOJA. By Leopoldo Benites Vinueza. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1950, 282 p. Pesos 11.
An Ecuadorian poet-scholar writes a lucid and balanced history of his country to the present.

PARAGUAYAN INTERLUDE. By Willard H. and Verna Graber Smith. Scottdale (Pa.): Herald Press, 1950, 184 p. $2.25.
Observations and impressions based on two years' residence in Paraguay.

CARACTERISTICAS FUNDAMENTALES DE LA ECONOMIA CUBANA. By Julian Alienes y Urosa. Havana: Banco Nacional de Cuba, 1950, 405 p.
An extensive description and analysis of the Cuban economy together with a discussion of theories of international trade.

THE BRITISH WEST INDIES. By W. L. Burn. New York: Longmans, 1951, 196 p. $2.00. (London: Hutchinson, 7/6.)
A study of the West Indies and the manner in which they were affected by the changing colonial policy and social concepts of Britain.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D. C. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. *United Nations, International Court of Justice, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2966 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 1825 Jefferson Place, Washington 6, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

Africa

Review of economic conditions in Africa. Supplement to World Economic Report, 1949–50. New York, 1951. 119 p. (1951. II. C. 2.) $1.25.

China

A Synoptic report on the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China; its history, organization, functions, powers, meetings and accomplishments, January 1948–June 1951. Taipeh, Legislative Yuan, 1951. 30 p.

Commercial Policy and Trade

Yearbook of international trade statistics 1950. New York, 1951. 174 p. (1951. XVII. 2.) $1.75.

Providing for the control by the United States and cooperating foreign nations of exports to any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the United States including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its domination. Report from Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., to accompany H. R. 4550, Jl. 16, 1951. Washington, 1951. 17 p. (H. Rept. 703.)

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INDONESIA

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CHINESE schools and the education of Chinese Malayans; the report of a Mission invited by the Federation Government to study the problem. Kuala Lumpur, Government Printer, 1951. 42 p.

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NON-FERROUS metals year book of associations and technical publications of O.E.E.C. countries, Canada, and the United States. Paris, O.E.E.C., 1951. 92 p.

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LASTING peace the I.L.O. way; the story of the International Labour Organization. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1951. 124 p. 25¢.
ORGANIZATION of the Secretariat. New York, 1951, 69 p. (1951. X. 2.) 70¢.
How to find out about the United Nations. New York, 1951. 51 p. (1951. I. 7.) 15¢.

UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT of Defense appropriations for 1952. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., May 29–Aug. 10, 1951. Washington, 1951. 3 pts.
THE SUPPLEMENTAL Appropriation Bill for 1952. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., May 29–Aug. 10, 1951. Washington, 1951. 3 pts.
MILITARY situation in the Far East. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. 5 and Index, Aug. 17, 1951. Washington, 1951. p. 3135–3691.
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